GENEVA 2013:WHEN NATIONAL INTEREST MUST SUPERSEDE IDEOLOGY
It is that time of the year. As the heat builds up in an otherwise wintry Geneva, capital cities of the world are abuzz with preparations for the forthcoming UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) sessions to be held in February-March 2013. While UNHRC sessions in general are important for Sri Lanka, the upcoming sessions in February-March 2013 are uniquely important for Sri Lanka for four reasons: first, it is the first time that Sri Lanka will come before the UNHRC after the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) review meeting; second, it is the first time that Sri Lanka sits at the UNHRC after the first ever UN Resolution has been adopted and passed on Sri Lanka; third, there continues to be intense international scrutiny and mounting national criticism on a variety of post-war issues; and fourth, diplomatically speaking, Sri Lanka will have to confront for the first time an unusual combination of forces that have lobbied against it.
A PRE - EMPTIVE STRATEGY
According to experts in Sri Lankan foreign affairs the most effective pre-emptive strategy to avert an adverse outcome would be to implement the recommendations of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) report. Implementing at least a significant portion of the most critical recommendations would then provide the Government of Sri Lanka a platform to argue that serious attempts have been made at addressing issues of accountability, socio-economic development and reconciliation through credible domestic mechanisms.
A BILATERAL STRATEGY
Senior experts on Sri Lanka’s external relations have also pointed out that we must not wait until the sessions begin in Geneva to consolidate our position but rather put in place immediately a bilateral strategy with all countries who are members of the UNHRC to provide an update on progress. Such a bilateral strategy, it is pointed out, must be continuous and ongoing and be activated periodically even after the UNHRC sessions in FebruaryMarch 2013.
The raison d’etre for the foregoing strategy rests on the fact that decision-making processes take shape in the capital cities in advance of the actual sessions being held; hence attempts at advocacy on the side-lines of the sessions can be of limited consequence. Those familiar with UNHRC diplomacy believe that such bilateral strategies effectively complement what can be achieved at international forums such as the UNHRC. The caveat however is equally clear: the defence must first be strategized internally and should reflect a uniform position that is then projected to the international community. A single interlocutor must be maintained though it could take varying forms depending on the demands of varying contexts.
CONTINUED AND CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT
Continued engagement which is both structured and constructive is the order. Senior diplomats argue that responding with hostility will not take us very far. Furthermore, it is necessary to study and address underlying causes and changes of position that led to previously supportive countries voting in favour of the UN resolution in Geneva in 2012.
Moreover, Sri Lanka must seek to regain its reputation as consensus-builder by allaying concerns of countries that have expressed concern. This in turn will be in our best interests as is the need to maintain good relations with key players in the
international community.
DE-EXTERNALIZING POST-WAR SRI LANKA
Given that the conflict in Sri Lanka has largely been ‘externalized’ due to a combination of events, interventions and circumstances over the years; it is becoming increasingly apparent that Sri Lanka’s post-war era is no different. This observation propelled an enquiry with senior diplomats and foreign policy experts on the best possible way of ‘de-externalizing’ current post-war efforts in Sri Lanka.
The recommendation is to put in place a domestic process of dialogue to neutralize two key drivers of externalization, namely the section of the hostile diaspora community and the combination of forces that worked actively towards the UN resolution in Geneva in 2012. The domestic process of dialogue must be with the minority communities to address the root causes of the conflict. Addressing concerns domestically in a credible manner is the surest way to foster internal stability and ‘de-externalization’ of Sri Lanka’s post-war era. The importance of achieving genuine and sustainable reconciliation in this regard cannot be overstated.
SRI LANKA IN THE WORLD
Turning to Sri Lanka’s role in a new and emerging world order of the much touted Asian Century, it must be stressed that an Asian Century is still in its earliest stages of establishment and can only proceed to materialize if growth within the region is manageable and development is sustainable. Asian diversity must be harnessed as an opportunity and strength but as long as the current challenges of disparities and divisiveness remain, Asian influence is unlikely to increase any further.
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS AND RIVALRIES
Worthy of note in such a context is the strategic interplay of forces that has come about as a result of such an emerging new world order – in this context, Sri Lanka too must be keenly aware and respond appropriately to the plethora of strategic partnerships and strategic rivalries that are fast developing within, across and beyond the Asian region.
It is safe then to conclude that we live in a period of transition and redefinition: the questions are many, the principal one being whether nuclear powers will fuel strategic rivalries amoung themselves or instead choose to maximize strategic partnerships through commercial cooperation.