WHAT DOES TRUMP AND PUTIN RELATIONSHIP MEAN FOR ASIA?
The United States (US) vote in favour of Presidentelect Donald Trump was a shock for Russian leaders, though a delightful one. According to public opinion surveys, Russia was the only country in the world that preferred Trump over Hillary Clinton. Post-election, the Kremlin argued that Trump and Putin’s views on major issues were very close and expressed cautious optimism that the Russia– US relations could improve. In turn, Trump has repeatedly said that he would like ‘to get along with Russia’.
Putin and Trump seem to have chemistry absent in the Russian leader’s relations with both current US President Barack Obama and with Hillary Clinton. Trump is a pragmatic deal-maker, not an ideologue. He is not going to call Russia out on democracy or human rights. If Clinton had won, confrontation with Russia would have continued and may have even escalated considering that Clinton’s foreign policy entourage included many figures with strong anti-russia and antiputin views. Trump does not have any preconceived notions about Russia. He is therefore more likely to succeed in making a fresh start with Moscow — or at least in avoiding dangerous clashes in places like Ukraine and Syria.
But most importantly, the Trump administration has a fairly good chance of getting along with Russia because of the presidentelect’s foreign policy philosophy. Trump is keen to scale back the US’ international commitments in order to concentrate resources on domestic priorities. Putting the US’ own house in order is much more important to him — and, it seems, to his supporters — than performing the role of global policeman.
Trump’s views appear to be close to offshore balancing, a concept promoted by American realist thinkers such as Christopher Layne and Steven Walt. The offshore balancing grand strategy calls for eschewing costly onshore commitments and getting other states to do more for their own security. Offshore balancing emphasises that the current US policy of maintaining global primacy is unsustainable because it can lead to imperial overstretch. Instead, it envisions a multipolar system in which the United States will still be the strongest player, although not a preponderant and overbearing one. Offshore balancing also stresses that the US’ comparative strategic advantages rest in naval and air power. This is very much in line with Trump’s stated desire to build up the US naval forces.
If Trump follows at least some precepts of offshore balancing, this will relieve much of the current tensions in Us–russia relations. After all, a multipolar world is exactly what Russia wants. Moscow may even agree to grant Washington the status of ‘first among equals’, provided Russia is given due respect as a great power. If Trump shifts military investments from the continental theatres of Europe and the Middle East toward the naval theatre of East Asia, this will only please Moscow. Historically, Russia has seen its main security concerns as lying to the west and south of its borders. The Asia Pacific is still of secondary importance.
If the Trump administration avoids lecturing Moscow on democracy (which is very likely) and strikes a grand bargain with the Kremlin on Ukraine and Syria (which is less likely but still possible) that would usher in a period of rapprochement in US– Russia relations.
But the most interesting question in all of this is: what impact will the Russian–us détente have on Russia’s ‘strategic partnership’ with China? Since 2012, ties between Moscow and Beijing have been expanding and deepening, especially in the political–military domain. Russo–chinese alignment has mostly been driven by shared opposition to the US, which they accuse of hegemonic pretensions and suspect of seeking to subvert their political regimes.
Moscow’s estrangement from the West in the wake of the Ukraine crisis has made it increasingly dependent on Beijing — and deferent to Chinese interests in East Asia. But if Moscow normalises relations with Washington, it will be less interested in pursuing a farreaching entente with China. This will remove the risk of the Asiapacific being divided into two camps: the Beijing–moscow axis versus Washington and its allies. The Sino–russian partnership will continue, but it will shed much of its current anti-us overtones, with the emphasis shifting to economics and trade. Moscow will feel less obligated to support China on contentious issues in East Asia, such as the South China Sea. Russia will also act as a more independent and proactive player on the Korean peninsula. It is an open secret that Moscow’s harsh protestations against the THAAD missile defence system in South Korea were caused not by immediate concerns about its impact on Russian security, but rather at the behest of Beijing. On the North Korea issue, Russia is interested in the resumption of the Six Party Talks, which may be possible if Trump decides to reopen a dialogue with Pyongyang. With relations between Beijing and Pyongyang marked by growing distrust, Russia is now the only neighbour with whom North Korea remains on more or less friendly terms, which could enable Moscow to play a mediating role.
The Trump victory will also affect Russia’s relations with Japan. The stark fact that US alliances can no longer be considered ‘ironclad’ has now been laid bare. Even though Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was the first foreign leader to be granted an audience with the president-elect, Japan is unlikely to regain full confidence in the alliance. This makes it imperative for Tokyo to look for more partners in order to hedge against a rising China. Russia is one obvious choice. After the Trump win, we may expect Prime Minister Abe to re-double his efforts to court Putin. (Courtesy East Asia Forum) (Artyom Lukin is Associate Professor at the School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivosto)
BUT THE MOST INTERESTING QUESTION IN ALL OF THIS IS: WHAT IMPACT WILL THE RUSSIAN–US DÉTENTE HAVE ON RUSSIA’S ‘STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP’ WITH CHINA?