Good, bad and complacency

Performance of nations should be viewed in relative terms, in comparison to the achievement of their peers. Sri Lanka is an underachiever. Now it risks the prospect of losing its hither- too held relative advantage in secondary education and health.

Sri Lankans may kowtow, various politicians, dead and living, as fathers of this nation. But in reality what Sri Lanka had at the helm of political power during the past seven decades were mere passengers, than any transformative leaders.

The venom of the other group of interlocutors is a product of two intertwined factors.

First, the Northern Tamils, the most articulate of minorities, were an exceedingly primordial lot, deeply ingrained in the Dravidian civilization which had metamorphosed into a unique sense of Tamil exceptionalism. Second, Tamils, perhaps only second to Burghers, were favoured by the colonial British and were disproportionately represented in the government service. That was in part, because they were hard working, had access to better education facilities thanks to American missionaries, but also, because they were willing to pay the second fiddle to the British, more enthusiastically than the Sinhalese.

However, the independence unleashed the political empowerment of the Sinhalese Buddhists, who at last wanted their due share in their country. Tamil elites did not want to share the spoil, nor did a certain sense of entitlement and superiority allow them to cooperate and cohabit. Tamil nationalist opposition emerged the very day the country gained independencemuch earlier than the much demeaned Sinhalese Only Act was passed in 1956.

Sri Lanka’s process of political empowerment and mobilization of its people was premature. It also overwhelmed its nascent political institutions and infused political elites with a populist idealism that blinded them from the realities of governance.

This enhanced scope of political activism was too much for a nascent nation-state to cope with. It weakened the central

In the end, in the absence of adequate state response, Tamil opposition metamorphosed into a nihilistic and self-destructive terrorist campaign which robbed this country two decades of its prosperity. It had its worst toll on the Tamils themselves

government and tied its hands.

Northern Tamils were better off in Ceylon in the 1950s than their compatriots in Malaysia, which still maintains a Bhumiputra system that favours the native Malays over the other races, or Singapore. Yet, why was it in Sri Lanka that the Tamil elites played the most destabilizing role and refused to take a role in the Central Government (even as of now) because the Sri Lankan state allowed space for dissent which neither Malaysia nor Singapore did. However, that unrestrained space of political activism effectively weakened the Central government, both to confront the excesses of dissent and accommodate the reasonable demands of protestors. Whereas if Sri Lanka had a rightwing autocrat who cracked the whip and herded everyone, to a unified policy, a good deal of Northern Tamil elites could well have vied for positions in his Cabinet. Singapore strikes a chord.

In the end, in the absence of adequate state response, Tamil opposition metamorphosed into a nihilistic and selfdestructive terrorist campaign which robbed this country two decades of its prosperity. It had its worst toll on the Tamils themselves.

At its seventh decade since the independence, Sri Lanka is still riven by the mismanagement of its history of independence. It is also blessed by certain, ( perhaps even populist measures) that built a largely functional welfare society. However, continued mismanagement of things would rob the last glimmer of hope.

Just like their predecessors over the seven decades, politicians at present remain to be mere passengers riding the gravy train down the precipice. Electoral populism has distorted the policy coherence. Opportunism has its toll on the economy. Fifty-odd days of the constitutional crisis triggered by the President saw an over 1 billion USD of FDI flight out of the country and downgrading of credit status by three credit rankers, making it further expensive to borrow.

Tamil politics though subdued by the military defeat of the armed struggle may revive in the opportune moment. Their perceived grievances are not addressed, and given the primordial factors of Tamil exceptionalism, there is no guarantee as to whether addressing those demands would satiate the nationalist quest or fuel further confrontation.

Countries learn from successful experiences of peer states and emulate them. Sri Lanka can learn from the experience of countries which were in similar economic standards decades ago and since then surpassed us in leaps and bounds.

The first lesson is that the government should regain a good deal of social and political autonomy to make policy changes in a disorganized polity like ours. That can be achieved through new laws and a bit of Gotabaya styled heavyhandedness. Policies should be pursued in a utilitarian, goal achieving manner, rather than them being excessively rulefollowing, which delay economic development in corrosive societies.

The Second should be to disentangle obsessive populism from economic policy. Third would be to build a cohesive structure vested with powers for policy and project implementation and monitoring.

The fourth ethnic question needs to be addressed since it remains a major distraction. Genuine grievances should be addressed through a constitutional amendment. However red lines should be drawn and enforced. The solution should entail a mixture of accommodation and threat or actual repression, where it is mandated, preemptively.

Ignoring these national priorities or mishandling them would result in other several decades of underachievement.