Reassess foreign and domestic policies
Thursday's vote at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva pitted Sri Lanka against the world's most formidable powerhouse, the United States. It stretched that super-power to the limit. The US sponsored resolution received the slimmest of majorities - just a solitary vote (24 out of 47), but it ended with Sri Lanka now in the dock of the world community. Could this have been averted?
It was the second attempt by the US, after the botched resolution soon after the defeat of the LTTE in 2009 to punish Sri Lanka. This time the US did not hide behind the Czech Republic as it had done last time; the US came forward itself, with all its muscle and just made it. One less vote and the US would have still had the resolution passed, but it would have been a pyrrhic victory. Even now, the final scorecard clearly indicated that the world community recognised a patent unfairness on the part of the US in singling out Sri Lanka. There were after all, eight abstentions while 15 voted against the anti-sri Lanka resolution.
That said, how did the Government of Sri Lanka react? From the beginning it was uncertain at best on what stand to take, eventually adopting strategies ranging from an incoherent foreign policy to a cacophony of voices playing to the local gallery and alas, a string of missed opportunities.
For some time, especially after the 2010 elections, there have been a series of foreign policy blunders. There was the case of Nepal and the Maldives denying statements by Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister that they had asked Sri Lanka for help in settling their internal problems. There was a major flaw in Sri Lanka's foreign policy towards the European Union. It saw the withdrawal of the GSP + duty free concessions for Sri Lankan exports to Europe. This was followed by the US adopting a similar stance. Then came this resolution; a move to internationalise the Sri Lankan issue and bring it into the league of Libya, Iraq, Iran, Syria and others.
That 'surgery' was inevitable to rid this country of the scourge of terrorism was a foregone conclusion. The West, for reasons best known to it, did not want the LTTE defeated. But it was. Unfortunately, the clinical surgery adopted to liquidate the LTTE militarily did not extend to the 'post-surgical' complications that arose in the diplomatic arena. Sri Lanka was at sixes and sevens on how to deal with this new phenomenon.
On page 18 this week, we have an article on Sri Lanka's first Prime Minister, D.S. Senanayake's foreign policy. In the immediate flush of Independence, without Defence Forces to call our own to safeguard our newly won sovereignty, he opted for a Defence Treaty with Britain believing as he did at the time, that it was in both countries' interests. The writer, who later became a President of Sri Lanka, says that the Treaty compromised Sri Lanka's neutrality.
Russia blocked Sri Lanka's entry into the UN partly due to this, but that allowed Sri Lanka to trade with China on whom there was an embargo. It showed that even the pro-british Prime Minister was pragmatic enough to do business with countries whose internal politics he did not favour, as long as it benefitted the Sri Lankan people.
The world has changed in the 60 years since his death. Today, the US is doing business with both Russia and China and the cold war is a thing of the past. Ironic as it is, the Communist Party of India backed the anti-sri Lanka resolution in Geneva and the CP leader in Sri Lanka who happened to be the acting Foreign Minister this week was unable to persuade his anti-imperialists comrades in India to oppose the US resolution.
During the week, an Indian television channel aired a programme on Sri Lanka. It showed how ill-informed Indian politicians were of events unfolding in this country. Sri Lanka's ineffective foreign policy must take some blame for this - for its inability to reach out and engage these influential quarters. It did not cultivate Indian political parties over the years. Knee-jerk reactions were the order of the day when the US resolution became a reality and delegations were sent to faraway Uruguay but not to Chennai or New Delhi.
Admittedly, the Geneva resolution was badly handled from the very beginning. US motives were misread. That it would want to avenge the 2009 UNHRC defeat was not flagged. When the UN Secretary General was arm-twisted by the US to armtwist Sri Lanka, the legitimacy of the report submitted to him was questioned and then, a delegation was secretively sent to argue the country's case before it, thereby legitimising it.
There were no back channel negotiations to ward off a resolution in Geneva. Instead, the President was misled to believe that US noises were mere 'pressure tactics'. No interlocutors were used to bring about a settlement. Instead, it was a case of putting up a brave front with chest-thumping rhetoric at home. Now, Sri Lanka has a UNHRC resolution, however watered down it may have eventually been, dangling over its head like the proverbial sword of Damocles.
The resolution calls upon the Government of Sri Lanka to implement the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) recommendations. As we have stated before, had the Government shown some interest and speed in implementing at least some of the Commission's recommendations on which there is common ground among political parties and the vast majority of the people, then the US resolution would have looked foolish. The cry for an international war crimes tribunal has almost been snuffed out in the process.
One would imagine that the US realised that such a tribunal did not have currency with the international community outside Europe. It was after all, the very US State Department that spearheaded this anti-sri Lanka campaign that once classified the LTTE as the 'most dangerous terrorist organisation' in the world.
One might venture to suggest that it was not the 'ground situation' in Sri Lanka that mattered so much as the 'ground situation' in the US, Europe and India in this case. The Sri Lankan External Affairs Minister made it a point to say after Thursday's vote that the UNHRC was no longer governed by the merits of a particular issue "but by strategic alliances and domestic political issues". While this is true to a large extent, Sri Lanka has failed to fulfil many of the commitments it has itself given before to the UNHRC - and to India. Often these commitments are made without much thought, or to get disentangled from knotty situations, and then they come to haunt the country thereafter. It is time the Government reflects and re-charters its foreign and domestic policy strategies and assesses where it went wrong on the road to Geneva.
"in consultation with, and with the concurrence of the Government of Sri Lanka." This meant that a clause which Sri Lankan officials feared was "intrusive" and "binding" was no longer in the resolution. Instead, the office of the UN Human Rights Council would now need to both consult and receive the government's approval before any action in Sri Lanka. In fact, a note on legal and procedural implications of the resolution, which the government circulated to UNHRC members said, "The effort to impose technical assistance and advice from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is contrary to the principle that these should be based on consent." The montage on this page gives the full text of the resolution. It also shows the additions by India marked in red. As revealed in these columns last week, India also pressed on the US to further "moderate" the text so it could make it acceptable to all UNHRC members and Sri Lanka. This was to achieve consensus instead of a vote. If that did not materialise, India which was set to vote against the resolution -as revealed exclusively last week- was forced to change its stance. A chain of events formed the cause for it. Later paragraphs reveal more on that.
The US resolution was co-sponsored by 40 countries, 13 of them members of the UNHRC. In terms of procedure, any member country of the UN could be a co-sponsor of resolutions. Those backing the US as co-sponsors were: Hungary, Romania, Netherlands, Australia, Monaco, Spain, Lithuania, Finland, Cyprus, Croatia, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Estonia, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Greece, Israel, Slovakia, Malta, Georgia, Switzerland, Somalia, Canada, Cameroon, Liechtenstein, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, France, Belgium, Portugal, Austria, Poland, UK, Germany, Italy, Iceland and New Zealand. Clearly, the US displayed its seriousness in pursuing its line and fanned out its State Department diplomats far and wide to rope in Sri Lanka through this resolution.
The official response of the government of Sri Lanka came from External Affairs Minister, G.L. Peiris. He noted in a statement issued in Geneva: "With 15 countries voting with Sri Lanka, the final result was that 23 countries, out of a total of 47 members of the Human Rights Council, did not support the Resolution, while 24 supported it. The margin was as narrow as this." It is
"The most distressing feature of this experience is the obvious reality that voting at the Human Rights Council is now determined not by the merits of a particular issue but by strategic alliances and domestic political issues in other countries which have nothing to do with the subject matter of a Resolution or the best interests of the country to which the Resolution relates. This is cynical negation of the purpose for which the Human Rights Council was established."
In Colombo, there was a much tougher response by the acting External Affairs Minister, D.E.W. Gunasekera. He told Parliament, "We will not under any circumstances allow others to impose on us their advice or solutions." There was an even more revealing remark over recommendations in the resolution that recommendations of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) be implemented. Gunasekera said, "Analysing the range of opinion expressed internationally on the LLRC report, it was evident that some consider that it has gone further than envisaged, as expected, others regret that it has not gone far enough." He added: "Pre-judging the efforts of a sovereign and independent Member State of the International Community by way of such action will, wittingly or unwittingly subscribe to the efforts and agenda of the terrorist rump to derail the delicate peace and reconciliation efforts in the country."
Peiris, the minister responsible for the conduct of Sri Lanka's foreign policy, is indeed cynical in his diagnosis which is negated by some hard realities. Some strategic partners of the United States in West Asia voted in favour of Sri Lanka. They were Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The only exception was Jordan, which abstained. Similarly, members of the pro-western ASEAN regional grouping - Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines - voted in favour of Sri Lanka. Only Malaysia abstained. So did, SAARC members Bangladesh and Maldives. (See box story on how UNHRC member countries voted)
Hence, how Peiris determined that "strategic alliances" were the guiding factor is a question of importance. If indeed that was a pattern, how did Sri Lanka win a UNHRC resolution in 2009? Here are two salient features from that resolution: "Welcomes the resolve of the Sri Lankan authorities to begin a broader dialogue with all parties in order to enhance the process of political settlement and to bring about lasting peace and development in Sri Lanka based on consensus among and respect for the rights of all the ethnic and religious groups inhabiting it, and invites all stakeholders concerned to actively participate in it;
"Urges the international community to cooperate with the Government of Sri Lanka in the reconstruction efforts, including by increasing the provision of financial assistance, including official development assistance, to help the country fight poverty and underdevelopment and to continue to ensure the promotion and protection of all human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights."
The passage of that resolution in Sri Lanka's favour in 2009 came after the country's delegation lobbied intensely with member countries. Helping in the task was India. On the other hand, if his remarks were a left handed compliment to India, the question still remains. If India voted against the resolution, does Peiris believe it would have been defeated? If Peiris' earlier argument is correct, he did not address the issue ahead of the voting on Thursday but concentrated on touring countries which, it is now clear, supported the resolution. The reasons he gives now could therefore be a fig leaf to cover the
If India voted against the resolution, does Peiris believe it would have been defeated? If Peiris' earlier argument is correct, he did not address the issue ahead of the voting on Thursday but concentrated on touring countries which, it is now clear, supported the resolution.
multitude of failures and debacles in the conduct of the country's foreign policy. But the slip is showing.
Barely hours after the Human Rights Council had adopted the resolution, the US government reactions came from the highest levels. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton declared in a statement that "The United States, together with the international community, sent a strong signal that Sri Lanka will only achieve lasting peace through real reconciliation and accountability, and the international community stands ready to help. The next steps are clear…." Ms Clinton urged the government "….to implement the constructive recommendations of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) and take the necessary measures to address accountability." Ms Clinton added she was looking forward to Peiris' forthcoming visit to Washington to discuss "future actions". Colombo and Washington are in consultation to decide on a date next month. If he does undertake the trip, that will no doubt be a sign that the government will address at least some or most of the recommendations of the LLRC. At a government sponsored ceremony at Bandaragama on Friday, President Mahinda Rajapaksa said that Sri Lanka would not tolerate any interference in its internal affairs by any other country.
There was also a response from the National Security Council at the White House. NSC spokesperson Tommy Vietor said on Thursday," The United States urges the Sri Lankan government to develop a comprehensive action plan for implementing steps on reconciliation and accountability, as called for in today's resolution, and to work with UN experts and its partners in the international community to take meaningful action to achieve these important goals, The United States Government," the statement added, "applauds today's passage of the UN Human Rights Council's resolution on "Promoting reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka." Canada, one of the co-sponsors of the resolution has sent in a team of three Canadian parliamentarians to evaluate the situation. Chris Alexander, a former diplomat and now a Conservative MP, Conservative MP Rick Dykstra and Conservative Senator Vern White, a former police officer, are to meet with government officials and non-governmental organisations, as well as community representatives. The trio will report back to Foreign Minister John Baird on the findings of their trip. They were in Jaffna yesterday meeting local officials as well as civil society leaders in the Tamil community. At Thursday's Human Rights Council sessions, US Ambassador Eileen Chamberlain Donahoe presented draft resolution L2. It was listed as Item 2 in the Agenda. She gave the reasons for doing so. Here is a brief account: "It is almost three years since the end of Sri Lanka's long and painful conflict. For the past three years, my government has worked bilaterally, and with like-minded countries, to engage officials at the highest levels of the Sri Lankan government on the steps that are necessary to build a peaceful future for the Sri Lankan people. For those three years Sri Lanka has had the time and space to develop its own roadmap for lasting national reconciliation and accountability. Most recently, we have encouraged Sri Lanka to address actions taken on both sides of the conflict through its domestic Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission Process. We looked forward to the Commission's report, and understood that Sri Lanka would develop its own
Contrary to claims and some media reports in Colombo, Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe, Special Envoy of the President on Human Rights issues, remained the leader of the Sri Lanka delegation in Geneva. Confirmation of this came when he delivered the country's response to the resolution before a vote was taken. External Affairs Minister G.L. Peiris was on a rear seat flanked by Minister Douglas Devananda and Minister Rishard Bahurdeen. His namesake former Attorney General Mohan Peiris however took a front row seat next to Minister Samarasinghe. Minister Peiris looked visibly nervous on a live webcast of the Council meeting on Thursday. Samarasinghe complained that Sri Lanka has been "selectively targeted by certain countries at the behest of some who, we believe, still bear resentment at the clear and decisive decision taken at the Special Session in 2009. Here are edited excerpts of what he said:
"….This attempt to undermine the Resolution of 2009 is unacceptable especially because of the continuing improvement in Sri Lanka during the intervening period. A resolution that dwells on the past will impose on this Council the character of an adjudicatory body, with no limitation as to its competence to reopen and revisit matters of the past, which could have consequences affecting many others.
"Those who live in glass houses are best advised to exercise caution before throwing stones. We are a nation proud of our history, heritage and values as much as any other nation state. We take our responsibilities as a member of the international community very seriously and needless to say, are more concerned about ensuring sustainable peace and reconciliation and further promoting the unity of our nation that is multi-cultural, multi-lingual, multi-religious and multi-ethnic in its composition.
"After 30 long years of instability and violence, we have achieved stability and peace. We need to be given time to further consolidate the clear progress that has been achieved in a short period of three years. It is against this backdrop that my country is compelled to face a misconceived, unwarranted
and ill-timed draft resolution, which embodies several harmful elements that clearly violate important principles that will have adverse ramifications, not only for my country, but many other countries. This is why we took a decision, on a matter of principle, that we will not accept such a Resolution, in an endeavour to also ensure that a bad precedent is not established by this Council.
"The way in which we will deal with this matter today will decide whether or not purely parochial, if not political, agendas far removed from the promotion and protection of human rights, will be permitted to prevail. When we look at this draft resolution, it is clear that the founding principles of the Human Rights Council which are anchored in universality, impartiality, cooperation, non-selectivity and objectivity, are being assailed. If we are true to our consciences, it is not difficult to concede that the situation in Sri Lanka does not warrant the attention and criticism in this Resolution.
"We are clearly justified in asserting that we require time to realize comprehensive reconciliation. This Resolution also runs counter to the principle of international law that domestic remedies must be exhausted and should be the first resort, prior to superimposing external mechanisms. In respect of Sri Lanka's situation, it is barely 3 months since the presentation of the domestic mechanism's report. Is it fair for this