Shed the gloom over Indo-us ties
Too many pundits in Delhi are writing premature obituaries for the Indo-US relationship.
Though the highs of the nuclear deal and the rhetorical extravagance of the Bush years may have subsided, the basic forward thrust of the relationship is not in dispute, and the positive momentum is strongly supported by the influential Indian-American community in the United States.
Of course, Americans should not expect as much from India as they would from a close ally like Israel, but they are no longer the recipients of non-aligned diatribes from India, and New Delhi has voted with the United States more often than had once seemed likely on key issues before the UN Security Council, notably backing a US resolution on Syria in early 2012 rather than joining Russia and China in their opposition.
Even when India and the US disagree, as they did on Libya and Iran, there is much more mutual understanding than before, and a respect for Indian ways of thinking on world issues that did not previously exist in Washington.
The two countries consult each other on a wide range of subjects and at a significantly high level, in ways that simply were inconceivable a couple of decades ago.
And when things go wrong for one country, the other one tends not to fish in troubled waters, as New Delhi's refusal to be drawn into the recent US-Pakistan tensions testifies. This is not to suggest that the relationship is perfect, or could not be improved.
Economic engagement in the era of globalisation has reinforced these bonds, as more and more categories of people in both societies interact with and learn from each other. The increasingly significant informal relationships between power brokers in the US and business leaders in India are another manifestation of this trend. Indian business leaders often attend the exclusive Bohemian Grove retreats, for instance, and the Aspen Institute has done an effective job of promoting strategic dialogue between the countries' elites.
And yet there remain some potential flies in the proverbial ointment. One is undoubtedly the notoriously short-term American attention span to foreign affairs issues that do not appear to impinge directly on the country's immediate security or welfare.
A more inwardly focused domestic orientation, a more benign relationship with China and a post-Afghanwithdrawal indifference to South Asia could all lead Americans to forget the enthusiasm for India of the Bush years.
India's own stubborn emphasis on its independence of thought and action, while respected in principle by Washington, can sometimes grate there: as became apparent on the issue of sanctioning Iran, Washington may not always understand or fully appreciate India's inability to agree with it, leading many to think of India as a false friend.
America's own gradual transformation from a globestraddling superpower to something less could have an impact on the relationship.
An America in decline, if that is indeed what transpires, will both have less interest in India and be of less use to it in the world as a partner in its own rise.