2013:First intel on Lankans fighting with the ISIS
It was in 2013 from Israeli intelligence that Sri Lanka’s Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) first learned that there were locals fighting with the Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria. It took the DMI by surprise, internal sources said. But they now set up dedicated teams to monitor communications.
ISIS publishes a magazine called Dabiq. In it was a photo of a man named Abu Shurayh As-Silani, which was the name given by the movement to a 37-year-old school principal from Galewela called Mohamed Muhsin Sharhaz Nilam. He had left for Mecca in mid-2013 and never returned.
It was found that Nilam’s elder brother went to Syria first. He followed with his wife, six children, wife’s parents and two of his wife’s brothers. Nilam’s brother’s daughter married a Sri Lankan origin Australian named Arush (phonetic spelling) and this man forged a connection with Abdul Latheef Mohamed Jameel, who also undertook a postgraduate degree at Melbourne’s Swinburne University before leaving the country in 2013.
Initially, there were 36 Sri Lankans from three families in Syria. This later went above 40. Nilam died in an air raid in 2015. Afterwards, Sri Lankan intelligence found an outpouring of support for ISIS among some Sri Lankan social media users. A key player was a man in Aluthgama named Adhil who was a computer wizard. Soft copies of ISIS propaganda was shared mainly on chatting platforms, particularly Telegram. They also created their own applications with secret enclosures within that space.
Adhil, like others in this movement, was young and well-educated. He adopted different personas on the internet. And this was how the grooming predominantly took place, intelligence sources said. They identified associates of the Sri Lankan ISIS supporters in Syria by monitoring who was in contact. It was a small group and not organised at the start. But they were well versed in the caliphate ideology. There were interactions, too, with an Imam at a mosque in Dehiwala but he later distanced himself from their beliefs.
They grouped themselves as one organization: the Jamathei Millathu Ibraheem (JMI), led by a man named Umair from Colombo 10. They thought themselves different from other Muslims but the group also had moderates who did not want to shed blood. Some JMI members wanted to migrate with their families to Syria. But Umair changed his mind after deciding to study Islam and understand the religion.
Two of the Easter Sunday bombers-the brothers, Mohamed Ibrahim Ilham Ahmed and Mohamed Ibrahim Inshaf Ahmed--linked up with Jameel because of a business and family connection. Jameel’s father was a tea business with a shop in Old Moor Street, Colombo 12. Ibrahim senior also had a shop there. The children became friends through the parents and started motivating each other.
They were also associated with JMI. But there was a split between Umair’s faction and Jameel’s faction, with the Ibrahim brothers aligning themselves with the latter. They believed they needed to “do something” in Sri Lanka, which the JMI leader opposed.
Another member of JMI then introduced Mohamed Zahran Mohamed Cassim to the movement. They identified him as like-minded. But he was from the East and many of the others were Colombo-based and did not take much interest in him. However, Zahran was against the Sri Lanka Thowheed Jamath and aligned himself with the breakaway National Thowheed Jamath (NTJ).
Those in the JMI who wanted him shared his preaching on social media. “He took Quran verses and interpreted them the way he wanted,” said a key source. Zahran went underground in 2017 March after a clash in Kattankudy town. “What we now believe is that Jameel and the Ibrahim brothers must have established contact with and even helped him during this period for practical reasons,” he said. “I also think the Easter Sunday attacks can neither be blamed on JMI or NTJ because the violent elements split from the main groups. It was Zahran with a few people.”
Intelligence was aware of the threats but towards the end of 2016, the political leadership lost interest in the ISIS and Muslim extremism element of national security. After 2009, the intelligence network flagged to the Government three post-war threats. First was the possible re-emergence of the LTTE terrorism. Second was Muslim extremism (it shifted up from being the fourth priority). Third was human trafficking and drugs or transnational crime. And the fourth was geopolitical developments.
Until 2015, a meeting of the Intelligence Coordinating Committee took place every Tuesday at the Ministry of Defence. On Wednesday, there was the National Security Council (NSC) discussion. After 2016, the NSC meeting dropped to once a fortnight, sometimes once in three weeks. And the focus continued to be on the LTTE bogey rather than more recent dangers.
“Our problem as that we never shifted to post-conflict surveillance mode, away from weaponised mode,” said an official who attended NSC meetings up to October 26, 2018. “Our security was always looked at through a weaponised mode that was essential when we were fighting the LTTE that had identifiable targets. Threats like ISIS and Muslim groups, where the enemy is not readily identifiable, require us to transform to a surveillance mode.”
The intelligence mechanism faced another battle: “national mindset versus liberal mindset”. In 2015, the DMI made a proposal to the political hierarchy. It outlined the present situation along with how the respective groups operate and called for a mechanism with three options.
One was to engage with the protagonists. Second was the introduce laws to reel them in (with a possibility of violence). And the third was a combination approach.
“It was very clearly spelt out,” said an internal source. “When the Government change occurred, none of them were interested. National and liberal policies don’t work together. In this area, you can’t have two fathers. There was a division right from the top. When thinking is divided, action is divided and loyalties are divided. That was the biggest problem.”