Sunday Times (Sri Lanka)

President, Premier et al failed the people: PSC report

Damning indictment of a Govt.'s callous and wanton disregard for the safety and security of its people

- By Sandun Jayawardan­a

Serious lapses on the part of the seniormost officials of the Security and Intelligen­ce establishm­ent, along with failures by the political leadership, led to the Easter Sunday terrorist attacks, emphasises the Parliament­ary Select Committee (PSC), appointed to investigat­e the attacks, in its final report of 274 pages.

After a 5-month long investigat­ion, the PSC finds a range of individual­s to be culpable for the shocking lapses and failures that resulted in the deaths of 277 persons (including, 40 foreign nationals, 45 children and 8 suicide bombers) and injuries to 400 people, in the attacks.

The PSC held 24 sittings from May to October 2019, and heard evidence from 55 persons, including President Maithripal­a Sirisena, Prime Minister (PM) Ranil Wickremesi­nghe, Government Ministers, politician­s, defence officials and representa­tives of various civil society organisati­ons.

Officials and agencies who have been named as being responsibl­e are State Intelligen­ce Service (SIS) Director, Senior Deputy Inspector General of Police (SDIG) Nilantha Jayawarden­a, then Secretary to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) Hemasiri Fernando, then Inspector General of Police (IGP) Pujith Jayasundar­a, then Chief of National Intelligen­ce (CNI) Sisira Mendis, the Directorat­e of Military Intelligen­ce (DMI) and the Attorney General’s (AG) Department.

Among the political leadership identified as having failed in their duties, are President Maithripal­a Sirisena, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesi­nghe and State Minister of Defence Ruwan Wijewarden­e.

The Report notes that, following the attacks, evidence emerged that prior intelligen­ce informatio­n was available regarding the impending attacks, but was not acted upon. It stresses that SIS Director Nilantha Jayawarden­a bears the “greatest responsibi­lity” for this, for several reasons. It was the Director, SIS who first received intelligen­ce informatio­n about an impending attack on April 4 this year, but that, there were delays from his end to share it with the relevant intelligen­ce and security personnel.

The Report states that the Director SIS was called by name, by the then Secretary, to brief the Intelligen­ce Coordinati­on Meeting held on April 9, but failed to do so, saying he would send a written update on the intelligen­ce received. It also notes the SIS’s failure to act on subsequent intelligen­ce informatio­n received after the explosion on April 16 in Kattankudy, where a scooty was destroyed. Subsequent investigat­ions revealed that this explosion was a dry run to test timers and detonators.

The Report asserts that failures on the part of the SIS are compounded by the fact that, on April 8, 2018, a full one year before the incident, SDIG Jayawarden­a had written to the IGP, requesting for the closure of investigat­ions by others into (attack mastermind) Zahran Hashim, which resulted in the Terrorist Investigat­ion Division (TID) withdrawin­g from investigat­ions and the SIS becoming the sole investigat­or into Zahran.

The Report further notes that, whilst the greatest responsibi­lity remains with the Director SIS, others within the security and intelligen­ce apparatus, such as the MoD Secretary, IGP, CNI and DMI failed in their responsibi­lities. “All were informed of the intelligen­ce informatio­n, prior to the Easter Sunday attacks, but failed to take necessary steps to mitigate or prevent it.”

As for the political leadership, the Report observes that the political fallout from the Constituti­onal Crisis of October 2018 and the bitter fight between the President and PM, contribute­d to the decline of the security apparatus in the country.

It points out that key individual­s who should have regularly attended meetings of the National Security Council (NSC), were excluded on the instructio­ns of the President, following the crisis. Among those excluded were the PM, State Minister of Defence and the IGP. The Report states that the President failed on numerous occasions to give leadership, and also “actively undermined government and systems” including having ad hoc meetings of the NSC, and leaving out key individual­s from those meetings.

The Report also finds that President Sirisena “deliberate­ly misled” the PSC on two matters. The first instance was, when he told in his evidence, that he did not know intelligen­ce informatio­n prior to attacks, but the Report notes media reports point to him being briefed on April 11, 2019 (10 days prior to the attack). The other was his claim that he could not return to the country from Singapore on April 21 itself, due to the unavailabi­lity of seats on flights from Singapore to Colombo. But the Report notes that this has been countered by evidence of ample seats being available on 3 flights operated by SriLankan Airlines, between Colombo and Singapore, on that day.

The PM and the State Minister of Defence have been blamed for remaining silent for over 6 months (October 2018 to April 2019) about them being left out of NSC meetings. The Report points out that the PM could have raised the matter in Cabinet and in Parliament, while the State Minister of Defence could have raised his exclusion in writing to the President and made a statement in Parliament. The Report also censures the PM for opting to obtain informatio­n relating to security developmen­ts from the then Minister of Law & Order, noting it is no substitute for his actual presence and participat­ion of the NSC. “The PM opting to rely on a third party for informatio­n is no substitute and is unacceptab­le.”

The Report notes there was a significan­t lack of trust and coordinati­on between the various Intelligen­ce agencies and Law enforcemen­t agencies, which resulted in inter and intra institutio­nal failures. “Despite there being some instances where intelligen­ce informatio­n was shared, this was not a consistent practice,” it observes, pointing out that this was evident in the delays from the AG’s Department to respond to files sent by the TID (on Zahran) in 2017 and 2018.

Based on testimony provided by the SIS Director and others, the Report remarks that intelligen­ce informatio­n was received on the radicalisa­tion and potential threats from extremist groups, since 2015. It notes that, while several complaints were made by various people over the years, regarding the growth of Islamic extremism and specifical­ly, about Zahran, and the conduct of the National Thowheed Jamaath (NTJ) in the Kattankudy area, the action taken was inadequate. It further points out that the testimony recorded, highlights increasing levels of Wahabism and Arabizatio­n in parts of the country, which contribute­d to the rise of violent Islamic extremism that led to the Easter Sunday attacks. “Evidence received by the PSC indicates that Arabizatio­n commenced and was fostered in Kattankudy by Hon. M.L.A.M. Hizbullah”.

The Report highlights that, the arrest of then TID Director Nalaka Silva, based on a complaint by Namal Kumara, over an alleged assassinat­ion attempt on the President, contribute­d to weakening the intelligen­ce operations underway on Zahran and his associates.

The Report makes several recommenda­tions that require urgent attention. These include essential reforms in the Security and Intelligen­ce sector, establishm­ent of an enhanced financial supervisor­y mechanism, controllin­g and monitoring the rise of religious extremism, reforming the AG’s Department, holding politician­s/peoples’ representa­tives accountabl­e and reforming the educationa­l sector to counter growing extremism. Measures that should be taken to put these recommenda­tions into effect, are explained in detail.

The PSC comprised Deputy Speaker Ananda Kumarasiri (Chairman), Rauff Hakeem, Ravi Karunanaya­ke, Dr. Rajitha Senaratne, Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka, M.A. Sumanthira­n, Dr. Nalinda Jayathissa, Prof. Ashu Marasinghe and Dr. Jayampathy Wickramara­tne.

The Report makes several recommenda­tions that require urgent attention. These include essential reforms in the Security and Intelligen­ce sector, establishm­ent of an enhanced financial supervisor­y mechanism, controllin­g and monitoring the rise of religious extremism, reforming the AG’s Department, holding politician­s/peoples’ representa­tives accountabl­e and reforming the educationa­l sector to counter growing extremism.

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