Walking on an unknown terrain: The State Intelligence Service and the PSC report

The Parliamentary Select Committee ( PSC) report on the Easter Sunday terrorrist attack was made public on Wednesday. This article aims to comment on observations made by the PSC on Intelligence Agencies’ role, especially the role of the State Intelligence Service (SIS).

“Intelligence and law enforcement occupy different worlds, but they are parallel worlds that have common dimentions,” stated Frederic F. Manget, a former member of the Senior Intelligence Service at the CIA. Manget’s attempt was to emphasise that intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies have two different roles.

John A. Gentry, a former intelligence analyst at the CIA, observes that while successful intelligence depends on the activities of intelligence organisations, it also depends upon the government’s non-intelligence agencies like foreign and defence ministries and troops in the field – decisions and actions beyond the control of intelligence services.

Therefore, one cannot correctly assess intelligence performance without appreciating different roles played by intelligence and law enforcement.

The PSC report

The PSC report finds, “failure by the SIS has resulted in hundreds of deaths, many more injured and immeasurable devastation to Sri Lanka and Sri Lankans and that must not be treated lightly.” This is a serious allegation levelled against the SIS.

The PSC report states that ‘the failure to act’ upon prior ‘intelligence information’ that was available, and delays in sharing them with ‘ relevant intelligence’ and security personnel by the SIS Director were parts of failure of the SIS. The SIS Director bears the ‘ greatest responsibility’, the PSC report notes.

As we noted previously, the ‘responsibility to act’ upon intelligence lies with law enforcement but, not with intelligence. Yet, the PSC report did not appreciate the different roles played by intelligence and law enforcement.

Absence of professionalism

The accusation levelled against SIS for not sharing ‘intelligence information’ on time is another erroneous observation by the PSC. It is worth noticing here that words used by the PSC to refer intelligence as ‘intelligence information’ are technically incorrect as information and intelligence have different subject meanings. Information is described as raw data whereas intelligence is the product of the analysis of information. This careless usage of words is an indication that the PSC did not have the level of professionalism it ought to have in assessing and documenting intelligence performance for an official report.

The SIS Director was alerted on April 4, 2019, verbally and briefly about an attack, and on April 5, he was informed in writing by his source. After receiving ‘information’, which is raw data, it is the responsibility of an intelligence agency to analyse it to process information into ‘intelligence’.

On the following day, April 6, ‘ intelligence’ was shared with the Defence Secretary, the reporting authority for the SIS Director. On April 7, he requested the Chief of National Intelligence ( CNI) who is the intelligence head of the country and responsible for coordinating intelligence agencies, in writing to provide further instructions. The IGP was informed on April 7 by the SIS Director. In addition, a letter was sent to the IGP by the CNI on April 8.

On April 9, the Intelligence Committee Meeting ( ICM) was briefed by the SIS Director and informed that a further report in writing will be submitted by the same evening. However, the CNI did not provide a briefing to the ICM on the subject, although he already had the report submitted by the SIS Director with him.

Although intelligence was shared by the SIS, law enforcement agencies did not act to Protect and Prepare. The accusation made by the PSC against the SIS for not sharing ‘intelligence information’ on time is misleading, and the failure lies with law enforcement agencies.

Intelligence was provided

The PSC report further notes: “On 20th April 2019, the Director SIS received via WhatsApp a message from his source. The Director SIS informed the PSC that he passed the message to Secretary, MOD, IGP, CNI and called them to follow up. The IGP had directed him to inform the CNI, Senior DIG-CID, Senior DIG- WP. He also claimed he informed STF during this period. On 21st April 2019 morning, the Director SIS received another message regarding the attacks. At this time the Director, SIS had immediately called DIG- WP, the IGP and Secretary, MOD.”

According to the British counter terrorism strategy CONTEST, some steps have to be taken by law enforcement agencies upon receiving intelligence. They are called ‘Protect and Prepare’.

‘ Protect’ is concerned with reducing the vulnerability to terrorist attacks by target hardening, and ‘ Prepare’ is the final strand, which recognises that it may not be possible to prevent every terrorist attack and planning is needed for improving the nation’s ability to respond to an attack if it occurs.

Although intelligence was shared by the SIS, law enforcement agencies did not act to Protect and Prepare. The accusation made by the PSC against the SIS for not sharing ‘intelligence information’ on time is misleading, and the failure lies with law enforcement agencies.

A dry run

part subsequent tion’ on The Director responsibility’. The April PSC received of PSC the 16, concludes bears notes ‘intelligence SIS 2019 after to a in ‘ the failure the act that Kattankudy. explosion upon greatest informa- the on SIS the the

“After the 16th However, explosion April receiving 2019, the in PSC the Kattankudy intelligence report Director states, SIS on of realises explosives and realises the found it connection is a in ‘dry Vanathavillu run’. to The the Director explosion SIS to the sent Secretary, images of MOD the via WhatsApp and followed by a call to brief him. On 18th April 2019, Director, SIS had sent a special report to the IGP and CID saying that the explosion is linked to Zahran and it is a ‘ dry run’. On 19th April 2019, Director SIS calls IGP and says “Sir, Meka Prashnayak” (“Sir, this is a problem”). He had then said that the matter should be given to the CID. On the same day, Director SIS had called, Senior DIG- CID, Mr. Ravi Seneviratne and said: “You have the people... IGP wanted me to tell you”. On 19th April 2019, Director SIS informed DMI: “There is an incident like this.

You have to act fast. Tell your people”. On the same day, Director SIS had called Director TID: “You have to take this seriously, because this is definitely a blast. This is Zahran’s activity. We cannot take it lightly”.

Despite having all this information, law enforcement agencies failed to act in this instance well. The writer is of the opinion that either the PSC members do not understand the meaning of the word ‘dry run’ or they simply ignored the importance given by the Director SIS to the said incident.

A written submission of a prosecutor

The length of the article restricts the possibility of discussing further points. However, even from the above points discussed, it can conclude that the PSC report made negative conclusions about the SIS’s performance without properly and reasonably evaluating evidence the PSC had in hand.

This is a serious error as it may not only generate a negative impression on SIS but, can demoralise the SIS community who, in fact, was the only agency that provided intelligence about the attack. Interestingly, the PSC report does not draw attention to major failures of law enforcement agencies, with the same enthusiasm the PSC demonstrates when criticising the SIS and its director.

Therefore, as a citizen, this writer can conclude that the failure of the SIS has not resulted in hundreds of deaths and immeasurable devastation to Sri Lanka and Sri Lankan’s, and it was the failure of law enforcement authorities.

( The writer is an Attorney- atLaw, holds an M. Sc. in ‘ Global Security’ from the Royal Military College of Science, UK. He is also a Fulbright scholar on ‘National Security’.)