Sunday Times (Sri Lanka)

Weaponisin­g human rights: The dilemma for Sri Lanka at UNHRC

- By Prof. Srilal M. Perera (Prof Srilal M Perera, is Adjunct Professor of Law at the University of Miami Law School, Coral Gables, Florida.)

Beginning February 28, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) will consider a written report on Sri Lanka by the Human Rights High Commission­er at its 49th Session, in Geneva. This prospectiv­e written Report was required by the UNHRC through a Resolution passed at its 46th Session in March 2021 (46/1).

Concerns about Human Rights in Sri Lanka began soon after the 30-year terrorist war ended in May 2009. At the HRC’s 19th Session in 2012, a core group of countries tabled a Resolution (A/HRC/ RES/19/2) on Sri Lanka that was followed by six other resolution­s at various sessions of the HRC. The Resolution­s varied in content, with the Office of the High Commission­er for Human Rights (OHCHR) obligated to present at regular intervals oral and written reports on Human Rights in Sri Lanka.

Given the escalating requiremen­ts and the trajectori­es of successive HRC Resolution­s on Sri Lanka, the anticipate­d written report does not bode well for the nation. It is evident that increasing­ly, human rights are being weaponised to push States into conformity with political agendas and moral platitudes that at times exceed human rights concerns. The intent has been to punish sovereign government­s than to advise. Successive HRC Resolution­s and OHCHR Reports on Sri Lanka have become increasing­ly adversaria­l and accusatory, losing sight of the original intent for the creation of the HRC and the OHCHR.

The mandates of HRC and OHCHR

The mandates of the UNHRC and OHCHR are derived from two key UN General Assembly resolution­s. UNGA Resolution 48/141 provides the mandate for the OHCHR. UNGA Resolution 60/251 provides the mandate for the HRC. Key prefatory clauses ( PCs) and operative clauses ( OC’s) direct the activities of both entities.

Both 48/141 and 60/251 recognise that upholding human rights is the sole and exclusive responsibi­lity of each State.

PC.9 of 60/251 recognises that in the work undertaken by the HRC it should ensure “universali­ty, objectivit­y and non-selectivit­y in the considerat­ion of human rights issues, and the eliminatio­n of double standards and politicisa­tion”.

OC.3 of 60/251 delineates the responsibi­lities of the HRC to “address situations of violations of human rights, including gross and systematic violations, and make recommenda­tions thereon.” In engaging on such work, the HRC is directed to: “be guided by the principles of universali­ty, impartiali­ty, objectivit­y and non-selectivit­y, constructi­ve internatio­nal dialogue and cooperatio­n.” (OC.4)

OHCHR mandate 48/141, similarly, has key PCs and OCs, the most important ones being that the OHCHR should be “guided by the principles of impartiali­ty, objectivit­y and non-selectivit­y”, and that it should function within the framework of the UN Charter and internatio­nal law including the obligation­s, within this framework, to respect the sovereignt­y, territoria­l integrity and domestic jurisdicti­ons of States…..” (OC 3(a)).

The above are, in turn, derived from the UN Charter, in particular, Article 2(7) that prohibits the United Nations from intervenin­g “in matters which are essentiall­y within the domestic jurisdicti­on of any State or…. require the Members to submit such matters to the United Nations;….”.

It is clear that both entities were set-up to provide advisory and consultati­ve services. There is nothing in both mandates that anoints an investigat­ive function on or that permits the HRC or OHCHR to recommend sanctions or penalties to be imposed on any member country.

The force of Resolution­s

HRC Resolution 19/2 of 2012 was really a critique of the Lessons Learnt and Reconcilia­tion Commission ( LLRC) report. It concluded that the LLRC Recommenda­tions were “constructi­ve” but did not adequately “address serious allegation­s of violations of internatio­nal law.” It recommende­d that Sri Lanka implement the recommenda­tions. Sri Lanka is not a party to 19/2.

The succeeding HRC Resolution­s 22/1, 25/1, 30/1, 34/1, 40/1, culminatin­g in 46/1 of March 2021 are characteri­stic of the escalating calls on Sri Lanka on Human Rights issues, requiring accountabi­lity due to lack of reliabilit­y or objectivit­y in the LLRC, the Paranagama Report and the present Commission of Inquiry. There are increasing calls for independen­t internatio­nal commission­s and for the applicatio­n of universal jurisdicti­on in member States. Calls, for the full implementa­tion of the 13th Amendment; the establishm­ent of an independen­t judicial mechanism with foreign judges and prosecutor­s to conduct hearings; and the repeal and replacemen­t of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, all matters, within the domestic jurisdicti­on of

Sri Lanka, would have had profoundly serious, political, social and constituti­onal repercussi­ons, if implemente­d without caution.

The relentless pursuit of Sri Lanka through the above resolution­s resulted, under 25/1 of March 2014, in the OHCHR establishi­ng an unpreceden­t Office of Investigat­ion on Sri Lanka ( OISL). Consequent­ly, a Panel of Experts under OISL wrote a devastatin­g report in which the Panel recommende­d, among others, imposition of sanctions, and trying of individual­s in States exercising universal jurisdicti­on. Subsequent­ly, 46/1, and yet again unpreceden­ted, the HRC, decided to strengthen the capacity of the OHCHR among other things “for future accountabi­lity processes for gross violations of … internatio­nal humanitari­an law in Sri Lanka, to advocate for victims and survivors, and to support relevant judicial and other proceeding­s including in Member States, with competent jurisdicti­on;”.

The OHCHR then institutio­nalised this decision by creating the “Sri Lanka Accountabi­lity Project” in complete disregard of the HRC and the OHCHR mandates. These actions have created dangerous precedents not only for Sri Lanka, but for all member States.

The effects of resolution­s:

As a matter of internatio­nal law, HRC and OHCHR Resolution­s on Sri Lanka are generally not binding (except, perhaps for 30/ 1, 34/ 1 and 40/ 1 that Sri Lanka co-sponsored and have since withdrawn from). In any event all the previous Resolution­s have been superseded by 46/1 which is also not binding on Sri Lanka since it is not party to it. Yet, Resolution­s can have serious consequenc­es for a member state selected for “review”. First, there is the reputation­al risk, where a State can be considered as a country in which there is systemic and systematic violation and abuse of human rights.

Resolution­s and reports supporting such Resolution­s that are not objective and take an anti-state stance, emboldens actors and NGOs which have vocally agitated against the State to boldly renew their agitation. Emboldened by 46/ 1, LTTE fronts (the LTTE is proscribed in over 30 countries) and their representa­tives have influenced national legislatur­es such as influencin­g Resolution 413 in the US House of Congress. They have brazenly filed law suits, for instance in November 2021 against the Council of Europe in the General Court of the European Union for the removal of restrictio­ns placed on the LTTE.

Finally, and of most concern is that Resolution­s of this nature create platforms for the imposition of sanctions on States, both economic and personal and provide justificat­ions for them.

Resolution­s, however, can have positive effects if, in conformity with the mandates, they are objective advisories about the present status of human rights in member states; and identify the areas where the OHCHR and HRC can provide technical assistance at the request of member states with their full cooperatio­n and consultati­on.

Weaponisat­ion

It is quite clear from the statements made by many responsibl­e state representa­tives that human rights are being used to pursue a broader political agenda. In the House of Commons during a “Written questions and answers” session on 20 January, 2022, the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonweal­th and Developmen­t Affairs, Amanda Milling, responding to a question about considerin­g sanctions on one of the most senior Generals of the Sri Lankan army responded: “Sanctions are one response among a number of diplomatic tools we can deploy around the world as part of a broader political strategy in order to change or send a political signal regarding particular behaviours. The Global Human Rights Sanctions regime gives the UK a powerful tool to hold to account those involved in serious human rights violations…”.

Former US/ UN Ambassador Nikki Haley citing the treatment of Israel by the HRC stated: “this disproport­ionate focus and unending hostility towards Israel is clear proof that the Council is motivated by political bias, not by human rights.”

The present US Secretary of State Tony Blinken also stated with reference to the HRC:

“We recognise that the Human Rights Council is a flawed body, in need of reform to its agenda, membership and focus.”

It is clear that both entities were set-up to provide advisory and consultati­ve services. There is nothing in both mandates that anoints an investigat­ive function on or that permits the HRC or OHCHR to recommend sanctions or penalties to be imposed on any member country.

Facing the dilemma

This summary review of the mandates and resolution­s of OHCHR and HCR should not be read to conclude that successive Government­s of Sri Lanka be fully absolved of each and every alleged or purported human rights violation reported by the HCR and OHCHR. Rather, it is a narrative about the lack of objectivit­y, of a tone of aggression and an adversaria­l approach towards Sri Lanka in the Resolution­s, that is its focus. It seeks to demonstrat­e that the HCR and OHCHR have been increasing­ly politicise­d, at times, beyond human rights concerns.

Sri Lanka needs to address, some current and past issues on Human Rights as expressed in the Resolution­s. Addressing issues of reparation­s, amendments to the Prevention of Terrorism Act and internatio­nal legal aspects of accountabi­lity are some. To be fair, Sri Lanka has already addressed many of the reconcilia­tion and accountabi­lity issues, as iterated by the Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka on 14th September 2021 at the HRC’s 48th Session.

In its current mood it is, however, unlikely that anything that Sri Lanka does will be considered adequate by the core members and their supporters in the HRC. Nonetheles­s, the strategy to cooperate with the UN and UN bodies to the extent of addressing issues raised by them that are clearly within the mandates of those bodies, is the right approach. Even more important, Sri Lanka must now embark on improving its bilateral relations with all members of the HRC.

The UN itself recognises that upholding of Human Rights is the exclusive responsibi­lity of each State. Sri Lanka must, therefore, squarely meet the challenges before it, not because of external pressures of the HRC or OHCHR to do so, but because ultimately that is the high responsibi­lity every State owes to all its citizens. That is the moral imperative.

The longer version of this article will be uploaded to our website timesonlin­e.lk next week.

Newspapers in English

Newspapers from Sri Lanka