Sunday Times (Sri Lanka)

Demands of the people and constituti­onal constraint­s

- By Prof. Srilal M. Perera (Prof. Srilal Perera is former Chief Counsel of MIGA, of the World Bank Group and is presently Adjunct Professor of Law of the University of Miami, USA.)

“Desperate times call for desperate measures” – Hippocrate­s

The burning issues that the people of Sri Lanka are confrontin­g, with crippling power cuts, gas, fertiliser and petrol shortages, inability to access or purchase basic needs – food, medicine – have resulted in daily demonstrat­ions. This clear and unquestion­able suffering of the people has to be addressed urgently. The national economy is in peril, with few weeks of reserves and facing imminent default on its Internatio­nal Sovereign Bonds (ISBs).

The demonstrat­ions have now morphed into powerful demands by the people requiring that the President resign from office, and more recently that all 225 Members of Parliament resign. These demands cannot, however, be met in a vacuum. They can only occur within the bounds of the legal system of Sri Lanka, principall­y, within the Constituti­on of Sri Lanka.

Fixing the economy

Resolving the economic crisis is the most crucial and urgent need to address the demands of the people. The consensus among the specialist­s can only be resolved urgently by: ( a) immediate negotiatio­ns for a rescue package from the IMF to stabilise fiscal and monetary conditions; ( b) negotiatin­g a moratorium and restructur­ing debt with creditors, mostly with those holding ISBs; and ( c) obtaining targeted bridge loans for meeting the urgent needs of the people.

The constituti­onal constraint­s

The demands of the people to remove the President or that he voluntaril­y resigns can only be accomplish­ed within the limits of the Constituti­on.

There are six ways in which the office of the President can be vacated.

Under Article 38, the office of the President will be vacant “( a) upon his death; (b) if he resigns his office by writing under his hand to the Speaker; ( c) if he ceases to be a citizen of Sri Lanka; (d) if the person elected as President fails to assume office, within one month from the date of commenceme­nt of his term of office; (e) if he is removed from office…..; or (f) if the Supreme Court in the exercise of its powers under Article 130( a) determines that his election was void…….”.

Resignatio­n from office

Of the above, two, Article 38 ( b) voluntary resignatio­n, or Article 38(e) removal from office address the demands of the people.

The President has stated presently that he will not resign, as it is his right under the Constituti­on. Ultimately, if the President does resign, there are two immediate consequenc­es that the Constituti­on contemplat­es and addresses.

The first, is where the President resigns and Parliament has not been dissolved. In these circumstan­ces, under Article 40(1)(a) and (b), Parliament is obligated “to elect, as President one of its members who is qualified to be elected to the office of President.” The Member so elected will serve out the rest of the term of the President. The election has to be held in no event later than one month from the date of the occurrence of the vacancy. The vote shall be by secret ballot and “by an absolute majority” of the votes cast.

Second, is where the President has vacated office and Parliament has also been dissolved. Here the President is elected “by the new Parliament within one month of the first meeting” (Article 40 (1) proviso). Until as such time as the new Parliament is convened and the election of the Interim President is held, the Prime Minister will act as the President, and the Prime Minister will appoint another member from the Cabinet to act as the Prime Minister. The President, so elected, will serve out the remaining period of office of the former President. This second method based on a prior dissolutio­n of Parliament and the President resigning thereafter, cannot happen just yet, because the President cannot dissolve Parliament until two and half years have elapsed. That period will only be completed in September 2022. Any earlier dissolutio­n of Parliament requires a Parliament­ary Resolution requesting the President to dissolve Parliament. (Paragraph 12 of the 20th Amendment).

In both cases, during the time period from the date on which the President’s office falls vacant and the date the new President is elected by Parliament, the Prime Minister, will act as President (Article 40(1)(c) of the Constituti­on). Also, the Member elected by Parliament to be Interim President must be qualified to hold such office under the Constituti­on.

Removal of a president

There are two methods by which the Constituti­on contemplat­es the removal of the President. First, under Article 38(1)(e) where Parliament removes him from office under the prescribed terms of Article 38(2) ( a). Accordingl­y, the President can be removed from office for “(i) intentiona­l violation of the Constituti­on (ii) treason (iii) bribery ( iv) misconduct or corruption involving the abuse of the powers of his office or ( v) any offence under any law, involving moral turpitude, and setting out full particular­s of the allegation­s made and seeking an inquiry thereon by the Supreme Court”.

The first procedure is, any Member of Parliament by Notice of Resolution to the Speaker allege that the President had committed one or more of the above referred acts, provided that the Notice is signed by two thirds of all 225 members of the Parliament. If the Resolution is then passed by two thirds of Parliament, the President is removed from Office (Article 38(2)(b)(i)).

The second procedure for removal is that if the Notice of Resolution is signed by not less than 50 per cent of Members of Parliament (i.e. by 113 members or more), it receives less than the required two thirds majority; and yet, the Speaker is satisfied that the allegation­s merit the Supreme Court’s inquiry, he will refer the allegation­s in the Resolution to the Supreme Court for its determinat­ion. At the Supreme Court’s hearing, the President is given the opportunit­y to defend himself. If the Supreme Court, determines that the President is guilty as alleged in the Resolution, its decision is referred back to the Parliament whereupon if a Resolution based on the Supreme Court’s verdict is passed by two thirds of the Parliament, the President is removed from office (Articles 38(b)(ii), 38(c), 38(d) and 38(e)).

Hence the procedures to remove a President are extremely tedious, time consuming and heavily evidence laden.

An option

Therefore, meeting the people’s demands to remove the President from office, or his resignatio­n, is extremely difficult to achieve.

If the President will not resign, the next best option is to examine whether his executive powers can be limited by Parliament. In other words, to make the office of the President, a nominal one. To achieve that end requires certain pre-requisites. First, there has to be subtlety of interpreta­tion of the relevant provisions of the Constituti­on. Second, there has to be, at least, a simple majority in Parliament. Third, there must be sacrifice, compromise and considerat­ion by all major political parties including the present governing party. Fourth, there have to be self-limiting measures taken by Parliament.

At the core of the proposal is for Parliament under its legislativ­e power ( Article 75 of the Constituti­on) to pass a Bill, by a simple majority, requiring responsibi­lity by Parliament for key executive powers assumed now by the President. The justificat­ion for such a proposal principall­y rests on Article 42 of the Constituti­on which reads: “The President shall be responsibl­e to Parliament for the due exercise, performanc­e and discharge of his powers, duties and functions under the Constituti­on.”

Based on that responsibi­lity, the subtlety of interpreta­tion lies in distinguis­hing between “Executive Procedure” and “Executive Acts” of the powers of the President under the Constituti­on. For most part, the Executive Acts of the President are clear in the Constituti­on. There is paucity, however, in it on Executive Procedure. Assumption by Parliament of Executive Procedure is at the heart of the proposal. An example of how this might work can be demonstrat­ed by reference to Article 43( 3) of the Constituti­on that states: “The President shall appoint as Prime Minister, the Member of Parliament who in his opinion is most likely to command the confidence of Parliament.” Under the proposal, the President retains, at all times the “Executive Act” of appointmen­t. With the proposed Bill, the President will be required to obtain, Parliament’s prior advice and consent before formulatin­g his “opinion” as to which Member commands the confidence of Parliament to be appointed as Prime Minister (“Executive Procedure”). The President will then have fulfilled his responsibi­lity to Parliament under Section 42, and would have still retained the integrity of Article 43( 3) of the Constituti­on. Similarly, Parliament can also determine which other Executive Procedures can be assumed by Parliament and include them in the Bill.

Even so, the proposal is vulnerable to attack as an implicit amendment to the Constituti­on and surely a Supreme Court decision maybe sought. In a democracy that would be welcome.

Because of limitation of space, and the urgency of the moment, the elaboratio­n of the proposal here is not possible. If this option is accepted by consensus of all parties, there are possibilit­ies for achieving the most urgent political demands of the people. The people, unlike no other time, have also demanded national unity in Government. By requiring advise and consent of Parliament, the President can also be required in volatile situations, such as now, to create a National Government under Article 47( 3) of the Constituti­on or alternativ­ely, an entity that maybe called a Parliament­ary Governing Council (PGC), limited to 4 or 5 leaders drawn from the parties having the highest representa­tion in Parliament with the leader of the party having the highest single representa­tion in Parliament being the Chairman ( equivalent to Prime Minister) of the PGC. The PGC could form a Cabinet of Ministers of not more than 10- 15 from the present Members of Parliament, drawn from any party, ensuring diversity of gender and minority representa­tion, the portfolios being determined by

Parliament to be the most critical to respond to the current economic crisis. The PGC members and Ministers should be qualified to hold office, experience­d, and should not have been charged, or facing charges at any time or otherwise have been previously prosecuted in any Court of Law for money laundering bribery and corruption or any criminal acts. An oath must be taken to that effect. Those conditions being met, they can be appointed by the President under Article 45( 1) of the Constituti­on. This way the supremacy of Parliament that is recognised under the Constituti­on is preserved. All that required is a simple majority in Parliament.

If this narrow window is utilised diligently by Parliament, there can be a glimmer of hope for a new and fresh beginning, clean government, the restoratio­n of democracy, of civility and unity in Sri Lanka, in the face of these dark and daunting times confrontin­g the nation.

The people, unlike no other time, have also demanded national unity in Government. By requiring advise and consent of Parliament, the President can also be required in volatile situations, such as now, to create a National Government under Article 47(3) of the Constituti­on or alternativ­ely, an entity that maybe called a Parliament­ary Governing Council (PGC), limited to 4 or 5 leaders drawn from the parties having the highest representa­tion in Parliament with the leader of the party having the highest single representa­tion in Parliament being the Chairman (equivalent to Prime Minister) of the PGC.

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