Treat Kinmen, Matsu with caution

IN MARCH 1979, both houses of the US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), ready for then-president Jimmy Carter to sign on April 10. Over the subsequent 45 years, the TRA has witnessed a series of historical ups and downs from the establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and China, to the US’ “rock-solid” commitment to Taiwan. To this day it still has a deep influence on the geopolitics of the Western Pacific region.

When US President Joe Biden delivered his third State of the Union address on March 7, he said that the US is standing up for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Biden has on many previous occasions clearly stated that the US would defend Taiwan if it is attacked by China. On one occasion he said “Yes... That’s the commitment we made.” This talk of a “commitment” mainly refers to the TRA.

This commitment could be seen during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996, shortly before Taiwan’s first-ever presidential election. When the crisis broke out, then-US president Bill Clinton quickly dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to stand by in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait.

At the end of 2021, Biden clearly expressed the US’ commitment when talking to Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). Referring to Taiwan, Biden said: “Its independence — It makes its own decisions.” The US executive branch, for its part, explained that the US supports the peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences and opposes unilateral changes to the “status quo.” It said that the US does not support Taiwan independence but does support cross-strait dialogue.

Reporting on Biden’s video conference with Xi, the White House said: “President Biden underscored that the United States remains committed to the ‘one China’ policy, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiques and the Six Assurances.”

However, US government officials have gradually adopted the position that UN Resolution 2758 did not decide the status of Taiwan.

The TRA firmly states that “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, is considered a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States” and that the US would therefore “maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.”

For this reason, Carter’s successor Ronald Reagan, dissatisfied with the Aug. 17, 1982 US-China Joint Communique on US Arms Sales to Taiwan, supplemented it with the “six assurances” to Taiwan, with the understanding that the latter would prevail.

One aspect that must not be overlooked is the geographical area to which the TRA applies. As the act states: “The term ‘Taiwan’ includes … the islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores” (the Pescadores being another name for the island county of Penghu, which lies within the Taiwan Strait). This applicable area is the same as that of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the Republic of China, which states that “the terms ‘territorial’ and ‘territories’ shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores.” In other words, in both the mutual defense treaty and the TRA, the area that the US is committed to defending is limited to Taiwan and Penghu.

In comparison with the concept of “Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu,” as conceived by the regime of former presidents Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國), Kinmen and Matsu are not included. This omission explains that there is a difference between the sovereignty of Taiwan and Penghu and that of Kinmen and Matsu.

When China’s Qing Dynasty government signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan in 1895, it ceded Taiwan and Penghu to Japan in perpetuity. In the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, the Japanese government gave up all rights, title and claim to Taiwan, Penghu and certain islands in the South China Sea.

This peace treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers only stipulated that Japan would give up Taiwan and Penghu, without specifying to whom they would be given.

Due to the outbreak of the Korean War, in which China’s leader Mao Zedong (毛澤東) resolved to resist the US and help North Korea, then-US president Harry Truman took the position that Taiwan’s status was undetermined, but during the Cold War, the US, based on its anti-communist strategy, acquiesced to the Republic of China’s rule over Taiwan and Penghu.

Kinmen and Matsu were originally part of China’s Fujian Province. After the civil war between the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) settled down, Mao, having failed to win a major artillery battle, had to give up on the idea of taking Kinmen and Matsu.

Mao wanted to use Kinmen and Matsu to keep Taiwan and Penghu within “one China” and prevent “KMT independence” or “Taiwanese independence.” Chiang Kai-shek, for his part, turned down the US’ suggestion to relinquish Kinmen and Matsu because he wanted to use them as a connection to China so that he could retain the right to represent China in the UN and elsewhere. Without Kinmen and Matsu, his regime would no longer have any basis for representing China.

As for Taiwan and Penghu, their government would inevitably come to be formed through elections by the people who live there, and it is said that Washington had a provisional list of potential leaders in its pocket.

Some people might say that, this being the year 2024, there is no need to talk about history and the present-day reality in the same breath. Ironically, the history that is happening now is not necessarily relegated to the history books, and some might even be in the present tense.

Only recently, Taiwan’s coast guard boats have been clamping down on unmarked Chinese fishing boats crossing into waters near Kinmen, and China has responded by announcing the launch of regular Chinese coast guard patrols in those same waters. China has used this cross-strait dispute to try and gain some leverage, and the whole issue has yet to be resolved.

Setting aside the superficial aspect of a dispute over who has the right to manage this maritime territory, the underlying contradiction that these events have brought to light is the dispute over sovereignty. If the forces involved were to escalate from coast guard vessels to military vessels and China rushed to “recover its historic territory of Kinmen and Matsu,” it would have the effect of making the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan and Penghu more straightforward, which would do China more harm than good.

The two governments have responded cautiously to the issue of clamping down on fishing boats, but the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) seems to be leaning toward stressing the difference in sovereignty between Kinmen and Matsu on the one hand and Taiwan and Penghu on the other.

If China uses force against Kinmen and Matsu, it would not only be blamed for undermining the “status quo,” but also allow Taiwan independence supporters and foreign forces to take advantage. China would be shooting itself in the foot.

According to China’s plans for unification, Kinmen and Matsu must be resolved along with Taiwan and Penghu, just as it insisted that the island of Hong Kong must be returned to China at the same time as Kowloon and the New Territories. If China acts in a rush, it will cause itself a lot of trouble. However, the question is whether Xi thinks along the same lines as Mao.

Nonetheless, if we focus on the issue of normalizing Taiwan’s national status, the question of Kinmen and Matsu is indeed a complex one. In the past, individual members of Taiwan’s “blue” and “green” political camps have called for Kinmen and Matsu to hold referendums to decide between unification and independence.

However, up until now, neither the KMT nor the DPP has adopted this imaginative idea as party policy. China’s ambition to achieve complete national unification does not allow for dealing with Kinmen and Matsu separately from Taiwan and Penghu. China’s strategy for promoting unification has always required that it should be in charge of the plan, process and rhythm. In China’s view, Taiwan’s only option is to tick the boxes provided by Beijing, which leaves no room for a referendum.

As for the idea of Taiwan unilaterally holding referendums in Kinmen and Matsu, we must be wary of a potential domino effect, because it would mean that other counties and cities also have the right to demand their own referendums on unification or independence. That would cause Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu to become fragmented, giving China an excuse to intervene. Furthermore, giving up any “existing territory” would cause the democratically elected government to be held accountable.

For all these reasons, the simple yet complex question of Kinmen and Matsu is one that both sides would be well advised to answer with caution.

‘As for the idea of Taiwan unilaterally holding referendums in Kinmen and Matsu,

we must be wary of a potential domino

effect, because it would mean that other

counties and cities also have the right

to demand their own referendums on

unification or independence. That would

cause Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu

to become fragmented, giving China an excuse to intervene. ’