The bubbling cauldron
Short but insightful, Robert Kaplan’s book offers a glimpse into the complicated — and at times troubled — territorial dispute of the South China Sea
On April 22 last year, at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Qingdao, China, 21 Pacific countries signed the “Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (Cues)” to generate mutual understanding and international co-operation in regards to the use of the seas. Cues is not legally binding but its role is clear: to reduce tension that results from maritime conflicts arising out of overlapping interests of member nations. It doesn’t apply specifically to particular nations or particular areas. Its timing, however, is crucially relevant to one particular body of water in the Indo-Pacific: the South China Sea.
A part of the Pacific Ocean, the South China Sea covers the area from the Singapore and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan; the 3.5 million square kilometre area consists of 250 islands, shoals, atolls, rocks and reefs that deposit various resources such as natural gas, oil and minerals. In the aftermath of World War II, when new nation-states were born, failure to identify ownership of many of the islands and control of waterways became an apparent issue. And because of the sea’s economic importance — US$5.3 trillion of trade passes through the South China Sea annually — attempts to control the sea have seen competing claims in ownership between China and neighbouring Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines.
Robert D Kaplan’s new book, Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea And The End Of A Stable Pacific, tells stories of these complex, competing claims among the Asian nations, as well as traces the historical development of the region. Opening with “the return” of the US to the region, Kaplan outlines a delicate yet growing relationship between China and the US. Many early pages are devoted to so-called “declining US” and “catching up China” thesis, highlighting China’s naval power.
Kaplan writes that “by the late 2020, at the current rate of acquisitions and decommissionings, China will have more warships in the Western Pacific than the US Pacific Fleet” and “China will pursue regional hegemony, regardless of whether or not its political system becomes more open. A faltering economy may make it only more nationalistic”.
However, in contrast to authors who often regard China’s rise as a malignant sign, Kaplan argues that despite the fact that China has repeatedly been questioned about the nature of its government at home, it doesn’t necessarily mean that China will apply its authoritarian attitude abroad. “China knows power”, Kaplan writes. “China is following up its historical claims with military movement... The fact that it seeks to dominate an adjacent sea crowded with smaller and much weaker powers, where there is possibly a plentitude of oil and natural gas, is altogether natural. If it weren’t, great power politics over the course of the past few millennia would not have been as they have.”
The book moves on to survey the tri-relationship between China, the United States and smaller states in Southeast Asia: Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Taiwan. In each chapter Kaplan writes in the tradition of travelogue narrative, which makes his writing more pleasurable to read than the first half of the book, densely packed with analysis and raw data.
Colonialism, post-colonial history and history of Asian economic miracles are central to Kaplan’s nation-building narratives. He also touches on “big men” in the ilk of Lee Kuan Yew, Mahathir Mohammad and Chiang Kai-shek (the latter finds his defence in Kaplan’s revisionist argument). Kaplan consistently cites historians who are strongly sympathetic with Chiang and his Kuomintang Party. For example, he refers to Jonathan Fenby who argues that during the ascendancy of Chiang and the Kuomintang, parts of China saw “a time of modernisation such as China had not seen before”. Kaplan believes that Chiang governed during a very difficult period in history, and some of his actions are overlooked by historians and analysts alike.
“No figures besides Mao Zedong himself has determined China’s destiny in the twentieth century as much as Chiang-Kai shek,” he concludes.
By late 2020, China will have more warships in the Western Pacific than the US Pacific Fleet
Asia’s Cauldron isn’t a book for beginners to East and Southeast Asia. Chapters on the areas are slightly too brief to include a bigger “regional” picture, and when the author delves deep into the history of each country, the book’s focus on conflicts in the South China Sea gets a little shaky. Moreover, like many books on geopolitics, Kaplan tends to stay away from giving recommendations on peace solutions. His book reveals a picture of the more complex, more complicated world in the 21st century, but it doesn’t say much on the account of how we are going to confront it.
Nevertheless, Asia’s Cauldron is a well-assembled small book of geopolitics of Southeast Asia, a region where territorial waters are about three times larger than its land composition. What seems to be missing from the book is an emphasis on the two largest economies of the region: Indonesia and Thailand. It’s true that they are farther from the South China Sea conflict, but as members of Asean, both countries have moral obligations to be involved in solving the crisis.
In that context, Asean was conceived 48 years ago with one of the original aims being a region which can stand on its own feet. To pursue this vision, its members should take heed that the South China Sea is an Asean issue and perhaps heed Kaplan’s advice that “the more anxious, complicated world awaits us”.