Thai-US treaty alliance needs realigning
That the United States’ role in Asia’s fluid and dynamic geopolitical canvas is considered indispensable is not a matter of dispute. Governments and states in South Asia, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia have all been in favour of a continued American engagement that dates back more than a century, and which intensified after World War II and throughout the Cold War. Even China, the pre-eminent giant with superpower status, has not opposed US engagement in Asia, thanks in part to unprecedented mutual economic interdependence between Washington and Beijing.
At issue, however, is the nature and extent of the United States’ role and dealings with Asian countries that must be nuanced and the right mix, weight and depth to sustain regional economic prosperity and to maintain a stable and secure neighbourhood for mutual and multilateral benefits in Asia. Central to US engagement in Asia are Washington’s relationships with its longstanding allies and partners, comprising what has hitherto been known as a “hub-and-spokes”. Among the five formal US bilateral alliances — with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand — the Thai-US axis can be characterised as the most underperforming one, owing to major changes and shifts at the interactive domestic, regional and international levels that are besetting both countries.
The relative decline in Thai-US ties in the early 21st century was partly inevitable because of structural changes in the region and in the international system more broadly. The Cold War provided an enabling environment to shape and solidify Thai-US relations. Thailand was long famous for its ability to navigate the treacherous waters of colonial expansionism and First and Second World Wars by playing off and balancing the major powers. But when it came to Cold War communist expansionism, Bangkok firmly took Washington’s side.
The end of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath in the late 1980s and early 1990s left Thai-US relations adrift in search of new bearings. At the same time, domestic political changes within Thailand impinged on the bilateral alliance. After Thailand’s sustained economic development during the Cold War decades, democratisation gained momentum and reached a critical juncture in the mid-1990s when it appeared Thai democracy was on its way to consolidation, even though Thailand’s economic prowess came to a halt in the 1997‒98 years as the epicentre of the Asian financial crisis.
The ensuing years of China’s rise and resurgence and America’s pre-eminent but challenged power in the wake of the post-Sept 11 “war on terror”, also spelt changes for the neighbourhood. America was no longer the paramount power in absolute terms, as it had been in the past. China was ”rising”, as was Asean. The uplift of Thai democracy culminated with the electoral supremacy in 2001 of Thaksin Shinawatra, a former police officer and consummate politician with a telecommunications empire and extensive networks in business and the bureaucracy.
Under Thaksin’s rule, which began with immense electoral popularity but which was later tainted by corruption and abuse of power, Thai-US relations appeared to have found a new footing. As the war on terror got under way, the ThaiUS alliance strengthened to a newfound understanding in October 2003, when Washington designated Thailand as a major non-Nato ally in view of a number of agreements that were put in place to boost US security objectives and lift trade ties. But this promising new era for the bilateral relationship was short-lived as both the war on terror and President George W Bush’s presidency waned in tandem with anti-Thaksin protests in Bangkok.
By the time the Thai military staged a coup on Sept 19, 2006 to depose Thaksin, the bilateral alliance was back in an “adrift mode”, despite the efforts of the US ambassador in Bangkok who channelled relatively lenient criticisms of the coup by the State Department. The United States’ forbearance was not enough, however. The domestic setting in Bangkok had soured so much against Thaksin that it irreparably politicised Thai-US relations, deepening the Thai people’s distrust of Thaksin as much as the Bush administration had confidence in his rule.
There was little that American officials could do through subsequent ambassadorships in Bangkok and State Department outreach to put the relationship on an even keel. Thai domestic politics dominated bilateral relations. By May 22, 2014, when a sequel coup was carried out in Bangkok which was contrary to Washington’s political outlook and preference, the alliance was not just adrift but became fully lost at sea. Washington was much harsher in its criticisms and punitive measures this time because American officials felt they had been misled in the belief that 2006 was just a “time-out” for democracy, rather than a long suspension as happened in 2014.
The future of the Thai-US relationship depends more on Thailand’s domestic political outcomes than those of the US. As the royal transition looms, the Thai domestic sphere is increasingly contentious. The Thai political order that grew out of the Cold War, anchored around the monarchy, military and bureaucracy, is in desperate need of recalibration so as to be compatible with growing demands and expectations spawned by economic development and democratisation.
After Thailand’s two coups in eight years, Washington’s repeated calls for the restoration of elections and democracy have further deepened the bilateral estrangement between Thailand’s ruling military regime and the US government. As a result, the Thai-US alliance has underperformed as Thailand is stuck in a domestic holding pattern. The geopolitical implications are far-reaching as Thailand’s military regime and conservative establishment have found succour in Beijing’s recognition and support.
To be sure, Thai-US relations were never going to be as staunch as they were during the Cold War era. Yet there can still be a solid and mutually beneficial relationship for Thailand’s traditional balancing among the great powers and for the US in its geopolitical engagements in Asia in view of Washington’s strategic “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific.
Thailand is the United States’ oldest friend in Asia. The friendship became a formal alliance in the latter half of the 20th century. It is now overdue for another transformation from alliance to an “allied partnership” — an ally in principle, but partner in practice in view of mutual concerns and benefits. The bilateral alliance of the Cold War is long past and will not be recaptured owing to structural shifts in the region and internationally.
China is dominant in Southeast Asia, and has been a close “big” friend of Thailand for centuries when Siam was part of the Chinese tributary system in Asia. The only hiccough in Thai-Chinese ties occurred during communist expansionism of the Cold War, but this quickly receded by the mid-1970s and the Bangkok‒Beijing axis was fully restored by December 1978 when Vietnam invaded Khmer Rouge-controlled and Beijingbacked Cambodia. By that juncture, Thailand and China were both against the Soviet-backed, Vietnam-supported, Heng Samrin regime.
But the more China is central in Bangkok’s strategic framework, the more Thailand needs the US alliance. Moving too close to China is inadvisable for Thai foreign and security policy planners. At a minimum, it exposes the Thai military government’s weakness and desperation for superpower recognition in view of its twin coups.
Further, a lopsided Thai-Chinese relationship risks pushing Bangkok onto the wrong side in a complex superpower rivalry, and cosying up and catering excessively to Beijing betrays Thailand’s traditionally masterful and clever foreign policy pragmatism internationally. Thai leaders need to steer Thai foreign policy towards a new moving equilibrium — neither too much China, nor too much the other major powers.
Here is where the future Thai-US alliance should be situated once Thailand’s domestic dilemmas over the royal transition and a recalibrated political order are resolved. For the US, Thailand remains essential in any strategic “rebalance” and future foreign policy strategies. Forfeiting Thailand to China would be detrimental to Washington’s long-term “core” interests in Asia. Yet the alliance will have to wait for Thai politics to catch up.
Meantime, both sides’ policy elites should accept that the near future will not be like the recent past, and that during the next two decades, Thailand will be even more of a partner than an ally in the bilateral alliance, with closer proximity to China in a remixed positioning among the great powers. Although it will be different to that during the Cold War, the Thai-US alliance can still be a mutually beneficial force to reckon with for both peoples across the Pacific.
Moving too close to China is inadvisable for Thai foreign and security policy planners.