China’s push to make new friends

As the world’s No.2 economic power with growing political clout, China is working hard to find regional strategic partners who it can “trust”. The desired partners can be any countries in Asean that have minds of their own but understand the game of power politics. Most importantly, their foreign policy must not in any way, real or imagined, undermine China’s position in the region.

Since China’s first foray into the Asean circuit in 1991, when it was invited as a guest to the Asean chair Kuala Lumpur, China-Asean ties have evolved quickly and differently from those with other dialogue partners. Beijing’s bilateral ties with all Southeast Asian countries, which followed Beijing’s admission to the United Nations in 1972, proved useful in laying the groundwork for establishing ties with Asean and forging Asean-led cooperation. Not surprisingly, China was the first major power to recognise Asean centrality, which cemented its position further and led to its accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003.

After all, China has established over 40 bilateral committees with Asean at all levels. Their leaders have met without fail 19 times, more than any other dialogue partners. Since the beginning, whenever any broader Asean-China cooperative framework faced difficulties, whether economic or political and security, China would adopt a bilateral approach. That has always been its approach. It was not until 2012, during the Cambodian chairmanship, that these tactics were criticised as impacting longstanding Asean-China relations.

Singapore-China ties have dominated regional and international news headlines recently. Any deterioration of their longstanding friendship would have far-reaching repercussions for Asean-China relations, of which Singapore is currently the country coordinator. The mutual friendship has now gone through a round of soul-searching on both sides. However, their leaders have been quick to point out that nothing has changed in their relations.

Despite such an assurance, China is now seeking new “trustful” strategic partners in Asean. Given the new dynamic within Asean, which is celebrating its 50th anniversary, it will be a rather difficult task.

At the moment, Asean members, both new and old, are more confident and bolder in conducting foreign relations with major powers. While adhering to their commitments to Asean, they are also pursuing national interests, and each of them has displayed unique skills of high-level diplomacy and hedging.

Given the increased imperative of Asean-China relations and pressure from other dialogue partners, each bilateral relationship has become a transformative factor that can have implications for broader relations. Of late, China has also encountered such a phenomenon resulting from diplomatic changes, some more dramatic than others, in individual Asean members.

Among the other Asean candidates on China’s list — Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Myanmar and Thailand — none have the strategic assets of Singapore, which established diplomatic relations with China in October 1990.

From Bangkok’s point of view, as far as China’s relations with individual countries are concerned, none of them can replace Singapore. After all, China has more investment in the island nation than in all other Asean members combined. From 2006 onward, Singapore received more than 50% of China’s investment in the Asean region.

In 2015 alone, China invested about US$10.5 billion (349 billion baht) in Singapore, or 71%, of its total $14.6 billion investment in Asean. The island’s excellent service facilities in finance and insurance as well as retail trade have attracted Chinese confidence and money. Nobody can tell whether China will continue this level of Singapore investment in the future given their current geopolitical positions.

On the surface, Thailand has often been cited as one of China’s best friends in the region. Indeed, if Thailand is perceived as China’s strategic partner, it is an unreliable one because it does not take a firm stand that would alienate its friends or foes. Outsiders view such a policy as “willow diplomacy”. Recently, Thailand decided to purchase Chinese-made submarines, the first in the region, despite its status as a treaty ally with the US. But it was tough in protracted negotiations with China on a high-speed train project.

During his visit this month, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson asked Thailand to downgrade diplomatic ties and cut off trade with North Korea over its recent intransigence and intercontinental missiles tests. While Bangkok did not agree, it was instrumental in drafting the group’s joint statement condemning Pyongang’s tests during the annual Asean meeting. Meanwhile, Thailand continues to welcome North Korean asylum seekers — a longstanding affair without making headlines.

Overall Thai-China relations are fragile, contrary to the general perception that they are very close. Their bilateral ties are only intimate among the elite and special interest groups. People-to-people relations are fluid and flat. Each day, at least 12,000 Chinese tourists visit Thailand, the most in Asia, making it the region’s most interactive with Chinese citizens. So far, both countries have shown resiliency and expediency in handling cultural mishaps that occasionally crop up.

Other cultural aspects still need consolidation.

Out of nearly one million Thais studying Chinese today, only a few thousand have managed to pass the standard Chinese-language (putonghua) test. The rest only speak, read and write mediocre putonghua. Also, it is extremely difficult to name Thai scholars who specialise in Chinese studies. Harder still is to find those who use Chinese-language research sources in place of Western materials.

In a similar vein, China’s investment in Thailand is minute in comparison to those in Singapore, Indonesia and Vietnam. Thai investment in China is also limited to big conglomerates, not as many smaller-size companies as in Singapore and Malaysia, which display diverse commercial groups. These two Asean members also have sizable Chinese populations with strong cultural links.

Therefore, China’s search for new trustful strategic partners will be difficult and time-consuming. At this juncture, no Asean country fits the bill. Both Cambodia and Singapore, despite their small sizes, have their unique strengths and voices in Asean while maintaining existing bilateral relations with China. With a new hierarchy of power and the radical changes associated with it, Asean as a group or individually today will be on full alert in forging new ties, trustful or otherwise, with the world’s No.2 power. They have to wait and see whether China’s interests are aligned with what their have in mind.