How will post-poll Thailand look?

Now the Election Commission and the National Council for Peace and Order have promised to hold the general election on Feb 24 next year, should we remain hopeful that the move will eventually lead Thailand to transition into a more democratic state? The answer largely depends on our expectations of the outcome, as well as the form of democracy that we want — and we can look southeasterly to Cambodia, or westerly to Myanmar to get a rough idea of what Thailand’s new beginning may be like.

As Cambodia announced a result of its widely-criticised election on Wednesday, one may start to wonder whether Thailand will follow suit in embracing the Cambodian model. While we can be sure that Thailand’s much-awaited election is unlikely to be marred by irregularities the way Cambodia’s was, we have to concede that the results won’t be entirely genuine.

Having grown up in the 1990s, I had high hopes for Thailand. We enjoyed greater freedom than our neighbours during those years. Our economy was rapidly developing — and we managed to come out of the 1997 tom yum goong financial crisis with the moniker “Teflon Thailand”, for our resilience during crises.

And as people in Myanmar saw their transition towards democracy thwarted by the military after the 1990 elections, we observed the event with sympathy. Our democracy was not perfect, as we swung from one extreme to the other, and pockmarked with military coups in between — but at least progress was made, especially after 1997. Following the 2006 and 2014 coups and the subsequent two constitutional changes — during which the country embraced more backward versions of democracy — I have been less hopeful and more wary of Thailand’s political future. Now, I could not help but envy my younger self, when Thailand was in a better state.

The announcement of the poll date has given me more relief than pleasure — at least there will eventually be an election after a series of broken promises. But I’m not particularly optimistic about the outcome. After the poll, Thailand will undoubtedly enter a transition period, where it will likely end up as either as a half-baked democracy, or even remain as an authoritarian state disguised under the thin veil of “democracy”.

In the lead-up to the poll, the regime’s political manoeuvring is not much different to that of Cambodia — although more subtle and less brutal. The attacks that Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Sen’s ruling party launched against its main rival, the Cambodia National Rescue Party, are not only irrational but brutal and illegitimate.

The CNRP was dissolved out owing to a conviction by Hun Sen’s regime that it had entered a conspiracy with the US to overthrow the government. Its MPs were banned from politics, while its leader has been jailed for treason.

Thailand has lived under a similar model. A popular political camp saw its parties dissolved, twice. Its former leaders have been prosecuted for criminal cases, known within the country as corruption offences, but recognised internationally as politically-motivated charges. The political developments indicate that the rules of the game leading up to the Feb 24 election are neither free nor fair. While the situation has yet to deteriorate the way it did in Cambodia, restrictions on the political opposition do exist — albeit more subtle in the way they are orchestrated.

The Pheu Thai Party is facing a probe over allegations that it had allowed former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra to get involved in its internal affairs. Meanwhile, the antimilitary Future Forward Party was accused of provoking the public and violating the Computer Crime Act in June.

With about six months to go before the election, both parties will have to watch their back, as the regime still forbids them and other parties from campaigning. By contrast, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha has been on the road meeting people in the provinces and allocating budgets for development in their localities — a move that can be seen as campaigning ahead of the election.

Gen Prayut will be unable to run as an MP candidate in the election because the constitution requires current cabinet members and lawmakers to resign from their post within 90 days of the promulgation of the charter. But speculation is rife he will be nominated as an outsider PM by parties that back the military — a non-democratic condition allowed by the regime-sponsored charter.

A group of shrewd politicians has also been in the field, poaching former MPs from the Pheu Thai camp to defect and join a pro-military party, Phalang Pracharat, which gives Gen Prayut a competitive edge.

Election rules make it hard for a big party to win elections by a landslide. In the best case scenario, Thailand will likely have a coalition or one-party government. The victors will still have to share power with Gen Prayut and other generals who will retain control over the Senate through 250 senators that they will handpick. However, if the parties who back Gen Prayut win the mandate to form a government and nominate him as prime minister, then administrative and legislative power will be in the hands of one man — the way it has been over the past four years.

The election may have drawn nearer, but it will take some time for Thailand to become a real democracy. Nowadays, I look at the political crises in Cambodia and Myanmar not with sympathy, but with the empathy of someone who shares a similar fate to the people there.

The poll may have drawn nearer, but it will take time for Thailand to become a real democracy.