What next with China as a superpower?
The spectacular celebrations to mark the People’s Republic of China’s 70th anniversary of its founding were the culmination of a sweeping ideological struggle over the past century between two competing systems of socioeconomic and political organisation. Under the stewardship of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China has now arrived as a 21st century superpower with an unprecedented hybrid of totalitarian control and a capitalist market economy, the successor state to the old Soviet Union whose demise nearly 30 years ago was attributable to its rigid collectivism over market capitalism.
Whether China can sustain its success and dynamism as a politically centralised state with a vibrant market economy will have far-reaching ramifications for developing countries that are having second and third thoughts about the premise and promise of liberal democracy, as Western societies are beset with internal divisions and polarisation along with anaemic economic growth. Some developing states are now attracted to what many see as a “China model” of having strong central authority at the expense of some civil liberties but with economic development.
None of these overarching themes about China’s ascendancy should overlook what took place on Oct 1, as central Beijing became the venue for the country’s biggest-ever parade and show of military might. It had everything in terms of pomp and pageantry from images of past leaders dating to Mao Zedong and the young and old waving flags to some of the most advanced military equipment on display, highlighted by President Xi Jinping’s exuberant speech about how “no force can ever undermine China’s status, or stop the Chinese people and nation from marching forward”.
The military portion of the National Day parade caught the most attention. It featured some 15,000 personnel, 160 aircraft, and 580 pieces of military equipment. As a land power, China was expected to show off a lot of tanks and artillery. Yet its military prowess during the parade was underpinned by newer and more innovative aerial weaponry, including the road-portable Dongfeng-41 (DF-41) ballistic missile.
The lethality of the DF-41 is its intercontinental reach — reportedly all the way to the United States in 30 minutes — with a warhead that can accelerate vertically as a single rocket but split up into 10 multiple, independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) when it comes down, aimed at as many destinations at the same time. A swarm of nuclear-tipped MIRVs are next to impossible to defend against.
Another array of air-related weapons to impress were a supersonic surveillance and targeting drone and an unmanned stealth aircraft dubbed “sharp sword”, which was noticeable for its lack of a visible external fuel tank. Along with early-warning and control aircraft (EWAC) and an airborne flotilla of fighters, bombers and refuelling tankers, these two types of drones were intended to show technological superiority.
China’s armed forces are still well behind those of the US, whose military expenditure is still nearly four times its rival’s. But the People’s Liberation Army, its navy and air force, are catching up fast in quantitative and qualitative terms. The PLA plans to be a fully modernised force by 2035 and second-tonone by 2049.
These military modernisation programmes parallel Mr Xi’s “Chinese Dream” vision and its attendant plans to be a “moderately welloff” society by 2021, when the CCP turns 100, with per capita income doubling that of 2010. In turn, when the PRC celebrates its centenary 30 years from now, the plan is to be a developed country with a “strong, democratic, civilised, harmonious, and modern socialist country”.
This bold vision has elicited doubts. Many see China as undemocratic for a lack of basic freedoms and key democratic institutions, such as a free media, civil society, and a functioning multiparty system. But the Chinese claim that they are democratic, except their democracy operates within one party, the CCP. To China’s critics, social harmony and breakneck economic growth are not worth the authoritarian repression and deprivation of fundamental freedoms, including in places like Xinjiang province where Muslim Uighurs are persecuted. The ongoing Hong Kong protests are cited as another rejection of Chinese-style top-down authoritarian rule through a proxy local government.
Nor does being Chinese and being economically successful require following the CCP’s path. The Republic of China, more commonly known as Taiwan, stands out and apart as a liberal democratic model that works, complete with a Chinese DNA. To the Taiwanese, President Xi’s insistence on “peaceful reunification” vis-à-vis Taiwan is an oxymoron. China’s use of force would be indispensable unless “reunification” is taken to mean something else altogether.
In addition, the Chinese government’s belligerence in the South China Sea, where it has constructed and weaponised artificial islands on rocks and reefs claimed by other states, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam, has brought regional scepticism and concern. Similarly, China’s upstream dams on the Mekong River have paid scant regard to grievances in downstream communities. Because China has relied on pressure and coercion more than trust and goodwill, its signature Belt and Road Initiative, Mr Xi’s geostrategic brainchild, has faced stumbling blocks.
Clearly, the jury is still out on China as a profound force in history, but so far it has confounded and frustrated critics and opponents alike. There is a longstanding cottage industry that looks like a graveyard full of conjectures and predictions about “China’s coming collapse” due to internal stress and the seeming incompatibility between centralised communist rule and a market-based capitalist economy. Indeed, there is no modern state like the CCP’s PRC.
The CCP learns by doing, and is highly adaptable and resilient, having catastrophically experimented with rapid industrialisation and collectivisation in the “Great Leap Forward” and later a communist catharsis in the “Cultural Revolution”. Turning to the market became the CCP’s answer to the challenges of modernity.
Moving forward, China’s shape and form at its 100th anniversary will depend largely on two trends. One is whether the CCP can continue to manage public expectations by delivering growth and better standards of living while maintaining meritocracy and integrity. The other is whether the Western liberal democracies and market economies can regroup and restore the trust and vitality in their once-vaunted institutions that have been increasingly fraying from the edges to their core.
Developing societies and their citizens, who are also characterised by polarisation and divisions in the continuum between autocracy and democracy, will be watching closely as to which is the more optimal way ahead. They are seeing how China has arrived, and many are asking where America and the rest of the West are.