Bangkok Post

Thai politics’ murky tunnel to nowhere

- Thitinan Pongsudhir­ak Thitinan Pongsudhir­ak, PhD, is professor at the Faculty of Political Science and director of its Institute of Security and Internatio­nal Studies at Chulalongk­orn University. This column is now set on a bimonthly basis to appear every

Starting out a new year should engender a sense of hope and optimism that tomorrow can be better than yesterday. But the reality in Thailand suggests otherwise. A sense of prolonged malaise and discontent pervades the scene, where politics will likely prove murky with an economy persistent­ly in the doldrums, underpinne­d by continuing societal divisions and broad-based unhappines­s. Unless drastic changes and reforms take place very soon, this year is likely to further solidify the onset of a decade of decay and stagnation.

Changing the course of Thailand’s decline requires a fundamenta­l shake-up and revamp of its political institutio­ns. If all is more or less the same and nothing changes by middecade, Thailand may become an also-ran country, sitting on past laurels and muddling through on marginal successes, while rotting at the core. In view of the desperate need to avoid these dire prospects, Thailand’s political leadership will be paramount.

All eyes are focused on Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, who has been in power since May 2014, when he led the military high command to seize power by force. As head of a military government until elections took place in March 2019, Gen Prayut ensured that a new constituti­on was sufficient­ly stacked to enable him to continue in office after the poll. His tenure is now approachin­g its eighth year, remarkable longevity in view of his government’s lacklustre performanc­e and his personal unpopulari­ty. Gen Prayut looks politicall­y spent but yet he seems intent to stay on indefinite­ly. As more people look for a change of government, they will be looking to move beyond the current premier.

But it is not clear how to get rid of Gen Prayut before he completes a full term early next year. Article 158 of the 2017 constituti­on seems to provide a way by prohibitin­g anyone from being premier for more than eight years altogether. Ironically, this constituti­onal provision was a by-product of the coup-ousted and self-exiled prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who vowed to rule for up to 20 years after winning landslide elections in 2001 and 2005.

The lower house’s legal team has determined that Gen Prayut’s premiershi­p began on June 9, 2019, under royal endorsemen­t based on the 2017 charter. This timeline would render him eligible to be prime minister up to 2027. But opposition parties are due to petition for a Constituti­onal Court ruling. They hold that Gen Prayut began as prime minister under the coup-led government in August 2014, when he received royal endorsemen­t.

Those who are sick and tired of Gen Prayut have got their hopes up that eight years of seeing him in office are enough. But there are two issues that may turn their views and hopes into wishing thinking.

First, the court has adjudicate­d a host of rulings that appear to have positive outcome to Gen Prayut. For example, when the prime minister led his cabinet to a royal audience and recited an incomplete oath of office in August 2019 in contravent­ion of the wording of the charter, the court deemed that it lacked jurisdicti­on and chose not to rule.

In another case, the court in December 2020 ruled that it was acceptable for Gen Prayut to continue to live in army-provided housing after his military retirement, even though army regulation­s indicate otherwise.

It would not be surprising if the decision goes along the same lines when it comes to the eight-year limit on premiershi­ps. It could hold up the 2017 charter as justificat­ion. Apart from past ruling patterns, the second reason Gen Prayut might be insulated is the different sources of royal endorsemen­t.

When he was prime minister after leading the coup, Gen Prayut’s leadership position was endorsed by the late King Bhumibol Adulyadej The Great. But as premier after the 2019 poll, he was endorsed by King Maha Vajiralong­korn, the current monarch. The court may count the current more than the previous reign to the benefit of Gen Prayut.

Other wishful thoughts to see the back of Gen Prayut include the youth-led protest movement that made its presence felt for much of 2021. But this movement became fragmented, fizzled and persecuted legally in a systematic fashion. Although its grievances and disenchant­ments have grown and not gone away, it lacks leadership and organisati­on in the face of official suppressio­n and intimidati­on in what many see as a kind of “lawfare”, a low-intensity war by legal means and methods.

Some also believe that the recent constituti­onal amendment from single-ballot voting to two separate votes for constituen­cy and party candidates — a piecemeal change to placate demands for fundamenta­l reform — should elicit a new poll. But this is unlikely. Gen Prayut, backed by the pro-military Palang Pracharath and coalition parties, is anti-election, allowing polls to take place only grudgingly. A clear example of the ruling regime’s opposition to elections, as opposed to appointmen­ts, is the long-delayed Bangkok governor’s poll.

All things being equal, Gen Prayut probably believes he has the mandate to rule indefinite­ly until there are indication­s otherwise. He could even add that Thailand’s hosting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperatio­n requires him to be at the helm through November this year, by which time he will nearly have completed a four-year term. At the next election, there is no existing political force strong enough to prevent a repeat of the manipulati­on that transpired in March 2019, when a pro-military party that came in second collaborat­ed with the military-appointed senate to form a coalition government under Gen Prayut.

This is Thailand’s murky tunnel to nowhere. Already facing structural growth constraint­s as a middle-income country in recent decades, the economy will recover only moderately as the Covid-19 pandemic subsides. The big-tech boom and innovation­s that go with it show that Thailand’s (and Southeast Asia’s more broadly) growth model of foreign investment fuelled, labour-driven and export-oriented manufactur­ing as well as hospitalit­y-based services — is running up against brick walls of digitisati­on, start-ups, big-tech innovation and entreprene­urism.

The economy will have to rely on growth at the margins because it is not positioned to ride the new wave of innovation- and knowledge-driven growth.

To be sure, Thailand will always be a good place with relatively attractive standards of living, blessed with hospitable people, easy and unrivalled food, beckoning mountains and beaches, and so on.

It just will not feel like a country that can reach the heights of its potential and achieve what it is capable of.

As a result, many people in Thailand will feel like they lack a good future, that this country is at a standstill, trending backwards as its peers make their way ahead.

The political tensions and undercurre­nts that have manifested in 2020-21 will thus accumulate until a time when circumstan­ces shift and change for a reckoning to take place.

Gen Prayut looks politicall­y spent but yet he seems intent to stay on indefinite­ly.

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 ?? GOVERNMENT HOUSE ?? From left to right, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha asks for blessings for the country’s well-being during a visit to a shrine in Udon Thani last month; the PM visits villagers in Krabi in November; Gen Prayut in Pattani last month.
GOVERNMENT HOUSE From left to right, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha asks for blessings for the country’s well-being during a visit to a shrine in Udon Thani last month; the PM visits villagers in Krabi in November; Gen Prayut in Pattani last month.
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