Do early elections matter?

Regional challenges have been invoked to justify early elections. How valid are the concerns?

Last week, President Erdoğan raised some eyebrows by agreeing to early elections on June 24. The decision came after weeks in which the president seemed determined to hold the presidential and parliamentary votes as scheduled in November 2019. Both the domestic and international press have been rife with speculation over what changed. The consensus appears to be that Turkey’s economic woes do not appear to be improving and the timing of the election is now critical: the longer the AK Party and its alliance partner, the MHP, wait, the more difficult it will become for them to win. Erdoğan, however, cited a multitude of reasons for the snap election, including a host of geopolitical challenges Turkey faces. Our chief political scientist looks at Turkey’s foreign relations and what the early elections mean for them. Will foreign policy play a role in the election campaign? Is it justifiable to argue early elections are needed to protect Turkey from international developments?

fferent countr es have d fferent hopes for how the elect ons n Turkey play out. The relat onsh p between the U.S. and the govern ng party s stra ned. There s even talk of sanct ons over the purchase of the Russ an S-400 m ss le defense system. The Russ ans have a d fferent po nt of v ew. How much potent al s there for th s elect on to fundamentally sh ft Turkey’s geopol t cal relat onsh ps?

This is a comprehensive question that may not be answered easily. There’s no indication that if a different combination of parties wins the elections, their attitude toward the U.S. or Russia will be substantially different. The major area of contention with the U.S. now is the way it has chosen to cooperate with the YPG in Syria. That cooperation is unacceptable not only for the governing party but for most major political actors in Turkey.

A change of government is unlikely to bring significant changes to the way Turkey’s external relations develop. What will change, if the government changes, is the rhetoric. A more diplomatic, less confrontational and populist language will be employed and this can be helpful to alleviating some of the problems that are experienced in international relations. A new government will also likely treat the erosion of the rule of law more seriously and will probably adopt a number of measures that are more in line with the democratic practices of Europe. This will probably smoothen somewhat the relations with the EU. While the fundamental points of disagreement will not go away, how Turkey is perceived by outside powers, the context in which we interact with other societies may and is likely to change.

As for Russia, when the ordinary citizen evaluates Turkey’s growing relationship, he or she couches it in the language of opposition to Americana policies in Syria. The citizens may overlook the fact that national interests of Turkey and Russia do not fully converge. There are major differences in many areas. Policymakers should always be cognizant of this reality. A change in government might facilitate putting the Russian relationship in a more realistic perspective. There is, for example, an aspect of external relations that is characteristic of our president that may not replicate itself with others. He tends to perceive foreign policy in highly personal terms and likes to interact with the Russian leadership himself. If the government changes, there might be a return to a more institutionalized interaction and a reduction in the personalization of foreign policy.

►In mak ng the dec s on for early elect ons, Pres dent Erdoğan has c ted geopol t cal tens ons as one mot vat ng factor. Do reg onal tens ons have a bear ng on th s dec s on?

If you want to relate the Turkish elections to international developments, the critical question is what is it that the Turkish government is not able to do now that it would be able to do after the elections? At the moment, we are going through a semi-presidential transitional period to move into a presidential system after elections. It seems that, for all practical purposes, the president has already assumed all the powers he would enjoy in a presidential system. The prime minister and parliament are both exceptionally accommodating to his wishes. There seems to be no particular difficulty in getting laws through the parliament; the government is fully supportive of what the president wants. There have been no impediments to government decision making and implementation with regard to foreign policy that would be enhanced by a positive outcome in the election. The real reason for the snap elections lies not in Turkey’s international but in its domestic politics. When you look at the international press, they seem to be of the same opinion: the decision was prompted to a significant extent by pending unfavorable economic developments. One might also add that the government does not appear to be assured of an electoral majority for either the presidency or the parliament. Therefore, before waiting for further electoral difficulties to arise, the current political leadership may well have decided that the margins against them are currently not that high and with a sustained effort they could turn the tide in their favor and win the election.

►Could the recent EU report on Turkey’s access on be one of those d ff cult th ngs? It was qu te damn ng.

Well, we seem to have this ritual with the EU. With regular intervals, we get a negative report and when you examine the contents of the report, they are generally similar to the past reports, though the language has been getting a bit harsher. Turkey has not been particularly responsive to these reports. It has said that the EU fails to appreciate Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy needs. It’s not clear at the moment that the EU report will have a significant effect on politics. In fact, this kind of report may possibly produce opposite effect of what is intended: The government has been following a strategy of arguing that Turkey is being attacked by major outside forces that harbor ill intentions toward it. This report, the government could argue, is another piece of evidence that Turkey is surrounded by hostile states that are trying to undermine its security and economy. In other words, it may provide the government with more electoral ammunition. But at this stage, the report may not make much difference because it is perceived as the usual old stuff. It’s not a change of policy, it’s not a report that points to a totally new direction. While the government might try to benefit from it politically, the fact that there is nothing new about it may reduce its impact.

In the end, it’s not EU accession or the war in Syria, or relations with Russia or the U.S. that will dominate this election. It will be all about the economy and the kind of future Turks envision for their society.