Turkey’s gambit

U.S. President Donald Trump gives Turkey what it wants. But at what cost?

Last week, it looked as if pieces of the geopolitical puzzle were finally falling into place for Turkey. On December 19, just five days after President Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke to U.S. president Donald Trump on the telephone, the U.S. State Department announced that it now supports the sale of the Patriot missile defense system to Turkey. The next day, Trump announced that he would be pulling American troops out of Syria, leading to the resignation of his defense secretary, James Mattis. It all sounds good but there are serious risks. With Turkey already taking on the responsibility to bring some semblance of order to Idlib, the last stronghold of the Syrian opposition, not to mention its ongoing presence in northwest Syria, a third region under Turkish control will seriously strain Turkey’s resources. Can it manage or has it bitten off more than it can chew?

►F rstly, can you go over what you th nk prompted Trump’s dec s on to pull troops out of Syr a? Was t the phone call w th Erdogan?

There was, already, a softening of the U.S. position regarding making Patriot missiles available to Turkey. Since the recommendation of the State Department requires Congressional approval, the missile sale is not yet definite, but this constitutes a shift of position. Then came the rather surprising development with Mr. Trump announcing that, having achieved its mission in Syria to bring Daesh under control, the U.S. would withdraw its forces in anywhere from 60 to 100 days. It appears that this came as a shock not only to the Turkish public and to the YPG, but also to the American bureaucracy and Congress.

I’m not sure whether Mr. Trump’s announcement is entirely a product of his conversation with Erdogan; we should remember that during his election campaign, he had promised to pull American soldiers out of Syria. But, more to the point is that we have here two leaders both of whom are prone to conducting politics on personal terms. We don’t know for sure if the conversation was the key to all this – though reports from U.S. administration sources also appear to point in that direction - but we know that both leaders seem to see the world in give and take terms. We still don’t know what was given and what was taken. What we know so far is that Mr. Trump seems to be persuaded that American soldiers should not remain in Syria.

►So perhaps a qu d pro quo. We know what the Amer cans are offer ng - the w thdrawal of troops along w th the patr ot system. What do you th nk Turkey could offer n return?

One possibility is that Turkey may have offered, as it has in the past, to take over the function of the U.S. east of the Euphrates – i.e. bringing end to Daesh as a major military and political force. But there might be other dimensions, including keeping the Iranians out, putting the acquisition of the S400 missile system on hold, etc. But of course, these comments are all mere speculations.

►Do you bel eve t serves the Amer can nterest to w thdraw from Syr a?

To answer that, we should analyze why American troops were there in the first place. The immediate reason was to fight Daesh, but as the fight against Daesh began to wind down, the American military and foreign policy establishment began redefining the purpose of the US presence. One goal is the prevention of further projection of Iranian power toward the west. Another goal is counterbalancing growing Russian influence. Possibly the American administration or more likely Mr. Trump may have judged that the current level of engagement and current plans - cooperating with the Saudis or establishing what would resemble an Islamic NATO - are unrealistic dreams and that the U.S. is simply not ready to go it alone in the area without reliable partners. The Saudis have not proven themselves to be a formidable fighting force and they seem to be so obsessed with Iran that they are not contributing much to the effort in Syria. On the other hand, cooperating with the YPG as a proxy harbored many problematic dimensions. Thus, the initial American plans to redesign the political map of the Middle East have not worked out. The U.S. appears not to be willing to invest significant sources, in particular military resources, to continue to implement those plans. It may be that Mr. Trump has decided to hand the responsibility over to Turkey.

►So a lot of respons b l ty now falls on Turkey, part cularly f t launches an operat on east of the Euphrates, and n the process, takes control over the whole of northern Syr a. What comes next?

I cannot see how Turkey can shape the post-YPG reality in northern Syria without having more communication with the current Syrian regime. That means Turkey’s earlier strategy of supporting Muslim Brotherhood-type movements will have to come to an end. I think this is going to be a bitter pill to swallow for Turkey but if doesn’t want to end up in a quagmire in Syria, it would have to negotiate with the Syrian government. One important dimension of that negotiation would have to be not allowing segments of Syria’s Kurds to organize in order to harass Turkey. This constituted the central issue that was addressed in the Adana Accords of 1999. So, we’ve come the full circle; and we’re back to the drawing board.

►Turkey has secured what t sought: a prom nent role n the reg on. Can t handle t? Does t have the resources to take on such a huge task?

If you want a one word answer: Possibly. If you want a two word answer? Probably not. At the moment, the Turkish economy is running into difficulties. To assume military responsibilities outside the country would generate additional economic strains which Turkey might not be able to bear. Secondly, it’s not prudent for Turkey to invest all of its military might in Syria; there are other challenges and contingencies it faces that it should be ready to meet.

►From the pol t cal perspect ve: The AK Party s not do ng well n op n on polls. Can th s help them pol t cally?

External action to buttress internal support is always risky business. Politically, often it does not pay off except in the short run because it tends to be very costly. While there might be some initial excitement and calls for solidarity behind the government, prolongation tends usually to generate negative responses. I cannot imagine that any involvement in Syria can be concluded in the short term. Turks should be prepared to be in this ordeal for the long haul.