A geopolitical re-alignment?

we looked at developments LAST WEEK, in Libya, where the influence of strongman General Khalifa Hifter appears to be waning. The Turkish-backed Government of National Accord has made significant progress in repelling Hifter’s forces from Tripoli and it seems now the momentum to find a negotiated solution to the Libyan crisis is closer than ever. This week, developments in the struggle over energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean also took a turn in Turkey’s favor. Libya, of course, is a key player in the Mediterranean. Thus the two developments are interlinked. What has happened and what does it mean for Turkey’s foreign policy?

Adnan R. Khan: Most readers are probably inundated by coronavirus news. Can you just bring everyone up to date on what’s been happening in the Eastern Mediterranean?

Ilter Turan: Two important developments have recently occurred. First, last week NAT• secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg announced that the alliance recognizes the Government of National Accord and is supportive of it. This runs counter to France’s policy, which has been oriented toward supporting General Hifter. Second, Egypt, Greece, the Greek Cypriot government and for some reason two outsiders, the United Arab Emirates and France issued a joint statement criticizing Turkey’s exploration and military activities in parts of the Eastern Mediterranean that Egypt, Greece and Greek Cypriot governments consider to be their exclusive economic zones. What’s interesting, however, is that Israel, which has been a partner in those discussions, did not sign the document. When questioned, the Israeli foreign ministry spokesman tweeted that the Israelis are proud to have diplomatic relations with Turkey and are looking forward expanding those relations. This reveals an important crack in the anti-Turkish alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Adnan R. Khan: Why the shift?

Ilter Turan: There are a variety of arguments that explain Israel’s position but I think the most plausible is to look at the world energy picture and draw a conclusion from there. The demand for energy has been declining. This is not exclusively a result of the pandemic; already a more general global economic slowdown was in progress. The general feeling seems to be that the gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean are not so rich as to justify extensive investment. It will simply be very expensive to ship this gas to European markets. And this is a singularly inappropriate time to insist on exploration in highly contested areas anyhow. This was already the case even before the pandemic gutted energy prices.

I think Israel may be looking to a future state of affairs where things will improve and it does not want to have hostile relations with Turkey, which has the largest economy in the region, in addition to being the most formidable military power and, in addition to Israel, the most technologically advanced country.

Adnan R. Khan: Geopolitical shifts appear to be in the making but France is sticking to its guns, backing Hifter as well as the Egypt-Greece-UAE troika. What do you make of that?

Ilter Turan: France seems to have judged that the conditions have offered her a unique opportunity. It feels it can wield more influence in the region than it has been able to in the past. Save their presence in Eastern Syria, the Americans have pretty much thrown in the towel in the Eastern Mediterranean. Also, they are no longer interested in assuming a strong leadership position in NAT•. France fancies itself as a great power. Accordingly, it would like to exercise influence in various parts of the world. In terms of the EU, some people have suggested that while Germany provides the economic dynamo, in the absence of American leadership, its security needs could be met by France. I don’t think this is realistic: other members of the EU would certainly not be willing to support French military power as the main backbone of a European defense mechanism. But by engaging in these activities, the French government nevertheless hopes that it can establish great power status in the region and call the shots.

Adnan R. Khan: So is Israel back on Turkey’s side?

Ilter Turan: Israel hasn’t come to the Turkish side, There are many difficulties that stand in the way of improving relations. It has simply refused to sign a joint post-conference statement that was clearly designed to push Turkey aside in the Eastern Mediterranean. I think Israeli policy is simply more prudent and less provocative. I think Israel thinking within a long term framework in the formulation and implementation of its foreign policy. It is cognizant of the fact that it is not necessarily a good idea to be in extremely adversarial terms with Turkey. I think Israel would be happy if relations with Turkey were better and I would personally judge that to be a good strategy. I wish also that we could have better relations with Israel because these are the two modern and most technologically advanced, and somewhat democratic, societies in what otherwise is a unstable and underdeveloped region.