Short and long term outcomes may be different

intervention in Ukraine begins AS RUSSIA’S to unfold, observers have begun to analyze both the scope of the Russian action and its short and long-term consequences. While how far the Russian forces will advance was still open to questioning at the time of writing, it now appears clear that the Russian action will not be limited to extending “military support” to the self-declared republics as was initially declared, but rather will extend to cover much of Ukraine, if not all of it. Mr. Putin, by employing lies and deception on the one hand, and relying on the lack of decisiveness of the Western world in responding to to Russian efforts to alter the post-Cold War order on the other, has positioned himself to launch a full-fledged attack.

What effects will the Russian move have on Russia’s relations with Europe, the United States, and countries around the world? When the outcomes of military action are evaluated, it may be useful to introduce time frames into the discussion. Since the Russian action, though not totally unexpected, was nevertheless sudden, Russia may achieve its initial military aims within a matter of days. As the world recovers from the shock, however, the situation may be altered. Within the next few days, it would not be surprising if Ukraine begins to receive more effective weapons with which to meet the Russian onslaught. Civil resistance may also become more effective, imposing losses on Russian forces. It is, of course, entirely possible that the Russians may, having acquired enough territory that they could use in bargaining, turn to negotiations.

Sanctions have already been introduced. Justifiably, various degrees of skepticism are expressed toward their effectiveness. They can be breached, the will to impose them may weaken particularly in light of the fact that their burden falls inequitably among those who impose them, the target countries may already be prepared to meet them and will take other measures that will reduce their effectiveness, and finally the will to continually impose will decline as time passes. On the other hand, the reason why the sanctions have been introduced may trigger some changes on the part of those who impose them. For example, the crisis has driven home the already-known reality that Europe is heavily dependent on Russian gas. This has already reinforced efforts to find and/or develop alternative sources. It will not be surprising if within a matter or two or three years Europe develops such sources, though this may be somewhat more costly than relying on Russian gas. Similarly, Russia may become a non grata territory for Western investments, inflicting considerable economic deprivation on the economy.

The western reaction to Ukraine will also influence the behavior of other countries that may be considering employing military methods to change the world’s political map. Leading the list is China, which has aspirations to incorporate Taiwan into its territories. An awareness of this is likely to push the Americans to use all possible means, short of sending American soldiers to Ukraine, to deter further Russian aggression and if possible, force the Russians to withdraw. The Europeans, on the other hand, may become concerned that not putting forth strong resistance might invite new Russian encroachments in the Baltic states. These concerns suggest that there will be strong motivations on the part of the Western world to employ more effective means than they have employed so far in stopping Russian territorial adventurism. Inevitably, in planning their foreign policy moves, democratic states have to calculate more carefully than authoritarian states the readiness of their publics to accept the risks and sacrifices their external actions might generate. This may go a long way in explaining their reluctance to employ military forces or other means that will expose their populations to risk or deprivation.

As I look at what is happening, I cannot but think about how the world was dragged into the Second World War. Germany and Italy, as the major revisionist powers of the time, were doing things not unlike what Russia is doing today. Democracies tried multiple ways of accommodating them in order to avoid a war. Hitler probably judged that his rivals, divided and reluctant to fight, would not be able to pull their act together and that he would get his way in establishing a German lebensraum. As he became more adventurous, he also provided an opportunity not only for the leaders but also the people of democracies to understand that there was no way short of fighting to stop him. Nowadays, nuclear weapons have rendered such large scale wars unacceptable. Nevertheless, the West may eventually employ all means available to it short of a direct war to penalize the Russians. Such penalties might be more than Russia might want to bear.