Russia’s nuclear threat

AFTERM R. PUTIN’S initial designs to conquer Ukraine in a matter of days failed, the Russian leadership made intermittent references to the use of nuclear weapons. Initially, Mr. Putin announced that Russian nuclear forces were being placed on high alert, implying that they would be ready to be used if needed. Most recently, presidential spokesman Peskov reminded adversaries that Russia will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons if it is faced with an existential threat. In a poorly planned and faltering invasion where so far only conventional forces have been used and where Russia’s presumed adversary, Ukraine, does even possess the conventional weapons it needs let alone nuclear ones, talking about nuclear weapons appears to be totally out of place. Ukraine does not possess nuclear weapons that it could use against Russia and none of its allies are ready to supply them. Furthermore, there is no possibility that Ukraine will defeat the Russian forces, drive them out, and continue on to stage a counter-invasion of Russia.

Given these conditions, why has Russia brought up the possibility of using nuclear weapons? Will it really use them and would it achieve its goals if it moves the war to a nuclear level? What would the long-term implications of such a threat be for global stability? These, among others, are some of the questions that immediately come to mind. Let us begin by noting that because the horrors of an escalating nuclear war would be so devastating for all those who take part in it as well as for bystanders that would be exposed to its fallout, we have led ourselves to believe that major nuclear powers would never initiate such a conflict.

The logic behind the confidence that we are protected against a global nuclear holocaust is deterrence theory. It posits that the two nuclear giants, i.e. the United States and Russia, have achieved between them a balance of terror based on mutually assured destruction. At the center of this balance is the assumption that if one side initiates a nuclear attack, the other, though destroyed, will retain sufficient second-strike capability to inflict unacceptable damage to the attacker. Deterrence theory, of course, leaves a number of questions unanswered, such as whether the United States would be willing to use its nuclear arsenal to respond to a nuclear attack on Europe and risk its own destruction in the process, whether the so-called theater or battlefield of nuclear weapons would contribute to the achievement of deterrence or undermine it, and whether a smaller nuclear power such as France or Britain could initiate a global nuclear war into which bigger nuclear powers would be drawn because they would have no time to judge whether this is a concerted attack by the allies or emanating from one a small partners acting on its own. The uncertainties about the answer to these questions, the proponents of deterrence theory argue, is a source of unpredictability that enhances deterrence.

Deterrence theory would tell us that Russia is unlikely to use nuclear weapons to get what it wants in Ukraine since such use would invite its own destruction. Why then is Russia issuing a nuclear threat? Or is it even a threat? Russian statements have all referred to a future state of affairs where the use of such weapons may become necessary if the country encounters an existential threat. These utterances are a way of saying “do not push me into a position where I feel existentially threatened.” This then leads us to inquire whether there are indications that Russia is currently facing or likely to encounter in the foreseeable future an existential threat. While we do not know what constitutes an existential threat in the minds of Mr. Putin and his entourage, any qualified observer would note that friends of Ukraine have restricted their support to a limited amount of mainly defensive conventional weapons with no intention to give offensive weapons or get involved in the fighting themselves. They do not want the conflict to escalate but rather want it to be brought to a peaceful conclusion. Ukraine, on the other hand, has clearly indicated that it will no longer pursue its goal of joining NATO, that it is willing to make policy changes to accommodate the aspirations of the Russian-speaking provinces of the country to have greater autonomy, and that it is ready to leave the future of Crimea to future negotiations.

Why the nuclear threat then? For that answer, it may be more meaningful to look into Russian domestic politics where Mr. Putin’s plans for a quick takeover of Ukraine have failed while exposing to the outside world that the feared Russian Army is in reality not such a fearful, efficient, or effective organization after all. Presenting the conflict rhetorically and vaguely as existential may be a way of subduing criticism and suppressing opposition at home. Sufficiently reasonable grounds for fearing a nuclear escalation are lacking and such fears should not constrain efforts to extend support to the Ukrainians to ward off the Russian invasion.