Being cautious is better than being unduly optimistic

past week has been one of excitement THE and hope. Russian and Ukrainian delegations met in Istanbul to talk about ending their war, and contrary to expectations, they appear to have agreed on enough points such that not only have the spokesmen of both parties expressed some satisfaction but also the head of the Russian delegation has said that he will take the proposals to Mr. Putin. Presumably, if the Russian president agrees on the main points, then the two countries’ Foreign Ministers will meet to prepare a final document and the presidents will meet to iron out the remaining sticking points and agree to end the war. An optimist might say that both sides have reached a point where they prefer not to continue fighting. Ukraine has offered some genuine concessions and Russia has withheld some of its more unreasonable demands, making it possible for the two parties to draw a roadmap that will guide the two countries to peace.

The invasion that has devastated Ukraine and mobilized the United States, NATO and the European Union against Russia has so far failed in part because Ukraine has put up an impressive resistance and in part because Russian forces have performed so miserably. Ukraine, however, is getting growing exhausted and its allies, concerned about escalation and other potential complications, would welcome an end to the hostilities. The Ukrainians have offered, among other things, to formalize their commitment to not join alliances and expressed their willingness to leave determining the status of Crimea to future negotiations, but they want international guarantees for their territorial integrity and insist that a peace treaty be subject to ratification by a national referendum. Evidently, the Russians will not object to Ukraine’s closer relations with the European Union. The emergence of such background conditions, indicating that the respective positions of the parties are nearing, would lead an optimistic observer to conclude that the conditions are ripe for a settlement.

Before indulging in the optimistic viewpoint that the war might come to a close quickly, it may be prudent to consider two different factors that are likely to affect the negotiation process. First, it should be noted that the Russians have not proposed a ceasefire but simply offered to reduce the level of their military activity around Kyiv and Chernihiv so as demonstrate their good (!) intentions. They have given no indication that they will reduce their fighting in such places as Mariupol and Odessa. A skeptic would predict that the Russians are not sincere in reducing the war effort. They were experiencing major difficulties in their attempt to take Kyiv and were already in the process of reorganizing and repositioning their troops there while waiting for the arrival of new troops and the replenishment of supplies. The lull in fighting will give them time to complete these efforts. They are not reducing their operations in the South where they are trying to close off the Black Sea to Ukraine. If they succeed in their plans, there will be little left to negotiate and their bargaining positions will be enhanced. The contradictory comments made by different segments of the Russian policy apparatus give credence to more skeptical interpretations of Russian behavior. These developments force us to evaluate the credibility of the Russian government that kept lying about military exercises until the last moment as its troops got ready to invade Ukraine.

The second set of factors are even more complicated. Who will assure, for example, that the Russians will withdraw after Ukraine has agreed to a set of concessions? Will the Russians agree to an international guarantee of Ukrainian territorial integrity? Assuming that they agree, which is highly doubtful, who will be the guarantors and what will “guaranteeing ” mean? Unless the guarantors agree to defending Ukraine’s territorial integrity militarily, would guarantees be effective, and would they deter Russia from engaging in efforts to change the political geography of Ukraine? Would any country be willing to accept the responsibility of fighting the Russians to stop their military encroachments on Ukrainian territory? Noting the current unwillingness of Ukraine’s friends to offer help that would place their own soldiers against the Russians, can we expect the guarantors to behave differently?

Many other questions also come to mind. For example, would the Russians agree to a referendum allowing Ukrainians to ratify a peace agreement that their government has signed? What if the agreement is rejected after the Russian forces have withdrawn from much of Ukraine? Or, what will happen to the sanctions that allies of Ukraine have imposed on Russia for which the Ukrainian government is neither responsible nor empowered to repeal? More questions may easily be added to the list. Suffice it to say that while we welcome the fact that the Russians and the Ukrainians have begun to negotiate about bringing an end to their conflict, caution rather than unwarranted optimism should characterize our approach. It is simply too early to rejoice.