Quiet diplomacy might have been better, but complaints need to be addressed

Russia’s Ukrainian intervention began, WHEN no one imagined that the traditionally neutral Finland and Sweden would transform their outlook and, to ensure their security, search for membership in NATO. Until recently, these countries had thought that keeping out of NATO was the best way to avoid Russian wrath and be assured of not constituting a target in a NATO -Russia conflagration. The highly questionable conceptualization of Russian security as necessitating control over territories bordering Russia and the destructive approach the Russian army has displayed in its failed efforts to capture much of Ukraine must have persuaded the Scandinavian governments that coming under NATO protection was a more assured way of achieving security than relying on Russia’s valuing the traditional neutrality of its neighbors.

NATO as an organization has welcomed the Finnish-Swedish decision as a development that solves several problems. The absence of these countries constituted a “hole” in defense of the Baltic region. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania must feel particularly elated that their neighbors will now become allies. As small countries bordering Russia, their security will be considerably enhanced. For the EU, the Finnish-Swedish decision is another step in bringing NATO’s European arm and the EU under the same umbrella. And finally, NATO’s expansion is a clear way of communicating to Russia that its efforts to expand westward under the pretense of security (read as a restoration of Soviet superpower status) will be resisted.

Since the assumption that the Finnish-Swedish membership procedure would be completed speedily prevailed, Turkey’s declaration that its security concerns must be met before expansion is entertained came as a shock. This reaction may be justified only in that Turkey had not given sufficient indication that it would attach a set of conditions to approving the Finnish-Swedish candidacy. Otherwise, when a country wants to join a new club, those who are already members take this as an opportunity to invite the aspirants to settle their mutual difficulties and respond to their complaints. No set of countries knows this reality better than EU members, as the organization always imposes numerous strict conditions on candidates for membership.

In the case of an alliance, it is natural that the incumbents want prospective members to be responsive to their security concerns. From this perspective, it is not surprising that Turkey would communicate to Finland and Sweden that some of their policies and actions have proven adverse to Turkey’s security and require modification. To cite an example, it is widely reported that the PKK collects money through extortion that it then uses to finance acts of terrorism. This is tolerated as part of an unholy bargain where the PKK, in return, abstains from conducting acts of terrorism in the host countries. Even more to the point, Sweden has provided the PKK/YPG with anti-tank weapons that are clearly intended for use against Turkey. Unfortunately, the way Turkey has communicated its expectations has been problematic. To begin with, rather than employing discreet diplomatic channels, it has publicly posited a set of demands expressed by the country’s president. The language employed has not been that of diplomacy but popular politics. This introduces a temptation among all to do the same. The Swedish prime minister responded with an arrogant quip that they have the backing of the major members of the alliance, insinuating that Turkey might not have a say in shaping the outcome. Furthermore, the elevation of problems to public debate limits the ability of governments to accommodate them and make concessions to reach compromises.

Secondly, Turkey has introduced other conditions that have limited bearing on Finland’s and Sweden’s application per se on how members of the same alliance should treat each other, particularly concerning selling military equipment and transferring technology to each other. Although there is no question that the Turkish complaint addresses a highly problematic aspect of an alliance relationship, its concerns the candidate countries only modestly. It is hardly prudent, therefore, to stipulate a set of additional conditions over which they have little control.

Finally, as in other walks of life, when certain steps are taken in international politics, an important aspect to be considered in advance is the responses and countermeasures these are likely to generate. A further consideration to be entertained is the ability of those putting forth stipulations to achieve their goals in the face of resistance and pressures to change policy. I am not persuaded that these were carefully studied before Turkey announced its position. In conclusion, it might have been much better for everyone, and in particular, Turkey, to have chosen a path of quiet diplomacy over popular politics in bringing about the peaceful and, in many ways, welcome entry of Finland and Sweden into NATO. It should be understood, however, that Turkey’s complaints are national and do not reflect only the whims of the current government. They need to be addressed.