Eastern Mediterranean and the Caucasus: Game changers for alliances

It is obvious that the Caucasus has a special sensitivity and importance for Russia since the czarist era. The Caucasus is the way to the Eastern Mediterranean, on one side through the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits, on the other side, via Turkey’s eastern and southeastern Anatolia corridor, and to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean via Iran. As a result of its long-term policy of reaching to the “warm seas,” Russia has taken a permanent position in Syria.

For this reason, it is a necessity for Russia to occupy a part of Georgia and to motivate Armenia to invade Azerbaijan’s NagornoKarabakh. Since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and when the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) started gaining weight in the 1990s, using tensions in Chechnya and Caucasus as an excuse gives Russia the opportunity to have military power in the region.

Being aware of Russia’s expectations, Armenia has not ended the occupation despite the United Nations resolutions. Yerevan also receives major support from the Armenian diaspora in Europe, especially from France, the Middle East and the United States.

These days, while Ankara’s tensions with both the U.S. and France are growing, it seems that Armenia will continue to escalate its hostility toward Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Ferhat Ünlü, a columnist for the Turkish newspaper Sabah, wrote an article two weeks ago that was like a flare. Since June of this year, Armenian authorities have been bargaining with the PKK’s senior management in Yerevan and Iraq, where they are discussing the use of 15,000 foreign terrorist fighters.

Following China and Russia’s military exercise “Caucasus 2020” that included countries such as Armenia, Belarus, Iran, Myanmar and Pakistan, Yerevan’s attacks on civilian settlements in Nagorno-Karabakh and on the Azerbaijani front earlier this week should be evaluated from many aspects.

First of all, the recent escalation of Armenia’s threats toward Azerbaijan strengthens the possibility that it is a tactical step to undermine the concentration and determination of Turkey by opening a new front in the Caucasus in the Russia, Iran and France equation.

It is also related to the negotiations for the Syrian, Eastern Mediterranean and Libyan issues that Turkey has been managing with its diplomatic skills.

A second point is the PKK elements in Iraq that were transferred to Armenia as foreign fighters.

PIPELINES THE TARGET?

A step from the Armenian side in this direction has two possible results. The first is that the Barzani administration consolidates its authority in northern Iraq. This is a development that the U.S. and Israel would prefer.

The second is the terrorist acts aimed at destabilizing the center of Azerbaijan through the use of the PKK’s foreign fighters, in particular toward pipelines of critical importance like the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) or toward projects that would increase Turkey’s weight in the global and regional energy game as neither Russia nor Iran would want to strengthen Ankara’s hand. Therefore, Turkey, who is fighting the PKK terrorist group, supporting Azerbaijan in this field is vital.

As Turkey is being further enriched by its gas and oil exploration in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, especially following its discovery of 32 billion cubic meters (bcm) in the Sakarya Basin, the nation has strengthened its power against its energy and gas competition, a development the U.S., Russia, France and Iran do not want.

Here, Russia and Iran’s threat to recruit Armenia and the PKK and their efforts in making them levers in their “tutelage quest” would be like shooting themselves in the foot in terms of the two countries’ relations with Turkey. As a matter of fact, Ankara’s contradictions with Moscow and Tehran regarding the developments in Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya serve the U.S., the U.K., France, and, in a broader sense, NATO.

Armenia, which is escalating its aggressive stance hoping to take advantage of the U.S. presidential election and the tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, is undoubtedly doomed to fail thanks to the Turkey-Azerbaijan alliance.