When allies argue
As Turkey threatens military action in Manbij, we look at the risks of brinkmanship
On December 12, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced that Turkey would begin operations “within a few days” to push YPG fighters in Syria’s Manbij region to east of the Euphrates river. The escalation comes after months of negotiations that have shown little progress. But are they empty threats? Brinkmanship of this kind has been a tool in foreign policy for centuries. As our chief political scientist notes, however, it is a risky strategy, narrowing options and forcing adversaries to either stand their ground or back down, both of which come with costs. What has prompted Erdoğan to take such a hazardous step? And will it pay off ?
►Is Turkey just f ed n tak ng th s extraord nary step?
We have to remember that the debate about Manbij has been going on for a long time and that the U.S. has failed to deliver on its promise of getting the YPG out of the region. It seems that the Americans are not really willing to drive the YPG out because they don’t want to undermine their cooperation with them in fighting Daesh. But then more recently, the U.S. has also talked about building a number of watchtowers along the Turkish border, presumably to prevent infiltration to the Turkish side. But from the Turkish perspective, it looks like an effort to monitor Turks and prevent them from coming to the Syrian side while they protect the YPG. The situation has become increasingly volatile. While it is not easy for Turkey to intervene in the area, it has decided that it can no longer tolerate the U.S. tactics of promising cooperation but not delivering while continuing its intense cooperation with the YPG, pouring materiel into the area, offering more training for YPG units, etc., apparently leading it to decide to say “That’s enough.” The question facing us at the moment is whether this a negotiating tactic or a statement of what Turkey genuinely intends to do.
In this kind of brinkmanship, the strategy is to threaten an action the outcome of which will be so horrible that the other side will yield; that is the assumption. The problem is that the other side may not respond to your threats; it may think that you are bluffing and call your bluff. I imagine Turkey’s assumption is that the U.S. will not immediately concede to its demands but will say: ‘I understand your concerns; come, let’s talk again.’ What Turkey likely expects to get out of this is more concessions. But what if the U.S. doesn’t go as far as Turkey wants them to? Are we going to take on American forces along with the YPG? It is possible, but then we have to ask: Is it wise? I am not so sure.
►There are two s des to th s br nkmansh p game. On one s de, we have the Turk sh government, wh ch s relat vely un f ed. But when we look at the Amer can s de, t’s a much more dangerous s tuat on. We have an adm n strat on that’s n a lot of trouble r ght now. It s not focused on these fore gn pol cy ssues as much as t should be. Does that make the s tuat on more precar ous?
Let’s start with Turkey: As you suggest, the Turkish government is quite unified and therefore capable of engaging in focused action. The danger on the Turkish side is that when it plays a game of brinkmanship, public opinion becomes part of the game. Turkey is going into an election in slightly more than three months. Obviously, when you initiate a game of brinkmanship, you cannot risk getting into a position where you appear to be losing. So, the danger is that the government could become a victim of its own mobilization of public opinion. Second, the situation in which you play this game is not a bilateral situation. In Syria, we have the Assad regime, we have Russia, we have Iran, suggesting that the game might become a bit more complicated. If the issue were confined to a bilateral one, then it might be more manageable. But we have other actors involved, each with its own agenda and each interested in taking advantage of the situation.
Turning now to the U.S.: The American administration is indeed getting into deeper trouble every day in view of investigations into its dealings during the presidential election campaign. Mr. Trump has his hands full. His political position is getting weaker. And from the very beginning, he has never been able to establish full control over his administration. This has allowed the individual institutions of the American government that develop and implement policy to be left to act on their own. In terms of military planning east of the Euphrates, the American military has proceeded with its own plans and it’s not quite clear how sensitive they are to commands from Mr. Trump. The military seems to feel that the U.S. president is not capable of making sound judgments on the military situation in view of the politics of the region. Thus, the danger of clashes is enhanced. Turkey wants to be influential on the political front, but the political leadership might not be sufficiently influential on the military front.
►It ra ses the r sks.
Right. In a broader sense, when playing this brinkmanship game, you must remember the risks and be willing accept them. Furthermore, you have to recognize the fact that you cannot engage in brinkmanship games frequently. In order for the game to be credible, brinkmanship has to be used infrequently and with discretion. If you constantly simply make threats, their credibility erodes.
►There’s that old say ng: the m l tary s a hammer, and to a hammer, everyth ng looks l ke a na l. If U.S. m l tary commanders are call ng the shots n Syr a, doesn’t that ra se the r sk of someth ng go ng wrong, of someone act ng too aggress vely and escalat ng the s tuat on?
There is that possibility but I would imagine that the American military leadership has the political sensitivity to recognize the dangers involved. I think they would try to direct developments to some sort of negotiated solution. Maybe they will cancel the building of these towers along the border. Or they may actually accede to what Turkey has requested and abandon the YPG and choose to work exclusively with Turkey to fight Daesh. Although debunking the YPG would clearly damage American credibility, from a historical perspective, their current partners have always been used by other forces including the U.S. and they have always been betrayed. So, this would be just one more instance.