No more than a token presence
Anything but a total US troop withdrawal will merely enable a corrupt regime in Afghanistan while providing targets for a resurgent Taliban
Last Tuesday, the Barack Obama administration spokesperson, Ben Rhodes, announced for the first time that the US may consider a “zero option” that is, pulling all troops out of Afghanistan by the end of 2014. There is little doubt today that the US is heading for the exits in Afghanistan. In 2009, President Obama committed the US to moving from a combat to a support mission for the Afghan military units by 2014, while drawing down the total number of US troops from the 68,000 currently present. The “US- Afghanistan strategic partnership” commits the US to stay in some capacity until 2024, but it does not specify how many troops will remain or what they will do.
Facing enormous budget pressures and rapidly declining public support for the war, the Obama administration has begun to consider even lower numbers, such as 3,000- 4,000 troops, or even a pullout of all but its special forces. It has already significantly reduced the number of civilians who will remain in Afghanistan and scaled back its ambitions for reconstruction and aid in the country. The reaction to the airing of the “zero option” in Afghanistan has been predictable. While it is highly likely that this option is little more than a negotiating ploy, it has drawn out all of those who have a vested interest in preserving an indefinite American role in the country. All of this suggests that there are strong institutional forces within the Pentagon, and among some quarters of the Republican party, that will seek to keep bases and significant military forces in Afghanistan as a way of preventing a civil war and retaining some influence over the Karzai government. The Obama administration should ignore these arguments and keep the zero option on the table for three reasons.
First, keeping a sizable number of troops, for example 15,000 troops, will do relatively little but provide the Taliban with a rich set of targets. The current US force, four times that size, is unable to stop the growing violence in the country or halt the Taliban infiltration of military and police units. Moreover, unless the issue of legal immunity for US troops in Afghanistan is resolved, there is also the chance that most US forces will be largely confined to bases, especially if they lose some of their logistical assets.
Second, the presence of a small combat force is unlikely to affect the calculations of Hamid Karzai, who has proven himself to be more- thanwilling to engage in conspiracy theories and attack the US, if it conveys a domestic political ad- vantage. The US- Afghanistan relationship will be shaped by much bigger political and economic forces, especially as the Karzai government decides how to respond to a resurgent Taliban.
Third, the presence of US troops, even in a support capacity, will further the culture of dependence that has permitted the worst abuses of the Karzai government to continue. The military has received billions in aid and years of direct combat support and training.
The result has not been the creation of a reliable US partner, but rather a military prone to desertions and poor performance. Today, the Afghan government remains unable to field more than one combat brigade out of a total of 23 created since 2001 that can fight on its own.
Moreover, this culture of dependence has sustained a government that stole an election, engaged in blatant corruption and shown signs of increasing brutality. At the same time, Karzai has blamed the US for generating insecurity in Afghanistan and has had the gall to suggest that continuing immunity for US troops after 2014 will be conditional on their ability to provide “peace and stability” for his country. The lesson of the last 12 years is that Karzai can only get away with this because the US so desperately needs him in place in order to justify its counterinsurgency strategy. All of this suggests that the “zero option” is a serious one: It should stay on the table, if only to provide a wake- up call to the Karzai government. Any more than a token presence of US troops will perpetuate this culture of dependency and stop this reckoning from occurring.
After more than 2,156 US troops killed and 18,109 wounded since 2001, and more than $ 590 billion ( Dh2.17 trillion) given in aid, it is time to call an end to America’s war in Afghanistan. With such losses, it is hard to accept that the US war in Afghanistan will end without a decisive victory, but keeping substantial American troops present in the country indefinitely will confer no real political or strategic advantages while risking death and injury to even more young Americans.