The Iran deal: Making ‘ yes’ work

The pact is based on an agreement to disagree over the extent to which Iran should be subject to scrutiny

Two weeks ago, in this space, I had asked whether Iran and its critics ( principally, but far from exclusively, the US) could get to ‘ yes’. After last Sunday morning’s agreement in Geneva, the question is now whether everyone involved can make ‘ yes’ work.

Sunday’s agreement between Iran and the so- called P5+ 1 ( US, Britain, France, Russia, China + Germany) is scheduled to last six months. During that time, Iran has agreed not to add to the roughly 11,000 nuclear centrifuges it currently has or to restart centrifuges that are currently inactive ( though it can repair and replace currently operating centrifuges that break down). It will keep its stock of roughly 7,000kg of low- enriched uranium, but will not add to it and will dilute the 185kg or so of medium- enriched uranium it already has ( dilution will leave this material still useful for medical purposes and power generation, but will make it far less useful for any potential weap--

◆ ◆ ◆ ons programme). Iran also agreed to stepped- up international inspections and other checks to ensure that it is honouring the accord.

In exchange, the P5+ 1, which, in this case, mainly means the US, agreed to ease some sanctions on Iran, including the release of more than $ 4 billion ( Dh14.71 billion) in Iranian assets that have long been frozen in foreign banks. Most importantly, the two sides believe they have bought themselves time.

Reaction to the agreement was predictable.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu denounced it as a “historic mistake” and US President Barack Obama phoned him to offer reassurances ( as though these were really needed) that the US “will remain firm in its commitment to Israel”. In his remarks announcing the agreement, Obama called on Congress to give the talks a chance. “Going forward, we will continue to work closely with Congress,” he said. “However, now is

Special to Gulf News not the time to move forward on new sanctions — because doing so would derail this promising first step, alienate us from our allies and risk unravelling the coalition that enabled our sanctions to be enforced in the first place.”

Critics in the US congress, mainly Republicans but including some important members of Obama’s Democratic Party, saw things differently. Senator Charles Schumer, a New York Democrat and important Obama ally, issued a written statement expressing disappointment because “the agreement does not seem proportional”. Schumer predicted a new push for more sanctions next month.

Broader sanctions relief

On the Republican side, the closest thing to a positive reaction came from Senator Bob Corker of Tennessee, who warned that Republicans will have to ensure that this temporary deal does not somehow become permanent.

Obama will need to be able to offer broader sanctions relief to Iran as part of a second deal, but the most onerous American sanctions can only be lifted with Congressional approval, and, right now, Iran’s critics so dominate the media debate in the US that it is difficult to see Obama winning any such legislative fight.

Many of Iran’s American critics are unwilling to see the country possess any nuclear technology at all. Contrast that with what Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javid Zarif, told reporters early last Sunday morning in Geneva: “In the ( Non- Proliferation Treaty) it doesn’t talk about nuclear reactors. It doesn’t talk about research reactors. It doesn’t talk about power plants. It simply talks about the development, use, production of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as an inalienable right. This inalienable right does not need explicit recognition. It’s there whether you recognise it or not.”

In other words: This deal is based on an agreement to disagree — both, over what the NPT’s wording means and the extent to which Iran should be subject to special scrutiny of its adherence to the treaty.

The well of mistrust is deep on both sides. Each will be looking for evidence of the other’s bad faith and each must deal with critics who prefer ideological purity and the likelihood of conflict to the vagaries of diplomatic language and its ( often equally vague) promise of reduced tension.

No one should be under any illusions: This agreement, as difficult as it was to reach, was the easy part.

■