Iranian nuclear negotiations remain precarious
It is unclear if a deal is possible that could allow both Iran and the P5+ 1 to plausibly claim ‘ victory’ and given the pressures on both sides, even if an agreement is ultimately reached, it could still get derailed domestically in either Tehran or Was
Iran and the P5+ 1 ( US, China, Russia, France, Britain + Germany) agreed on Monday to an extension until end- June 2015 of their talks aimed at forging a comprehensive, final nuclear deal. This follows failure to reach what would be a landmark historical agreement before the previously self- imposed November 24 deadline. In intense diplomatic dialogue in recent days in Vienna, progress was made and it is hoped that a broad framework agreement may be possible within three months so that final details can then be tackled. Thus, the talks remain alive, but prospects for a permanent agreement remain uncertain given the gaps that remain between the negotiating parties.
There is also sizeable opposition to an agreement, including from conservatives in the US and Iran and key US allies in the Middle East and beyond, including the Israeli and Canadian governments. To date, these critics have remained relatively publicly quiescent, but it is likely that at least some of them will become more emboldened now that a second deadline for conclusion of the final deal has been missed this year after a previous extension in July.
This is not least in Washington given that Republicans in January will take over control of the US Senate. The Republican- controlled House of Representatives has already passed legislation that would levy additional sanctions against Tehran, which has the potential to torpedo the negotiations process.
However, the Senate ( which for the last few years has been controlled by Democrats) has not allowed these measures to the floor of the chamber for consideration. This may now change with the incoming Republican majority from January. From Obama’s perspective, this opens up the prospect of greater congressional interference in his Iranian policy.
Moreover, as an international treaty, any final deal that is agreed between Iran and the US, acting as part of the P5+ 1, will ultimately require ratification by the Senate. This will be an uphill struggle, especially now that the Republicans will have control of the chamber from January.
The most vociferous foreign critic is Israel whose Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu implied that an agreement on the basis of what was discussed in Vienna would be “disastrous”. Thus, even if a deal is struck in 2015, Tel Aviv will probably reserve the right to act unilaterally, including the option of military strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities.
The preliminary deal that Iran reached with the P5+ 1 last November saw it freeze key elements of its nuclear programme, but not ( yet) permanently dismantle them. Perhaps the key bones of contention in the negotiations since then is how fast international sanctions will be lifted in the event of a final agreement and how far Tehran needs to go in unwinding its nuclear facilities.
To be sure, no deal that Iran is likely to agree to will completely eliminate its ability to build a weapon. In testimony earlier this year, US Secretary of State John Kerry had told Congress that it would, in theory, currently take Tehran around “two months” to produce sufficient nuclear material for a nuclear bomb.
Very sensitive issue
However, buttressed by greater international monitoring and oversight of Iran’s programme, the P5+ 1 are seeking to significantly lengthen this so- called ‘ breakout period’. This is a very sensitive issue with many conservatives in Tehran, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It is unclear if a deal is possible that could allow both Iran and the P5+ 1 countries to plausibly claim ‘ victory’.
Given the pressures on both sides, even if an agreement is ultimately reached, it could still get derailed domestically in either Tehran or Washington.
The most likely outline of a deal would be for prohibitions to be placed upon the nature and number of centrifuges that Iran uses to enrich nuclear material. Moreover, the P5+ 1 could seek to make permanent the current temporary ban on uranium enrichment beyond 5 per cent purity, which would still allow Tehran to service its nuclear energy sector.
It is reported that in Vienna, the US pushed for Iran to eliminate around 80 per cent of its approximately 19,500 centrifuges and for the country to relinquish around 90 per cent of its estimated stockpile of near 8.5 tonnes of low- enriched uranium. Collectively, these two measures would help lengthen the so- called break- out period for Tehran to develop enough weapons- grade uranium for one nuclear weapon to a reported 12 months.
While a deal along these lines would still have critics, not least in Israel, it could potentially give the P5+ 1 enough to assert it has, in effect, significantly disabled Iran’s potential to build nuclear weapons.
Meanwhile, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani could try to sell the deal to conservatives in Tehran on the basis that it secures the international legitimacy of the country’s longstanding position that it has the right to
Opportunity to outflank conservatives
enrich uranium. While the success of the talks is uncertain, the P5+ 1 and Iran remain motivated by the fact that securing final agreement will be hugely significant. In particular, it will represent a major foreign policy win for both US President Barack Obama and Rouhani.
This is not only because, as Obama said on Sunday, a deal would “take a big piece of business off the table and begins a long process in which the relationship not just between Iran and [ the US] but the relationship between Iran and the world, and the region, begins to change”.
In addition, it would constitute an important victory for long- standing efforts to combat nuclear non- proliferation. And this at a crucial time when, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, more than 40 countries have expressed their interest in joining the ‘ club’ of 30 states with nuclear energy.
For Rouhani specifically, a final agreement is the key to revitalising the Iranian economy, which has been hit hard by years of international sanctions. Moreover, it will also give him opportunity to outflank conservatives in Tehran and bolster reformists, many of whom are key supporters, in advance of the 2016 Iranian parliamentary elections.
For Obama, a deal would be a precious foreign policy victory at a time when his administration is on the back foot domestically, following the success of Republicans in congressional elections. Moreover, it will also allow him to potentially draw a line over setbacks in the Middle East, ranging from the rise of Daesh ( Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and the collapse of Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations and subsequent conflict in Gaza.
A deal with Iran would also constitute part of Obama’s foreign policy legacy — one of the pillars of which is enhanced global nuclear security. As well as interstate nuclear diplomacy, the administration has created the Nuclear Security Summit ( NSS) process to counter nuclear terrorism that the president has described as the “most immediate and extreme threat to global security”.
Since 2010, three NSS summits have been held, with a fourth scheduled in 2016 in Washington. These have set in train a body of international work to “secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world” by the end of Obama’s presidency in January 2017.
Taken overall, a nuclear deal remains possible despite the new uncertainty surrounding the negotiations. Much will depend on how quickly any breakthrough can be made in 2015, and how far critics, including Republicans in Congress and the Israeli government, step up opposition to try to derail the process in coming weeks.
Andrew Hammond is an Associate at LSE Ideas at the London School of Economics and a former UK government special adviser.
For Rouhani specifically, a final agreement is the key to revitalising the Iranian economy, which has been hit hard by years of international sanctions.