A better way to rein in lobbying

America is most likely to get the best policies if decision-makers can hear the strongest case on all sides

Corporate influence is an old problem in American democracy. But in the last decade or so, corporate spending to influence Congress and federal agencies has reached a new, and probably unsustainable, level. Corporations and their trade associations now spend about $2.6 billion (Dh9.56 billion) a year in reported lobbying, and probably as much on unreported lobbying. That is more than the funding for the entire Senate ($860 million) and House ($1.18 billion) combined, and the gap grows wider every year. Moreover, that $2.6 billion is about 34 times the total lobbying spending for all labour unions and groups representing public and consumer interests — the organisations most likely to serve as a countervailing force to business outside of government.

This does not mean that corporations always get what they want. Politics is not a vending machine. And in the current gridlock, it’s hard to do anything. But it does mean that, with rare exceptions, any significant policy changes, especially on economic or regulatory issues, will require the support of large corporations.

And yet there is little use in calling for limits on corporate lobbying. For one thing, any cap on lobbying would run up against basic American ideals of participatory democracy. A better strategy would be to rebalance American democracy.

We can start with Congress. Sarcastic observers often complain that we have the best Congress money can buy. Actually, it is the opposite. We have been doing Congress on the cheap for decades. Thanks to stagnating budgets and a few bouts of budget slashing, it has about a third fewer committee staff members than it had in 1980, which means it has less and less experience and expertise to deal with our most pressing problems — and, instead, effectively outsources more and more of its work to lobbyists.

Because congressional pay is considerably less than that of comparable private sector jobs, staff members usually stay just long enough to get experience and build connections, and then leave — often to become lobbyists. “It’s tough to live off the government paycheque,” one lobbyist told me. “One of the big things that’s wrong with the system is that somebody finally learns their job and then they have to move on, so you have a bunch of young folks who turn to lobbyists to figure out their jobs.”

Key committee positions

It does not need to be this way. We can give the House and Senate (which account for a minuscule 0.06 per cent of the federal budget) the resources to hire and keep enough of the best people, especially in key committee positions. We can bolster independent capacity for technical analysis by giving a boost to the research arms of Congress, like the Congressional Research Service and the Government Accountability Office.

While congressional salaries cannot possibly equal lobbying salaries, they do not have to. The thrill of being on the inside is enough of a draw that congressional offices have little trouble filling openings. The problem is that staffers burn out quickly.

None of this is to say that lobbyists do not bring valuable perspectives to governing — they do. That is why balancing them, instead of limiting them, makes sense. No side has a monopoly on the truth. But we’re most likely to get the best policies if decision-makers can hear the strongest case on all sides.

It is easy to get depressed about the state of American democracy, but one does not need to be. The solutions are not overly complicated: Give government the resources it needs to think for itself and to develop policy without having to depend almost entirely on outside lobbyists. Make sure all sides have the resources to make their best case. The politics of checks and balances can do the rest.

Lee Drutman, a senior fellow at New America, is the author of The Business of America Is Lobbying: How Corporations Became Politicised and Politics Became More Corporate.