Turkey’s Syrian tangle
The problem for Ankara is that its interests are not as straightforward as stopping Daesh
As 2015 ended, new steps — albeit small and tentative — were taken towards ending the war in Syria. The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2254, expressing its backing for a transition out of the conflict, and the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) has set a date for its next meeting, to be held this month. But the ISSG comprises both allies and adversaries — for example, Saudi Arabia and Iran — meaning that continued progress will be a challenge.
Now, another pair of countries in the process, Turkey and Russia, appear headed down the road to mutual enmity. Turkey, whose proximity to Syria generates both challenges and opportunities, could play an especially significant role in shaping how the peace process plays out. But Turkey’s downing of a Russian warplane on its border with Syria in November has spurred a swift and sharp deterioration in bilateral relations, with the Kremlin imposing retaliatory economic sanctions.
Russia, for its part, is facing the tough reality of maintaining an active military presence in the Middle East.
The problem for Turkey is that its interests are not as straightforward as stopping Daesh (the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), or even driving President Bashar Al Assad from power. It also aims to ensure that Kurdish groups — such as the Democratic Union Party (PYD) of Syria, which is closely affiliated with Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) — do not consolidate control of territory in Syria, now or during the post-conflict reconstruction.
Since the summer, when several severe outbreaks of violence effectively ended a two-year ceasefire between the PKK and the Turkish government, the Kurdish conflict in Turkey has once again been burning white-hot, raising fears about the impact of an empowered PYD. Ongoing domestic political upheaval, including two parliamentary elections in just six months, has complicated Turkey’s situation further.
Turkey’s opposition to empowering the Kurds has been a source of tension with its traditional ally, the United States, which believes the Kurds are the only force on the ground capable of fighting Daesh. The rekindled hostility between Turkey’s government and the PKK is thus undermining Turkey’s interest in the success of the Syrian peace negotiations.
Amid these challenges, however, is a ray of hope: Turkey’s relations with the European Union have lately improved markedly. Europe’s desperation to resolve the refugee crisis has strengthened its incentive to cooperate with Turkey. This creates an important opportunity to restart negotiations for Turkish accession to the EU
A top priority
In short, the refugee crisis has tilted the European Union (EU) towards Turkey, but defeating Daesh remains a top priority. This will require negotiating with Russia — something that EU members have recognised. The tension between Turkey and Russia has also hurt Turkey’s own position in Syria.
Turkey cannot risk being perceived as a country that jeopardises basic freedoms, thereby widening the gap with the EU. Two factors will sustain its position as an essential ally of the US and the EU: Improved relations with the Kurds and progress towards a settlement in Cyprus. In the Syrian peace process, the decisions Turkey makes can either drive or impede progress towards a settlement.
The myriad factors shaping Turkey’s position make decision-making very difficult. But there is a way out of the current tangle: A strategic approach that makes the most of rapprochement with the EU, recognises the importance of stabilising Syria as soon as possible, and clarifies, once and for all, Turkey’s role in the fight against Daesh.
Turkey recently demonstrated its ability to overcome complex challenges, restoring full diplomatic relations with Israel. Given this, reconciliation with Russia cannot be ruled out. Such an approach would, no doubt, facilitate the management of a host of risks that have been exacerbated by the Syrian conflict.
Javier Solana was EU high representative for Foreign and Security Policy, secretary-general of Nato and foreign minister of Spain. He is currently president of the ESADE Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics and distinguished fellow at the Brookings Institution.
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