Giving a ‘bloody nose’ to Pyongyang isn’t prudent

Force will be necessary to deal with North Korea if it attacks first, but not through a preventive strike that could start a nuclear war

orth Korea, if not stopped, will build an arsenal with multiple nuclear missiles meant to threaten the United States homeland and blackmail America into abandoning its allies in Asia. North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un will sell these weapons to state and nonstate actors, and he will inspire other rogue actors who want to undermine the US-backed postwar order.

These are real and unprecedented threats. But the answer is not, as some officials of the administration of United States President Donald Trump have suggested, a preventive military strike. Instead, there is a forceful military option available that can address the threat without escalating into a war that would likely kill tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of Americans.

When I was under consideration for a position in this administration, I shared some of these views.

Some may argue that US casualties and even a wider war on the Korean Peninsula are risks worth taking, given what is at stake. But a strike (even a large one) would only delay North Korea’s missile-building and nuclear programmes, which are buried in deep, unknown places impenetrable to bunker-busting bombs. A strike would also not stem the threat of proliferation but rather exacerbate it, turning what might be a North Korean moneymaking endeavour into a vengeful effort intended to equip other bad actors against the US.

I empathise with the hope, espoused by some Trump officials, that a military strike would shock Pyongyang into appreciating US strength, after years of inaction, and force the regime to the denuclearisation negotiating table. I also hope that if North Korea did retaliate militarily, the US could control the escalation ladder to minimise collateral damage and prevent a collapse of financial markets. In either event, the rationale is that a strike that demonstrates US resolve to pursue “all options” is necessary to give the mercurial Kim a “bloody nose”. Otherwise, he will remain undeterred in his nuclear ambitions.

Yet, there is a point at which hope must give in to logic. If Kim is unpredictable, impulsive and bordering on irrational, how can we control the escalation ladder, which is premised on an adversary’s rational understanding of signals and deterrence?

Some have argued the risks are still worth taking because it’s better that people die “over there” than “over here” [in America]. On any given day, there are 230,000 Americans in South Korea and 90,000 or so in Japan. Given that an evacuation of so many citizens would be virtually impossible under a rain of North Korean artillery and missiles (potentially laced with biochemical weapons), these Americans would most likely have to hunker down until the war was over.

An alternative coercive strategy involves enhanced and sustained US, regional and global pressure on Pyongyang to denuclearise. This strategy is likely to deliver the same potential benefits as a limited strike, along with other advantages, without the self-destructive costs. There are four elements to this coercive strategy.

First, the Trump administration must continue to strengthen the coalition of United Nations member-states it has mustered in its thus far highly successful sanctions campaign.

Second, the US must significantly up-gun its alliances with Japan and South Korea with integrated missile defence, intelligence-sharing and anti-submarine warfare and strike capabilities to convey to North Korea that an attack on one is an attack on all.

Preparing military options

Third, the US must build a maritime coalition around North Korea involving rings of South Korean, Japanese and broader US assets to intercept any nuclear missiles or technologies leaving the country. China and Russia should be prepared to face the consequences if they allow North Korean proliferation across their borders.

Lastly, the US must continue to prepare military options. Force will be necessary to deal with North Korea if it attacks first, but not through a preventive strike that could start a nuclear war.

In the land of lousy options, no strategy is perfect, but some are better than others. This strategy gets us out of crisis-management mode. It constitutes decisive action, not previously attempted, by Trump. And it demonstrates resolve to other bad actors that threats to the US will be countered. Such a strategy would assuredly deplete Pyongyang’s hard currency, deter it from rash action, strengthen America’s alliances in Asia for the next generation and increase the costs to those who continue to subsidise Pyongyang.

A sustained and long-term competitive strategy such as this plays to US strengths, exploits America’s adversary’s weaknesses and does not risk hundreds of thousands of American lives.

Victor Cha is a professor at Georgetown University and senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.