Why China-India border spat is so dangerous
Nearly 400 face-offs occur each year along the Line of Actual Control, but this time it’s different
Covid-19 isn’t the only threat that has crossed India’s borders this year. According to alarming reports from India’s defence ministry, China has deployed a “significant number” of troops across the disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC) along the countries’ Himalayan frontier. So far, these transgressions have occurred at four points on the world’s longest and most highly disputed border, with thousands of Chinese troops showing up in Sikkim and in parts of the Ladakh region, northeast of the Kashmir Valley.
Neither government disputes the fact that Chinese soldiers have occupied territory that India considers its own. Notwithstanding a brief but bloody war in 1962 that ended with the humiliation of India’s underprepared army, China and India have managed an uneasy but viable modus vivendi on their common border for nearly half a century. No shots have been fired in anger since 1976, and both countries tend to downplay each other’s troop movements, citing “differing perceptions” as to where the LAC — which has never been officially demarcated — actually lies.
Owing to these fraught conditions, an estimated 400 face-offs occur each year along the LAC, all of which are quickly defused. But this time is different. Chinese troops have reportedly advanced into territories that China itself traditionally considers to be on the Indian side of the divide. And rather than merely patrolling, they have established a fixed presence well beyond China’s own “Claim Line,” occupying the “Finger Heights” near Pangong Tso Lake.
Obviously, these encroachments have met with resistance. Last month alone, there were two clashes between Indian and Chinese soldiers, with brawls resulting in dozens of injuries on both sides. Though the two armies had a similar standoff on Bhutan’s Doklam Plateau in 2017, that was in a third country. This time, India has every reason to interpret China’s incursion as direct aggression.
True, the Doklam standoff ended with a Chinese climbdown, as did a similar episode in the same part of Ladakh during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first visit to India in 2014. But the China of 2020 is stronger, more assertive, and eager to throw its weight around in a new era of Sino-American “decoupling.” It will be less inclined to withdraw unilaterally this time.
Salami tactics
But the problem is not that China is planning an all-out war or a major military campaign. Rather, it is using “salami tactics”: minor military incursions that inflict small-scale military setbacks on India. Most likely, the Chinese will occupy a few square kilometres of territory for “defensive” purposes, and then declare peace. This approach is nothing new, and it poses a test of India’s resolve.
Because India’s government cannot afford to take China’s latest aggression lying down, it is reportedly already preparing for a long standoff. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s nationalist “strongman” regime, especially, cannot risk losing face before India’s easily inflamed public.
To be sure, China may argue that it was provoked by India’s infrastructure construction along the LAC. But these projects are long overdue. Two summers ago, the Indian parliament’s External Affairs Committee (which I chaired at the time) visited the border areas and found the infrastructure there to be woefully inadequate. China, meanwhile, has been building all-weather roads, railway lines, and even airports on its side of the LAC.
The India-China relationship is nothing if not complicated. The wounds of the 1962 war never healed, yet annual bilateral trade has grown to almost $100 billion (Dh367 billion), albeit overwhelmingly in China’s favour. Moreover, China uses its alliance with Pakistan to needle, distract, and confine India within its own subregion.
China also continues to reiterate its claims to Indian territory directly, particularly the northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, which it describes as “South Tibet.” Against this backdrop, episodes like the current standoff should be understood as part of a larger strategy of keeping India in check.
Indian foreign-policy analysts understand this, warning that, because the latest act of Chinese belligerence clearly marks a shift in the long-standing status quo at the border, it augurs the end of China’s self-proclaimed “peaceful rise.” Under Xi, China seems much more willing to demonstrate openly that it is the region’s preponderant power. By taking a tough stand on the Indian border, China hopes to show the world, especially the United States, that it is not intimidated by Donald Trump’s bluster, and that other Asian countries should fall into line.
The India-China relationship is nothing if not complicated. The wounds of the 1962 war never healed, yet annual bilateral trade has grown to almost $100 billion.