America’s new tension
Washington finds itself alone in crossing swords with Moscow
RUSSIA’S AGGRESSION in Ukraine has had the effect of unifying the Western democracies, at least in their robust condemnation of the action. But travel further afield and one sees a variety of responses, which foreshadow the great emerging tension in 21st-century international life — between global norms and national interests.
Consider the response of India, the world’s most populous democracy. New Delhi was mostly silent through the events of February and early March, refused to support any sanctions against Russia, and its national security adviser declared that Russia had “legitimate” interests in Ukraine — all of which led Vladimir Putin to place a thank-you phone call to India’s prime minister.
India’s reaction can be explained by deep ties with Russia. From 2009 to 2013, 38 per cent of major weapons exported from Russia went to India, far more than to any other country (and more than triple the second country, China, at 12 per cent). And 75 per cent of the major weapons imported to India came from Russia (just seven per cent came from the United States). Over the same period, Russia de- livered to India an aircraft carrier and a nuclear-powered submarine — the only one in the world exported anywhere in those years.
In addition, as the United States withdraws troops from Afghanistan, India knows that Pakistan will try to fill that vacuum, using as its proxy the Taleban and other such groups. In this great game in Northwest Asia, historically Russia has sided with India while China (and the United States) sided with Pakistan. Things are different now, the United States is the sworn enemy of the Taleban and has clashed with Pakistan on these terrorism issues repeatedly, but old habits die hard for everyone.
More curious has been the reaction of Israel, the most pro-American nation on the planet. The country, which has tended to support almost all American foreign policy initiatives, has been determined not to do so on this issue. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was uncharacteristically circumspect: “I hope the Ukrainian thing is resolved quickly, amicably, but I have enough on my plate which is quite full.” Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman was more explicit, describing America and Russia in equal terms. “We have good and trusting relations with the Americans and the Russians, and our experience has been very positive with both sides. So I don’t understand the idea that Israel has to get mired in this,” he said. Israeli officials explain privately that they don’t want to alienate Russia because they need Moscow in their efforts to deal with myriad threats — chiefly Iran but also those emanating from the Syrian civil war.
But there are also those who believe that Israel can forge a special relationship with Moscow, fuelled by the connection between the hundreds of thousands of Russian Jews who immigrated to Israel and have been gaining political power there. Lieberman boasted this week in Brooklyn, N.Y., that in the near future a prime minister of Israel would be Russian-speaking. (When Lieberman meets with Putin or Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, they speak in Russian, which is Lieberman’s first language.)
China, perhaps less surprisingly, was also unwilling to condemn or sanction Russia. But its position has been more nuanced, refusing to endorse Russia’s actions in any way and emphasising its support for the “independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity” of Ukraine.
One could argue that in all three cases, the countries are misreading what is actually in their national interests. China shares a long border with Russia and should not want to support Moscow in efforts to “adjust” its borders by force. It would be foolish for Israel to compromise its relations with its closest ally, the United States, for delusions of an alliance with Moscow. The fact that Lieberman speaks Russian has not stopped Moscow from shipping arms to Iran, Syria and Hezbollah (through Syria). India, for its part, should want to forge a much tighter relationship with Washington as it confronts a rising China in its neighbourhood.
But beyond these narrow considerations is a larger one. Do these countries want to live in a world entirely ruled by the interplay of national interests? Since 1945, there have been increasing efforts to put in place broader global norms — for example, against annexations by force. These have not always been honoured but, compared with the past, they have helped shape a more peaceful and prosperous world. Over the next decade or so, depending on how rising new powers behave, these norms will be either strengthened or eroded. And that will make the difference between war and peace in the 21st century. Fareed Zakaria is a renowned international affairs analyst