Iran ready for pause!
As a reward for a freeze, Iran will gain access to global finances
THE NEW round of talks opened on April 8 marks another step in the race against time to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power. The powers have given Iran until July 20 to reach comprehensive agreement on denuclearisation. But what if Iran believes it has enough nuclear potential and the time has come for a strategic pause in its nuclear programme? From a technological standpoint, Iran is in much the same class – in the sense of possessing the technical ability to build nuclear weapons – as Germany, Brazil, Japan, Korea and some 10 other nations.
From the narrowest legal perspective, Iran has only violated a safeguards agreement, which it denies and which in turn led to referral to the UN Security Council. For the clerics and their increasingly competent lawyers, the legal arguments are on their side. Iran argues that it is in full compliance with safeguards obligations and calls the referral by the IAEA Board to the Security Council “unjust.”
Since the first disclosures of clandestine enrichment were made in 2003, Iran’s response has careened from outrage and denial to limited cooperation with the IAEA that led to acceptance of the Agreed Protocol along with more intrusive inspections, to angry rejection of the protocol since 2006. In the ensuing years, with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president, the “possible military dimensions” file opened another point of contention despite the 2007 US intelligence conclusion that Iran had suspended such activities in 2003. Then Iran disclosed the existence of the enrichment plant Fordow in 2009, under pressure of discovery, affirming expectations and raising questions about whether Iran is trustworthy even with inspections.
During this period Iran continued to work on its centrifuges, introducing new iterations, drastically increasing the number of centrifuges spinning and amassing an enriched-uranium stockpile out of proportion to actual need.
President Hassan Rohani and Foreign Minister Javed Zarif, followed recently by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Revolutionary Guard leaders, now sound a new tone of acquiescence. It’s possible that a pause in Iran’s nuclear programme has become desirable and convenient in the face of the sanctions that undermine the economy and the regime. Tehran may have concluded there’s little downside risk in hitting a reset button with the big powers.
Why would Iran, if determined to build nuclear weapons, accede to the Joint Plan of Action worked out in Geneva, its associated commitments to the IAEA and the expectation of further limits on its nuclear programme? The Obama administration argues that sanctions led to this juncture: Economic pain finally wore out a restive public. The mullahs decided they had better cut a deal. US Senators Mark Kirk, Robert Menendez and others have doubled down, introducing a bill adding new sanctions on Iran should it fail to reach or violate the agreement.
But Iran’s government still stands after years of persistent ratcheting up of economic punishment. Its foreign policy fundamentals remain unchanged. The interim agreement is not worthless, but $7 billion in sanctions relief seems like relatively small potatoes in view of Iran’s broader ambition.
The interim agreement is actually strong on its face. An advantage is increased verification and reporting on Iran’s declared programme. With better access to Iran’s programme comes better opportunity to discover anomalies that may lead to undisclosed activities, including research. This dynamic can be expected to cause many irritants in this nascent process. Iran will resist more intrusive measures. But as a side effect of the process, the IAEA confirms Iran’s own bragging about its nuclear prowess. Membership in the eminent club of 14 or so countries that can enrich uranium is confirmed.
As a reward for a verified freeze on most current activities, a rollback of others yet to be determined, dilution of its stockpile and more intrusive IAEA inspections, Iran gains greater access to the global financial system and overseas technology in the short term, with perhaps more to follow. It also begets willingness on the part of the international community to consider the nation more “normal” rather than the predictable spoiler it’s been since the 1979 revolution. The multifarious business delegations headed to Tehran and the reputed oil deal with Russia bear this out.
Much time will be spent trying to figure out what breakout scenario is acceptable. Whatever is agreed, Iran becomes another Japan or Brazil, and quite possibly that’s the goal for now. Iran has made its point: fait accompli. Inspectors or others may catch Iran in prohibited activity, which would lead to another dustup and another round of recrimination. But as Iran continues to refine its nuclear narrative, especially with a pause or rollback in place, only a drastic downturn in political relations with the big powers will provide timely warning of an Iranian nuclear weapons programme.
Of course, everything is in play during the period of the interim agreement. No one has a crystal ball. But Iran may have hit its nuclear groove for the moment, and if so, can better engage with the rest of the world and turn its attention to more pressing problems, confident that its nuclear position is secure.