Iran should be prevented from taking over Syria

Tehran is set to reap the benefits of a conspicuous absence of the US in the country, and is poised to play a larger role

From the end of the Cold War until 2010, Syria, led first by President Hafez Assad and then by his son Bashar, had a uniquely flexible geopolitical position in the Arab world: Syria was an avowed enemy of Israel but directly negotiated with it. Syria claimed to be the beating heart of Arab nationalism but joined the United Nations coalition that evicted Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. The Assad government was labelled by the United States a state sponsor of terrorism, but Syrian intelligence agencies cooperated with their American counterparts in the fight against Al Qaeda. Those days of flexibility may be over. Since the civil war began in 2011, the government of Bashar Al Assad has relied on Iran and its proxies like the Lebanese Hezbollah to stay in power. While Russia, too, has played an important role, Tehran has been the Syrian government’s primary backer. With the end of the war now apparently on the horizon, Iran looks set to be the big winner and in control of Syria’s foreign policy in the future. The results could be truly disastrous.

The Syrian-Iranian alliance was born in 1979 following the Iranian revolution and the signing of a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, which had previously been Syria’s Arab nationalist partner. Feeling isolated, Hafez Assad believed that Syria needed some new powerful friends. Iran played the part by delivering military and economic assistance and by supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon, thus helping Damascus maintain its strategic position there.

The relationship has always been an uncomfortable one, though. Syria has also often deviated from Iran on policy issues — much to Tehran’s consternation. In fact, Bashar Assad tended to see his alliance with Iran as a tradable asset, something he could get rid of in exchange for, say, a grand bargain on the Golan Heights, which Israel has occupied since 1967, or for improved relations with the United States.

Then came the civil war. As the battle lines between the government and its rebel opponents hardened inside Syria, Damascus’ foreign policy hardened, too. From the outset, Iran came to Bashar Assad’s aid to ensure its access to Lebanon and keep Saudi Arabia from extending its influence in the Levant. That help has been decisive. The war looks set to end, eventually, with Assad still in charge.

From being granted reconstruction contracts to organising and supporting the pro-government militias who have propped up the regime, Iran has deeply penetrated Syria in a way that Assad cannot ignore. On August 20, the Syrian president delivered a defiant speech in which he thanked his allies and stated that there would be “no security cooperation with nor opening of embassies” for countries that opposed him. He said explicitly that Syria will, in the future, look more to the East than to the West.

But most of Syria’s political and military elites, including Assad himself, worry that an overreliance on Iran will limit their flexibility when it comes to postwar reconstruction, economic development and future diplomatic relations with the West. A top Russian policy expert told me recently in Moscow that the “nightmare scenario” for Assad is that when the war ends, no country will care what happens next in Syria except Iran. If Assad ends up as a client of Tehran, it could make for a very dangerous situation. Israel, in particular, is worried by that prospect. Israel has repeatedly attacked proSyrian government forces in and around the Golan Heights. The civil war has even led Israel to tacitly support some Syrian opposition groups, including extremists ones, along the border to prevent Iranian proxies — namely Hezbollah — from establishing a permanent presence there. If Syria’s orientation toward Iran continues, Israel will feel that when it looks across the Golan Heights, it sees Iran staring back.

The Trump administration seemed willing to cede Syria to Russia, save for the defeat of Daesh. But Washington should understand what this really means: ceding it to Iran. Moscow will not actually provide a counterweight to Iran once the war is over.

For decades, Syria has seen the US as leverage in terms of pressuring Israel on the Golan, keeping Israel off its back in return for the prospect of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. But if the United States isn’t interested in Syria anymore, and if Russia continues to focus solely on security issues while ignoring politics, Iran will be dominant in Damascus.

In a vacuum this wouldn’t matter. But the Middle East today is not a vacuum. Israel will not tolerate Iranian control over Syria — and if his recent speech is any indication nor will Assad be able to prevent it. The result will inevitably be a Syria-Israel war, which would really mean an Iran-Israel war, one that would not be limited to Syria.

To prevent this, American and Russian policymakers should help create and monitor “de-escalation zones” and work on diplomacy to set up Syria’s postwar future. If Iran is the only party invested in Syria’s future, the outcome could be catastrophic. —NYT Syndicate

David W Lesch is a professor of Middle East history at Trinity University in San Antonio and the

author of “Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad.”

From being granted reconstruction contracts to organising and supporting the pro-government militias who have propped up the regime, Iran has deeply penetrated Syria in a way that Assad cannot ignore