Peace with the Taleban, but at what cost?
US President Donald Trump’s intent to withdraw US troops from Afghanistan, reiterated in his State of the Union address, has thrown the already fraught situation in a state of flux. Saddled with a tough brief from his boss, US special representative Zalmay Khalilzad has met the Taleban a number of times in recent months. His wish list includes a ceasefire, paving the way for withdrawal of US forces with the exception of some counter-terrorism presence, a pledge by the Taleban not to permit use of the Afghan soil by international terrorists and an intra-Afghan dialogue involving the Taleban and the Afghanistan government to settle the details of power sharing and a future political set up.
Khalilzad met with the Taleban in Abu Dhabi in December last year, along with the representatives of Pakistan, UAE and Saudi Arabia. Later, they met in Qatar for six days — the most substantive round of dialogue so far — even as in a show of force, the Taleban attacked the training school of the National Directorate for Security in Maidan Wardak province, killing a large number of persons.
Information trickling in from both sides suggests that the Taleban had their way in keeping the agenda narrow. There was agreement in principle on withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, though no specific timeframe was agreed upon, and a return commitment by the Taleban that they would do what is necessary to “prevent Afghanistan from ever becoming a platform of international terrorist groups or individuals,” as Khalilzad put it.
There was clearly no meeting of minds on a ceasefire and intra-Afghan dialogue. While Khalilzad stated that “Nothing is agreed till everything is agreed, and ‘everything’ must include an intra-Afghan dialogue and comprehensive ceasefire”, the Taleban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said that progress on other issues was impossible until the issue of withdrawal of foreign forces was settled. It was reported that the talks would reconvene on February 25 in Qatar. Increasingly marginalised in the process, President Ashraf Ghani insisted in an address to the nation that the Taleban engage with Kabul. He looked even more isolated when the Taleban sat with a number of Afghan leaders, including former President Hamid Karzai, in a Russia-engineered meeting in Moscow, organised by the ‘Council of the Afghan Diaspora in Russia’, which was dubbed as a political drama by the Afghan foreign ministry.
Uncertainty hung over the Presidential election due in July this year because of the reports concerning setting up of an interim government following a deal with the Taleban, reinforced by a plan circulated by the RAND Corporation that envisages an 18-month transition period and a transitional government with rotating chairmanship. The talks so far seemed headed increasingly towards what Karzai described as a deal between the US and Pakistan on Afghanistan. The only silver lining was the appointment of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who co-founded the Taleban with Mullah Omar and is reported to be a votary of peace, as the head of the Taleban Political Office in Qatar.
Going by the interests and compulsions of the key players, the prospects of the ongoing efforts bringing about durable peace and stability to Afghanistan do not look good. The process will face many hurdles as it moves forward.
Even though Khalilzad has said that the US is seeking a peace agreement and not an agreement to withdraw its troops, his president’s professed desire to pull out of Afghanistan and his publicly articulated impatience (Khalilzad said recently that the timing of a peace settlement from the American point of view would be sooner the better) have left him with a weak hand.
Therefore, the Taleban, who are adept at running rings around their interlocutors, may succeed in making the war-weary Americans accept a face saver for their exit rather than working for an inclusive arrangement with adequate safeguards for its survival (though the best of safeguards can fail in an environment like today’s Afghanistan!). With nearly all international partners of Afghanistan now willing to talk to the Taleban, they already look winners. Their spokesman has said they are not looking for monopoly on power, but to live with their countrymen “in an inclusive Afghan world”.
However, the propensity to control the entire country and shape it after their worldview is hardwired in their DNA. If there are any moderates
With nearly all international partners of Afghanistan now willing to talk to the Taleban, they already look winners. Their spokesman has said they are not looking for monopoly on power, but to live with their countrymen “in an inclusive Afghan world”.
among them, they have never held sway over the movement. They have not fought all this while to share power. Even if they initially accept a power sharing arrangement, they could be expected to push for complete dominance, thereby unleashing yet again a power struggle, particularly with the ethnic minorities (Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras) and other local warlords.
They may not harbour international terrorists, but their control over the country will facilitate the projection of their obscurantist ideology and religious extremism to the rest of the region. The joint declaration issued after their meeting with some Afghan leaders in Moscow is full of generalities and pious wishes. Thus it speaks of protection of the social, economic, political and educational rights of the Afghan women and of the entire people of Afghanistan “in line with Islamic principles”. Ironically, when they ruled the country the last time, they always maintained that they were running it in keeping with the principles of Islam. It is just that they practice a very extreme version of Islam combined with archaic tribal traditions.
The Russians have publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with the American peace moves. If the Americans are able to retain a long-term residual security presence as alleged by the Russians, it would cause concern among countries like Russia, China and Iran that may feel compelled to take some counter-measures.