Tehran continues to use Iraq for its gains

The economic crisis caused by the pandemic is worsening, unemployment is rapidly rising, and a lot of businesses globally are teetering on the brink of collapse.

In the Arab region, which was already in bad shape, the situation in the deeply troubled countries, such as Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon, is expected to deteriorate further with the pandemic adding to their socio-political crises caused by Iran’s hegemony.

Experts in the Middle East believe that Tehran’s sway over the Arab countries weakened after the killing of Qasem Soleimani, the head of IRGC. Moreover, since the appointment of Mustafa Al Kadhimi as Iraq’s Prime Minister, the voices and influence of the militias have weakened.

However, experience suggests Tehran’s political ‘dissimulation’ must be met with caution. The Iranian leadership and its Iraqi henchmen can do anything during the next few months leading to the US elections in early November. Many believe Iranian leadership’s military culture is based on the principle of ‘attack as the best form of defense’. Thus, while fighting its ‘defensive’ wars deep in the enemy’s territories, it would not mind taking one step backward before moving two steps forward.

Moreover, the Iranian leadership regards the re-emergence of Daesh on Iraqi soil as its valuable political and security ‘reserve’. Whenever Tehran’s position seems to be weakening, Daesh reappears suddenly on territories that are supposed to be under Iranian control. The recent return of Daesh to northwestern Iraq coincided with Al Kadhimi’s move to improve the cooperation with the international community.

I still think that Tehran is playing its ‘Iraqi game’ in Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. It is based on the tactic of ‘facilitating solutions and feigning moderation’ just to gain time, and wait for changes in Washington. Meanwhile, Europe continues to be unsure of its position. Germany has taken a tough stand against Hezbollah, but France maintains ‘grey’ attitude.

The common interest of Washington and Tel Aviv as well as Moscow is nothing but ensuring a manageable ceiling for Tehran’s regional ambitions. This is where the visions of the three capitals converge as they deal with the future of Syria, and subsequently, Lebanon.