US resolve on Syria is a nasty surprise for Russia
The change in US policy in Syria in the past two months, in terms of expanding its political role and solidifying its military presence, has left a dent in Russia’s conviction that it held the keys in Syria, including with regard to the roles of Turkey, Iran and the United States in the war-torn nation.
Polarisation has returned to the rival camps, and with it the contradictions within each of them. Those who were optimistic that the Syrian war was ending with an Assad victory and a strategic advantage for Iran and Hezbollah have suffered a setback and, likewise, those who believed Russia had reaped all the fruits and stood to dictate Syria’s future. This polarisation has also paralysed the political process entrusted to the stewardship of UN envoy Staffan de Mistura, although all sides remain keen on preserving the political solution until its conditions fully mature.
The equation in Syria could be changing radically because the United States has recaptured the initiative there, revived its influence in Iraq, and resolved to confront Iran on multiple fronts.
The war against ISIS, the former Nusra Front, and others has not ended yet, either, and perhaps this is deliberate. All actors in Syria and Iraq benefit from the existence of ISIS remnants to varying degrees.
Recent developments in Iraq are positive, with the election of Barham Salih as president and Adel Abdul Mahdi as prime minister, both veterans of politics and diplomacy. They can also be seen in the context of containing Iran and its regional projects, in light of serious US pressures and measures against the regime in Tehran.
James Jeffrey, the US Special Representative for Syria Engagement, spoke to Al Hurra TV last week on a programme in which he also appeared, to explain the features of the new US policy in Syria. Mr Jeffrey echoed remarks the previous week by National Security Adviser John Bolton, which seems to suggest that the Trump administration will condition its military presence on Iranian withdrawal from all its foreign deployments.
A few days ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin said: “We should pursue a goal that there would be no foreign forces, [the forces] of third states in Syria at all … including Russia, if this would be adopted at the level of government of the Syrian Arab Republic.” Yet Mr Putin’s remarks primarily target the US-led coalition forces. Mr Putin is also making the distinction between the presence of Russian forces sanctioned by a “treaty” with the Syrian government, which also covers the Russian military bases in Syria, and the presence of Iranian forces at the mere “invitation” of the government. In other words, he has kept the door open to the possibility of an accord with White House over the departure of Iranian forces from Syria, while Russian and US forces remain.
Mr Jeffrey told Al Hurra that US forces are present in about one-third of Syrian territories, denying Syrian regime troops access to those areas, and through wider presence if local allies are factored in, also denying access to Iranian forces. He added that while the mission of the US forces is to ensure the total defeat of ISIS. When asked whether the Trump administration believed Syrian President Bashar Al Assad’s days were numbered, he replied that that the days of any regime that behaves like Mr Assad’s are numbered, which is why the Russians and Iranians have to invest immense effort and large sums of money to revive the “corpse” of the current Syrian government.
However, Mr Jeffrey stressed that the US was not conducting military operations against the regime nor does it plan to. Rather, the administration is working to secure its interests there without a human cost to its forces, while Russia and Iran are suffering casualties in their efforts. Yet this does not mean that the US is on board with Mr Assad remaining in power. If anything, the rhetoric from the past two weeks suggests there is a change in the position regarding Mr Assad’s fate – after a while of sidestepping the issue.
Damascus is not the only side concerned by the change in US policy. Tehran is extremely anxious about US measures against it, at home or in Iraq and Syria. Moscow too, because the new approach of the administration in Syria has halted the Russian victory parade in Syria.
What will Russia do? It is still too early to answer this question, bearing in mind that Moscow has leverage over Iran and the ability to meet US demands that would allow both powers to reach an accord, should Moscow agree to disengage from Tehran. Such a decision would be a major and complex move, and the Kremlin will not rush into it unless it has guarantees of that grand bargain.
Driving Iran out of Syria will not happen overnight. It is clear, however, that this is a firm goal that the Trump administration intends to see through. The cost of US deployment in Syria is very low compared to those being felt by the Russians and Iranians, while the returns on its investment are very high.
Not long ago, the Kremlin thought its Astana strategic troika, along with Turkey and Iran, would guarantee its control over Syria. Now, Washington wants the Kremlin to reconsider this formula, as it is neither willing to enable Russia’s alliance with Iran, nor is it satisfied with the Russian rapprochement with Nato member Turkey.
Washington’s opposition to Russia’s delivery of the S-300 air defence system to Damascus does not mean the Kremlin itself is fully comfortable with its decision, which it had to make following Damascus’s accidental downing of a Russian reconnaissance plane. Naturally, Moscow will have its own men operate the system, even if it is officially in the hands of the Syrian military. The risk, however, is that Israel is well versed with the S-300 system, which means continued risks on the field in a way undesirable to Moscow, which wants to maintain good relations with Israel bilaterally and on Syria.