Rising tension in the Strait of Hormuz shows security matters more than ever
The US may think its policy of “maximum pressure” has driven Iran’s economy into dire straits. But the Iranians have other straits on their mind. Their adeptness at finding weaknesses in maritime and energy transit around the four sides of the Arabian Peninsula heightens the question of what, if any, regional security arrangement could be effective.
Along with others, I had previously observed that Iran would not attempt to blockade the Strait of Hormuz entirely, except in extremis, but could slow and threaten shipping significantly by low-level deniable attacks and stop-andsearch missions that could be painted as reasonable enforcement of regulations.
On July 4, a tanker, the Grace I, carrying Iranian crude allegedly to the sanctioned refinery at Banias in Syria, was seized by UK Royal Marines off Gibraltar. In response on July 19, Iranian forces boarded the Liberian-flagged tanker Mesdar before releasing it when it turned out to be owned by a British Virgin Islands subsidiary of Algeria’s state company Sonatrach, then instead seized the UK-flagged, Swedish-owned Stena Impero.
Britain offers a weak point for the Iranians to exploit. The UK was one of the “E3+3” that negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran, along with France and Germany, Russia, China and the US, which withdrew unilaterally in May 2018.
It has sought to keep the JCPOA alive despite the re-imposition of strict US sanctions, and Iranian actions of selective reduced compliance, along with various deniable incidents in and around the Arabian Gulf.
But the UK traditionally stays close to the US in foreign policy, even more so now as Brexit looms. The decision to detain the Iranian tanker was taken by lame-duck Prime Minister Theresa May, with the new Conservative party leader to be announced tomorrow. Foreign secretary Jeremy Hunt, one leadership contender, is now attempting to deal with the tanker fallout. His predecessor Boris Johnson, who is likely to win the leadership vote, has a poor record with Iranian diplomacy, is
compromised by his association with Donald Trump’s circle, and lacks the finesse to deal with such a complicated situation.
There is one British warship in the Gulf, the HMS Montrose, which already rescued the British Heritage, another tanker approached by Iranian boats two weeks ago, and another, HMS Duncan, is on its way. But these cannot escort all the 15 to 30 British-flagged tankers that ply the Gulf daily. These have begun turning off their transponders to avoid broadcasting their position.
For now, oil markets are relaxed. They are probably right to think that neither Mr Trump, the British nor the Iranians want a war. Mr Hunt has signalled the UK could release the Grace I if it does not continue to Syria. There has been talk of US-Iran mediation by congressman Rand Paul, and Tehran’s foreign minister Javad Zarif has essentially offered to repeat the JCPOA conditions in return for a lifting of sanctions.
Indefinite attempted containment of Iran is a recipe for expensive instability. Iran’s loss of oil exports removes its stake in free passage of the Gulf. The more forces are sent to the region to counter it, the more active their missions, and the more Iran is squeezed, the more probable a cycle of escalation, of incidents from which neither side can back down.
Geo-strategy author Robert Kaplan has floated a “Nato of the Indian Ocean”, comprising a number of Gulf and South Asian countries along with Australia, Singapore and South Africa, with the US presumably as guiding spirit. But he acknowledges the improbability of knitting together some disparate – and even openly hostile – states across a vast expanse of ocean and many time zones.
Instead, individual task forces and alliances could be assembled for different areas and challenges. Of course, this raises the question of who would join the US and GCC states in a Gulf mission. France, which maintains bases in the region and the UK have the capability but might not want to bail out the US given their opposition to its Iran policy. India has already sent naval forces to escort its own shipping but has said it will not join an American coalition. Despite the attack on one of its tankers, Japan has also indicated it would not send forces to the Gulf, although it does patrol off the Horn of Africa against piracy.
Beyond this, the question becomes much more tangled. Russia has a base in Tartus on Syria’s Mediterranean coast, China has one in Djibouti. Following the tanker attacks in June, Mr Trump tweeted that the US, as the world’s largest energy producer, should not be defending oil shipping routes for China, Japan and other countries. But it has long been a core US doctrine to keep rival superpowers out of the Gulf.
Iran is a fact of the region, a powerful and influential state with its own security concerns. It will always pose a challenge to its neighbours. Under the Shah, it was a western-friendly aspiring local hegemony which took control of and occupied the UAE’s Tunbs and Abu Musa islands.
During the Iran-Iraq war and again today, it has been a besieged adversary, retaliating asymmetrically. In the 1990s and early 2000s, it was a sometimes frustrating and troublesome neighbour, but with fairly normal international economic and diplomatic relations. Following a US attack, it could be something like post-invasion Iraq, a chaotic vacuum harbouring dangerous groups bent on revenge.
A regional energy security framework is essential, at least as long as oil and liquefied natural gas continue to be important commodities. Naval and other forces are essential for now in maintaining free passage through the Red Sea and the three Gulfs – Arabian, Oman and Aden. This arrangement, though, is not a solution – just a stopgap, until diplomacy can work.