HOW RUSSIA OUTFOXED IRAN IN SYRIA
▶ Flipping an Afghan militia commander exposed tensions between Moscow and Tehran’s Revolutionary Guards
As orchestral conductor Valery Gergiev strolled onstage amid the ruins of Palmyra in 2016, few were in any doubt how much of a public relations coup the concert by the Mariinsky Symphony Orchestra was for Russia.
Moscow had helped recapture a historic site, ravaged by ISIS, but more importantly, it had beaten Iran to the prize in Syria.
Several figures came to prominence in that fierce desert battle. One was Abdullah Salahi, a commander in the Fatemiyoun, a militia created by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Comprised of Shiite Afghan refugees in Iran from the Hazara ethnic group, the militia has played an increasing role in the IRGC’s Syria strategy.
Thousands of Hazaras joined the fight in the country’s civil war, often on the promise of permanent residence in Iran. Others answered the call to help defend Syria’s Shiite shrines.
Yet the militia, which hitherto has remained loyal to the IRGC, is now facing unprecedented division which has exposed a tug-of-war for influence between nominal allies Russia and Iran.
Central to this is Mr Salahi, commander of Hudrat Faisal Al Abbas, a unit of about 500 Fatemiyoun fighters based in the eastern city of Deir Ezzor.
He recently accepted an offer of advanced training and support from the Russians, something that separate sources within the militia told has angered their IRGC handlers, and others within the group.
It represented one of the first documented successful cases of Russia drawing a contingent of IRGC-backed forces into its orbit since intervening in the conflict in September 2015.
Mr Salahi’s relationship with Russia goes back several years. He rose to prominence during the fight for Palmyra in 2016. It was there that he would foster close relations with one of the highest-ranking Russian generals in Syria, Col Gen Aleksandr Dvornikov.
In 2016, a rivalry was brewing as Russia raced IRGC forces to recapture Palmyra from ISIS. Col Gen Dvornikov, then Commander
of the Russian Armed Forces in Syria, made Mr Salahi, and the Fatemiyoun fighters under his command, an offer of air and ground support.
A hero was made of Mr Salahi in that conflict and his face appeared on billboards in the recaptured city.
That May, the Mariinsky would play a concert in the city’s ancient ruins that would be broadcast around the world. Moscow had beaten its IRGC rivals in the race to recapture a bastion of ancient culture. Col Gen Dvornikov continued to invest in his relationship with Mr Salahi.
As the Fatemiyoun source told “Salahi and Dvornikov were friends. They had good relations between them, very good relations that were not work-related.”
The source said that Mr Salahi travels regularly to meet Russian forces.
“They [Russians] do not have permission to enter [Fatemiyoun bases] because the Iranians have informants and spies among the ranks of Fatemiyoun. Mostly Salahi goes to them.”
Col Gen Dvornikov left Syria later that year to become head of the Southern Military District, with responsibility for Crimea and the Black Sea. Yet the relationship he had cultivated with Mr Salahi remained.
This month, the Fatemiyoun commander accepted an unprecedented offer to work closely with Russian forces. This offer of training on and supplies of advanced Russian weaponry took them closer than any IRGC militia has gone before.
Phillip Smyth, the Soref Fellow at the Washington Institute
for Near East Policy and researcher of the Hezbollah Cavalcade blog, described it as a move against Iran’s operations in Syria.
“The Fatemiyoun is different from any Iraqi militia and even Lebanese Hezbollah. It’s a direct IRGC branch, with no understanding of autonomy like the Iraqi groups.
“For the Russians to be doing this, it’s an aggressive signal to send to the Iranians – it’s an attack directly at the heart of how Iran is cultivating itself within Syria.”
He said the move may indicate a Russian effort to exploit the IRGC at a moment of weakness.
“This may say more about how Iran is operating now, possibly because of the coronavirus pandemic and because of the US sanctions. It’s possible that they are not able to maintain the same level of control over their networks and the Russians are taking advantage.”
The killing of Quds Force commander Qassem Suleimani may also have caused groups like the Fatemiyoun a degree of uncertainty.
Sources within the group told of widespread unease in the aftermath of Suleimani’s killing in a US drone strike on January 3 near Baghdad airport.
The Salahi move also gave Russia a deeper foothold in the country’s restive east, where recent attention has focused on several oilfields.
Many regard the city of Deir Ezzor, where Mr Salahi’s fighters are based, as a gateway to those oilfields.
In October, US President Donald Trump sent US troops to secure the oilfields. In March, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan mooted a plan to use the oilfields to fund Syria’s reconstruction.
A cocktail of US sanctions, a global epidemic and the death of its leading military strategist may be the undoing of Iran’s grip on Syria.