Risk to planes landing in Beirut as Israel jams GPS signal
Civilian airliners arriving in Beirut are being forced to use alternatives to GPS to help them land, because of jamming and “spoofing” attributed to Israel.
The disruption could pose risks for pilots.
Since the outbreak of the war in Gaza and border clashes in southern Lebanon, Israel has admitted to increasing GPS jamming in the region in an attempt to thwart missile attacks by Hamas and Lebanese militia Hezbollah.
Earlier this week, a Turkish Airlines flight ran into difficulties as it began its descent into Beirut because it was still using GPS navigation.
It circled the airport for about 40 minutes before being forced to return to Turkey.
There are completely safe alternatives to GPS when landing a plane, but the jamming and spoofing – tricking the aircraft’s receiver into calculating a false position that could send the pilot off course – create further complications for a region in conflict.
“If they don’t use the GPS signal, they will be using the ground-based equipment, which is not affected by any spoofing,” a source in the aviation industry told The National.
The use of electronic warfare to disrupt aircraft navigation has been seen in the Middle East before, as well as in southern Turkey and other parts of the world. Electronic warfare often involves jamming enemy communications and navigation systems – typically to interfere with drones and missiles that use GPS to find targets.
While this area of warfare has been in development for decades, it is only recently that it has had a major impact on civilian aircraft.
European civil aviation authorities warned of an increase in GPS jamming in February 2022, in the early days of Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine.
To this day, the problem persists across the region. Since October 7, there has been an increase in GPS spoofing in the Middle East. While a pilot will immediately know if their GPS is being jammed, spoofing can be harder to spot, said Mohammed Aziz, a retired pilot and adviser to the chairman of Lebanon’s Middle East Airlines.
“The problem is the pilot might not notice [spoofing] if he is relying entirely on GPS,” said Mr Aziz. He urged pilots to ensure that “the signal you
have on the GPS corresponds to the signal you are getting from the ground navigation, make sure you report your position to the air-traffic controller so they can confirm your position.”
In November last year, the EU’s Aviation Safety Agency said it had observed an increase in the jamming and spoofing of global satellite navigation systems, particularly in the south-eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Black Sea.
As a result, Lebanon’s civil aviation agency told airlines to switch to conventional groundbased navigation systems and stop using GPS. The radar used by air-traffic controllers does not rely on satellites.
Earlier this month, Lebanese Transport Minister Ali Hamieh blamed Israel for the GPS jamming, which he said posed “a significant risk to all airlines”.
Lebanon submitted a complaint to the UN Security Council over the jamming and what it called Israel’s “recklessness”.
If global satellite navigation systems are not fully functional, this can lead to inconsistency in flight guidance, which can result in route deviations.
While there are alternatives, the loss of it is still felt by pilots.
“The aircraft these days depend on the GPS so much,” said the industry source. “Using the GPS relieves the pilot and his first officer from a load of work during the flight. This is why lots of errors are occurring during flights – like the Turkish Airlines [flight] … aircraft are still using GPS.”
Middle East Airlines is used to landing in Beirut without GPS, said Mr Aziz. It has used its instrument landing system – which involves radio beams – to land there since the onset of the Syrian civil war. However, that system requires additional effort from the pilot.
“But if you are from outside and if you don’t notice [spoofing], this is a problem for a pilot that comes to Beirut once every six months.”