Greatest Battles
The Eastern Roman Empire falls to the Goths at Adrianople
Pressure from Hunnic conquests from the east and a civil war among Germanic tribes north of the Danube meant that in the late summer of 376 CE, the Gothic tribe of the Thervingi gathered on the borders of the Roman empire. Modern estimates suggest that 200,000 men, women and children assembled on the northern bank of the Danube under their leader, Fritigern, and asked for asylum within the Eastern Roman Empire.
Fritigern had converted to Arian Christianity (the same faith as the Roman emperor, Valens) and was therefore considered to have a ‘special relationship’ with the Emperor. Nonetheless, fierce debate followed within the Imperial court about the wisdom of allowing an entire Germanic tribe to enter Roman territory. After two months of waiting, the Goths were eventually allowed to cross the Danube and settle in the province of Thrace. One of the factors in their favour was that they had agreed to be recruited into the Roman army, thereby solving a manpower shortage. Valens also required that the Goths all convert to Arian Christianity. They did so, and the crossing began.
Most of our surviving ancient sources view this decision as catastrophic for the Roman Empire – which it was, but all wrote with the benefit of hindsight. In 376 CE there were good reasons to allow such large numbers to cross over and settle in Roman territory. Allowing the Thervingi in can be seen as the moment the fate (and fall) of the Western Roman Empire was sealed, even though it was how those settlers were subsequently treated and what happened as a result that led to a disastrous war for the Romans.
It seems as though far more people crossed the Danube than had been expected by the Romans. The local commander, Lupicinus (the ‘comes rei militaris’, or military count), did not have the resources to feed the newcomers, nor sufficient troops to control them. Winter was approaching and food was running short, the Thervingi themselves brought little with them (what they had was used up in the two-month wait to cross the Danube).
Both Lupicinus and the other Roman commander, Maximus (who held the post of either dux Moesia or dux Scythiae, ‘duke’ of Moesia or Scythia), decided to take advantage of the situation for personal profit and route the Goths. Treated poorly and starving, they quickly lost faith in Roman promises. Meanwhile, seeing the success of the Thervingi, other Gothic tribes also sought permission to cross the Danube into the Roman Empire. The Greuthungi weren’t allowed the same privilege, but after learning that the local Roman troop numbers were preoccupied with supervising the Thervingi, they decided to make the journey anyway.
Fritigern’s Thervingi were marched to Marcianople, some 60 kilometres south of the Danube and close to the eastern shore of the Black Sea. There, Lupicinus banned them from accessing the city’s stores of food. This was the final straw, and the Thervingi clashed with Roman troops. Fritigern’s guards were slaughtered, but he escaped and did nothing to quell the warlike temper of his men. Lupicinus summoned troops to him, but these were defeated by the numbers and fury of the Goths.
The rebellion spread, and the Goths – still in Thrace – had no Roman troops to oppose them. Emperor Valens was still focused on a Persian campaign, and was based in Antioch. The Greuthungi now unified with the Thervingi, and other Gothic units already in the Roman army joined the revolt. Gothic slaves abandoned their masters and joined too. The combined Goth forces moved on Constantinople, ravaging the 250 kilometres from Marcianople to the capital for food. The city was put under siege, but the Goths lacked the means to maintain it, and soon abandoned the endeavour. Messages were sent to Valens that a major campaign would be needed to deal with the Gothic threat. Valens sent word to his nephew and Western Roman Emperor, Gratian, for help. Despite fears that a denuded West would be tempting for barbarians to cross the Rhine, Gratian sent his commanders, Richomeres and Frigeridus.
The Goths split into various groups, although the largest remained under the command of Fritigern. Valens’ commanders, Profuturus and Traianus, were sent from the east in summer 377 CE, and their troops were able to force the Goths to retire to the Haemus mountains. Another group (either separated or newly crossed) was in the north, however, near
the town of Salices. Profuturus and Trajanus took the opportunity to confront this group separately, confident of eliminating them. They were also joined by the troops from the west under Frigeridus and Richomeres. Nonetheless, the Romans were outnumbered by the Goths but, forming into a testudo, the Romans withheld the Gothic attacks. Some sources declare that the battle was a Roman defeat, others a draw.
In early 378 CE, the Goths broke out of the Haemus mountains where they had been penned up. Other tribes crossed the Danube and joined them, notably a group of Huns and Alans. Several skirmishes and small conflicts followed, some by sections of different tribes. Valens, finally turned aside from his eastern campaign, marched his army west to face the Gothic threat. Gratian also led an army from the west. In high summer, Valens marched from Constantinople towards the Goths, positioned somewhere near the town of Adrianople.
At this point an envoy arrived from Fritigern, a presbyter and some humble folk, possibly monks, requesting Thrace as a new land for Goth settlement and promising peace. Various negotiations followed, which are usually looked on as Fritigern playing for time to allow him to summon all his troops to him. Time was not on Fritigern’s side, however, and he must have known that Gratian was on his way with another army to reinforce Valens. It seems far more likely that Fritigern had another plan, and that his actions in sending multiple envoys were deliberate; the time he needed was a matter of hours rather than days. We are even told that Fritigern was full of trickery and pretence “all too skilled in craft and various forms of deception” (according to the historian Ammianus Marcellinus (our best source), and with his envoy he sent a private letter asking that Valens bring his army close to the Goths, ready for war, “to entice them to adopt conditions favourable to the Roman state” through fear of the
Roman army. Fritigern’s forces had shown, however, that combined and equipped they had little to fear from the Roman forces they had seen up to that point. The Goths had taken better equipment from the Romans they had defeated. It seems more likely that Fritigern was luring Valens into a trap. One of Ammianus’ criticisms of Valens character was that he was a procrastinator, and Fritigern had dealt with the emperor (in person) before, so knew who he was up against. The envoys were dismissed, and the Roman army prepared to march.
Valens’ commanders debated whether to attack or wait for the arrival of Gratian. The Romans must have been confident of victory to attack alone, and may have been misled regarding the Goths’ strength. Valens’ skirmishers advised him that the Goths numbered only 10,000 warriors (but as the battle played out, many more previously concealed Goths emerged). On the morning of 9 August, the day had dawned hot, and Valens’ army marched ‘with extreme haste’ from Adrianople towards the Goths, reaching the wagon circle at the eighth hour, or two in the afternoon. The fatigue of the march, and the fact the Romans were strung out on their line of march would have a part to play in the coming battle. The Gothic position was clearly deliberately chosen and carefully drawn up; Ammianus tells us that the wagons were arranged in a perfect circle, ‘turned by the lathe.’ The Romans moved into position on the right while the centre waited and the left was still deploying.
We are given more details of the Roman disposition than for any other battle of the period, although Ammianus warns his readers not to expect exact detail, and all our accounts are far from satisfactory. The Romans had cavalry on the right wing had drawn up, with the infantry some way behind them. The cavalry on the left wing, however, were still on the road.
At this point in his narrative, Ammianus mentions that Fritigern’s cavalry under Althaeus and Saphrax was far away and, because of that, Fritigern sent more envoys. Most modern reconstructions of the battle state that the Gothic cavalry were away foraging, but this cannot have been the case. The
cavalry would soon make a decisive, massed, charge into the Roman flank and it is therefore highly unlikely they were away foraging. Fritigern’s various tactics of playing for time are far more likely for him to have been waiting until he knew his cavalry were in position. They would charge in one body, not piecemeal as they returned from a foraging expedition, and this implies that the Gothic position was deliberately chosen. What’s more, the terrain on the left of the Gothic position, a steep valley, would let the cavalry assemble unseen by the Romans.
Fritigern’s first envoys were men of low rank, and Fritigern knew they would be rejected by the Romans. Ammianus talks of this ‘pretended truce’ to allow the cavalry to return. He adds that this wait also exposed the Romans to more summer heat, and that the Goths had lit fires to make things worse. These fires are intriguing, and are accepted by all reconstructions, even though the smoke from the fires would affect the Goths just as much as it would the Romans. These fires may have served another purpose, however; to signal the cavalry, to hide the cavalry’s assembly, or lit by the cavalry themselves to hide their deployment and signal to Fritigern that they were in position.
Another low-ranking envoy was sent to the Romans to ask for hostages. This too seems to be Fritigern playing for yet more time. The request for hostages caused great debate at the tent of the emperor, but eventually Richomeres volunteered to go as a hostage. Before he could arrive at the enemy’s laager, however, two units of cavalry of the Roman right flank, the Scutarii and Sagitarii, had engaged in skirmishing with the Goths, and this then escalated into the battle proper. It would seem that this skirmish was deliberately provoked by the Goths once the fires had been seen, and Fritigern knew that the Gothic cavalry were in position.
The reason for thinking this is that once engaged, the Gothic cavalry charged from their unseen assembly point and crushed the Roman right flank. Ammianus’ description makes it clear that these troops were not returning from foraging: “like a thunderbolt” they charged and threw into confusion the entire Roman flank.
This is not the arrival of groups of cavalry that had been away foraging, but part of a deliberate plan to deliver a massed cavalry charge into the enemy’s flank. As such, Fritigern’s delaying tactics, as well as his obviously careful selection and preparation of the Gothic position, were deliberate. We are told on several occasions how tricky and cunning Fritigern was, and yet no interpretation of the battle of Adrianople has suspected him of such cunning. Most accounts are very straightforward. Fritigern’s plan was helped immensely by Valens’ eagerness for battle and several other mistakes, such as not sending out proper scouts or ensuring accurate reconnaissance.
The remaining Roman troops now surged forward towards the Gothic wagon laager despite the fact that the cavalry of the Roman left wing were still on the road and had not deployed. The troops of
the Roman left wing actually reached the wagon laager, pushing the Goths back, but they had no support on their flank from any cavalry. It seems that the cavalry of the Roman left saw the way the battle was unfolding, and made no effort to engage, but abandoned the field. The remainder of the Roman force were therefore crowded together as they advanced. Ammianus describes the scene:
‘So pressed upon by the superior numbers of the enemy, that they were overwhelmed and beaten down … different companies became so huddled together that a soldier could hardly draw his sword, or withdraw his hand once he had stretched it out.’
More Gothic infantry then made a charge from their wagons (again something that had been deliberately planned by Fritigern, rather than some spontaneous movement), which broke the Romans. This charge suggests that Fritigern had more troops hidden within his laager and who swarmed over the engaged Romans.
On the right, the Roman cavalry fled, defeated.
The historian Zosimus calls the battle an easy victory for the Goths (since the Romans were in disarray and overconfident) and a massacre. The Romans broke and fled to be pursued by Gothic troops. Several units did stand firm; realising the battle was lost and despising death, they decided to fight to the end. Even though their fate was sealed, they fought on. Ammianus names two of these legionary units, the Lancearii and the Mattiarii. It was to these that Valens, who had been deserted by his own guards unit, fled. The remaining units were cut down and few escaped. Only a moonless night brought an end to the killing.
In the aftermath, according to Ammianus and Libanius, Valens died from an arrow wound, and was never found. Another version of his demise is that he took refuge in a unwalled village or a peasant’s cottage, which was then burned by the Goths. The level of the disaster of Adrianople is difficult to assess – certainly the Roman army of the East had been destroyed and the emperor killed. Some estimates say that as many as two thirds of the Roman army were killed, others one third. Several Important Roman commanders fell, as well as 35 tribunes. Contemporaries regarded it as the greatest disaster ever to befall them, others the worst defeat since Cannae against Hannibal in 216 BCE. Ammianus is more balanced (although the end of the Western Roman Empire was only two generations away).
The repercussions of Adrianople have been much debated, especially since it was a defeat for the Eastern Roman army, and yet it was the Western Empire that would fall. The Eastern empire would persist for a 1,000 years more. The very barbarians who visited the disaster of Adrianople upon the empire were now enlisted to help the new emperor, Theodosius I, defend it. Fritigern disappears from history, although his successor, Alaric, would sack Rome itself in 410 CE. Nonetheless, Adrianople marks a watershed moment in the history of the Roman world, and the subsequent fall of the West can be traced from it and the events which led to it.