All About History

Prussia and Austria fight for supremacy at Königgrätz

CZECH REPUBLIC, 3 JULY 1866

- Written by Murray Dahm

The Battle of Königgrätz was the most decisive clash between the armies of Prussia and those of Austria and her allies during the seven-week Austro-prussian War in 1866. It was one of the largest battles of the age, with almost half a million men fighting on the field. The context of the Austro-prussian War was one of nationalis­m and the unificatio­n of German states. At the time, the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia were the two largest and most dominant forces in the German-speaking world. There were actually 37 separate states in the German Confederat­ion but their unificatio­n became a hot topic known as ‘The German Question’ in the postnapole­onic world.

From 1815 tensions had grown over which of the states would lead the new ideology of

German nationalis­m; unificatio­n under Prussia was known as ‘Little Germany’ and under Austria ‘Big Germany’.

Another fiercely debated topic in 19th century politics was the Schleswig-holstein Question. This involved the disputed land between Prussia and Denmark in the Jutland Peninsula. In 1863 an attempt to integrate the territory into the Kingdom of Denmark was made, leading to a war in 1864. Prussia invaded, this time with Austria as an ally. The alliance was so successful that they invaded Denmark itself, eventually occupying all of the Danish mainland. The Treaty of Vienna ceded the disputed territorie­s to Prussia and Austria from Denmark (losing 40 percent of her total area and population). Prussia wanted to absorb the territorie­s into her kingdom as provinces, but Austria wanted them to be independen­t autonomous duchies. Under the Gastein Convention of 1865, Prussia would control Schleswig and Austria Holstein. The rest of Europe reacted negatively to the Convention but it set the stage for war between the two rivals the following year.

A PRETEXT FOR WAR

In early 1866 the issue of the status and governance of Schleswig-holstein erupted. Austria brought the issue before the German Diet on 1 January, Prussia declared the Gastein Convention null and void and, on 7 June, invaded (Austrian-controlled) Holstein. The German Diet voted mobilise against Prussia on 14 June and German leader Otto von Bismarck declared that the German Confederat­ion was ended. Both sides mobilised for war. The other German states were conflicted on which side to ally with. Several saw that they could not stand against Prussian arms but other autocratic rulers feared for their own position if they did not side with Austria. Fear of Prussian expansion was also widespread. In the end the southern German states allied with Austria, including Hanover, Bavaria, Württember­g and Baden, joined by Saxony, Hesse, and others. Prussia had allies in Oldenburg, Brunswick and both Mecklenbur­g houses. Several states (including Liechtenst­ein and Luxembourg) remained neutral.

PREPARATIO­NS AND TECHNOLOGI­ES

The Second Schleswig War had shown that the military reforms in Prussia, undertaken since 1862, had proven highly effective. These included the

adoption of universal conscripti­on (which made Prussia’s potential army much larger). Austria still used old conscripti­on methods, which meant the majority of her troops were poorly trained. Prussian conscripts by contrast were drilled to a much higher degree. Prussia, aided by a booming economy, also adopted the Dreyse needle gun, a breech-loading, bolt-action rifle capable of faster and more accurate fire than the older muzzle-loading Lorenz rifles of the Austrian army. Prussian troops could fire five rounds a minute, the Austrians could manage two.

Another important factor in the Austro-prussian war was the use of railroads. The Prussian rail system was more advanced and extensive than that in Austria and this allowed Prussian forces to mobilise much faster than those in Austria. The Prussian Chief of the General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke, assessed that Prussia’s five railway lines could concentrat­e almost 300,000 men in under four weeks, whereas Austria’s single rail line would take almost twice the time to amass fewer men. In actuality the use of rail was not seamless, but it marked the way of the future.

INVASION

Moltke mobilised his forces on the Prussian border for an invasion of Bohemia through Saxony on 16 June. The Austrians, meanwhile, had been amassing for a defensive strategy at Olmütz in Moravia in order to protect Vienna. Preliminar­y engagement­s were fought in late June. Elements of the Prussian advance were met by Austrian forces but these encounters were indecisive, although the Austrians suffered heavy casualties.

The Austrians then moved to the fortress of Josefstadt (Josefov) and to defend the mountain passes into Bohemia. Marching against them were three Prussian armies: the First Army under the command of Moltke (although nominally commanded by King Wilhelm); Second Army (commanded by Crown Prince Frederick and Leonhard von Blumenthal); and the Elbe Army (commanded by Karl von Bittenfeld).

Using modern telegraph communicat­ions to his advantage, Moltke was able to coordinate and concentrat­e his three separate forces with precision. He guessed that the Austrian commander,

Ludwig von Benedek, would retreat to the Elbe River. Benedek was of Hungarian descent but unwavering­ly loyal to the monarchy and believed courage and valour were the soldier’s most important tools on the battlefiel­d. He also knew his limitation­s as a commander and this may have been the cause of his reticence on the battlefiel­d. The preferred Austrian method was Stoßtaktik (shock tactics), 1,000-man columns engaging with the enemy at close quarters. These tactics suited Benedek’s concept of war but were sadly outdated. The accuracy and rapid fire of the Prussian rifles would decimate the courageous advances of the Austrians, inflicting huge losses.

AUSTRIAN BACKS TO THE WALL

Benedek knew from the losses inflicted in the opening engagement­s that his army faced annihilati­on if he faced the Prussians en masse. On 30 June, he requested Emperor Franz Josepf I make peace but this was refused. Benedeck took position on high ground between Sadowa and Könnigrätz with the Elbe River at his rear.

His position was sighted by the Prussians on the evening of 2 July and plans were made to attack the following morning. The Prussian Elbe and First armies were in position but communicat­ion with the Second Army, on the Prussian left flank, was broken and so old-fashioned dispatch riders were sent, reaching the Second Army at 4.00am on 3 July. Nonetheles­s, the Second Army immediatel­y leapt into action and marched to close the trap on the Austrians later that day.

OPENING SALVOS

The Austrians had a superior position on high ground stretching from Problus (Probluz) to Chlum. They also outnumbere­d the two Prussian armies which initially opposed them; the Elbe army was 39,000 strong and the First Army had 85,000 men. The Austrians had 215,000 men, with the army of Saxony on their left flank. In the rain, the Austrian artillery opened fire just before 8.00am. The Austrians should have had the edge in regard to artillery, with modern, breech-loading rifled artillery whereas the Prussians still used smoothbore, muzzle-loading cannons. Despite the greater accuracy and longer range of the Austrian artillery, this edge would not prove decisive. On the left

flank of the Prussian centre, General Eduard von Fransecky advanced with the 7th Division into the Swiepwald Forest, where he clashed with two Austrian Corps.

Fransecky was tasked with clearing the Austrian centre and covering the Prussian right flank until the arrival of the Second Army. The First Army moved in support of Fransecky, capturing Sadowa and wading across the Bistritz (Bystrice) River. This advance was, however, halted by accurate Austrian artillery fire. All reserves were committed by midday but the Second Army had not yet arrived.

Up to now Benedek’s superior numbers and the greater range of his artillery kept the Prussians at bay and the battle was going in his favour. The infantry battle being waged in the Swiepwald also meant that the Austrians could not use their artillery for fear of hitting their own troops.

At around 11.00am the Austrians began to manoeuvre to outflank the Prussian 7th Division on their right. Finally, an Austrian charge led by Colonel Pöckh of the 4th Corps, commanding a brigade consisting of two infantry regiments and a feldjäger battalion, all but dislodged the Prussian 7th Division from the Swiepwald. Benedek, however, refused to order a charge against the pinned First and Elbe armies even though his commanders insisted he do so.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE SECOND ARMY

Pöckh’s Brigade, flushed from their successful charge, had no time to savour their success. They were suddenly hit with devastatin­g fire on their right flank as the advance units of the Prussian Second Army finally arrived on the field. Pöckh was killed and the brigade was obliterate­d, 2,000 dead in minutes and barely a man unwounded.

At the same time, the Prussian 8th Division strengthen­ed the 7th and the Austrians, who had belatedly moved to outflank the Prussians on their right, now presented their own exposed right flank to the newly arriving Prussian Second Army. The bulk of the Second Army was not in position until around 2.30pm but this was still a remarkable feat – marching more than 30km having only received orders at 4.00am that morning.

The balance now shifted decisively. Crown

Prince Frederick and the Second Army brought 100,000 fresh Prussian troops to the field and they now outnumbere­d the Austrians. What is more, the new troops had a vulnerable flank to attack and they lost no time in taking advantage. The Second Army attacked the Austrian right flank as they made more piecemeal attacks on the reinforced Swiepwald. The artillery of the Second Army could also fire on to the Austrian centre.

The Prussian cavalry of the 1st Guards Division of the Second Army broke through to the Austrian artillery, forcing it to withdraw. It could therefore no longer support any attacks being made by Austrian forces. Benedek was forced to order the general withdrawal of his forces at 3.00pm. The Austrians had already taken heavy casualties but the attacks

 ??  ?? The Prussian King, Wilhelm I oversees the defeat of the Austrians accompanie­d by Chancellor Bismarck, Moltke and Minister of War Albrecht Roon
The Prussian King, Wilhelm I oversees the defeat of the Austrians accompanie­d by Chancellor Bismarck, Moltke and Minister of War Albrecht Roon
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 ??  ?? Prussian infantry fire on the advancing columns of Austrians
Prussian infantry fire on the advancing columns of Austrians
 ??  ?? Prussia’s Otto von
Bismarck and Helmuth von Moltke on the battlefiel­d
Prussia’s Otto von Bismarck and Helmuth von Moltke on the battlefiel­d

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