Greatest Battles
BULGARIA, 20 JULY – 10 DECEMBER 1877
Russia takes on the Ottoman Empire at Plevna
The ten-month war between the Russian and Ottoman Empires from April 1877 to March 1878 remains one of the most understudied (and under-appreciated) of the 19th century, despite its political, military, economic and social repercussions. The shifting political boundaries following the war can be linked to inducing revolutionary fervour that led to the brutal murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914. The gruesome reality of how wars would be waged in the 20th century also became painfully apparent during this conflict.
Roughly 285,000 soldiers (Ottoman, Russian, Bulgarian and Romanian) perished during this brief conflict, and thousands more civilian refugees succumbed to starvation, disease, or were murdered. Of the thousands of military fatalities, about 75,000
men (26 per cent) fell during the savage battles waged outside the small Bulgarian village of Plevna from the summer to winter of 1877.
War erupted between the Russians and Ottomans in April 1877. The Russians crossed over Romania’s borders, in a stroke ‘liberating’ it from the Ottoman yoke, and in return Romanians would send thousands of soldiers to fight and die alongside the Russians. The Ottoman commanderin-chief, Abdülkerim Nadir Pasha, with no clear plan or objective, left about 160,000 soldiers strung out along hundreds of kilometres on the banks of the Danube River to counter the anticipated invasion. By July, four Russians corps successfully forded the Danube River at Sistova with little opposition, exploiting the indecisiveness and poor planning of the Ottoman high command.
The Russians entered Ottoman territory with their eyes fixed on the capital of Constantinople to the south, advancing in that direction at an alarming rate. None of the senior Russian commanders could have speculated that one intrepid Ottoman general and his small army would threaten to derail their grand offensive and nearly send them reeling back across the Danube in defeat.
A professionally trained soldier with experience fighting in the Crimean War, the 45-year-old Osman Pasha proved to be one of the Ottoman Empire’s most talented generals. If one word described Osman’s character, it was persevering.
Stationed with a small army in western Bulgaria at the village of Widin (modern Vidin), Osman grew anxious when word reached him of the Russian passage of the Danube. His flank exposed and position untenable, Osman, in a bold manoeuvre, moved his 11,000 men and 54 guns to counter the Russian columns advancing south. After a six-day forced march tallying over 160 kilometres down filthy roads, with the sun beating down on their faces, the exhausted Ottoman soldiers dragged themselves into the village of Plevna (modern Pleven) on 19 July 1877. Plevna proved to be a tactically significant location because it formed a junction of six major routes. Not giving his weary men a moment of respite, Osman ordered them to immediately begin digging a network of trenches and cutting loopholes in some of the village’s buildings in order prepare for an imminent Russian assault.
The next day, a single Russian division appeared on the outskirts of the Ottoman entrenchments
with orders to scatter Osman’s defenders. The commander of the division, General Yuri Schilderschuldner, demonstrated his ineptitude when he impudently launched a head-on assault with two separate columns without bothering to make a thorough reconnaissance on Osman’s wellentrenched position. Outnumbered and facing Osman’s men armed with superior firearms, Schilder-schuldner’s division, made up of 8,600 men and 46 pieces of field artillery, was demolished after suffering a loss of 3,000 men. Osman only suffered the loss of 50 troops.
Fresh from his effortless capture of the Ottoman fortress of Nikopol on 16 July 1877, General Krüdener arrived with the remainder of his IX Corps to support Schilder-schuldner’s broken division. Bringing the combined Russian strength outside the village to 35,000 men and 176 guns, General Krüdener oozed confidence, assured his veterans would easily drive out Osman and his men with the cold steel of their bayonets.
The bayonet became the pillar of Russian strategy following the Crimean War, as an alternative to adopting the world’s modern firearms and implementing up-to-date tactics. A significant portion of Osman’s men carried a simpler version of the British Martini-henry, the Peabody-martini, a fast-loading and fast-firing breech-loading rifle that could hit a target at a distance of 1.6 kilometres and outdistance any standard Russian rifles by hundreds of metres.
The second Russian assault on Plevna commenced on the morning of 30 July 1877, with the landscape draped in a thick fog. Badly needed Ottoman reinforcements had arrived through the mountains from Sofia, bringing Osman’s total force to 22,000 men and 58 guns. Despite inflicting 2,000 casualties on the Ottomans, the Russians suffered a staggering 7,300 casualties and made no considerable progress. Osman had beaten back two Russian assaults, inflicting over 10,000 casualties and demoralising the Russian forces.
The successful defence of Plevna provided several major complications for the Russians. Foremost, it threatened Russian supply lines and their line of communication stretching back for many kilometres through Romania and into mainland Russia. Secondly, by holding Plevna, Osman provided a major obstacle to the Russian offensive, and began to absorb thousands of Russian soldiers to extinguish the Ottoman opposition. Thirdly, it jeopardised the success of the Russian offensive thus far, threatening the flanks of Russian forces at Shipka Pass and near Rushchuk, putting any further progress toward Constantinople on hold. Lastly, a delay in capturing Plevna could also be disastrous, the Russians wanting to bring the war to a quick conclusion for financial, military, (before the harsh Bulgarian winter set it), and political reasons (they were fearful of British intervention).
The defence of Plevna also embodied a religious and ideological struggle. The Russians viewed the war as a crusade to liberate their fellow Christian Slavs living in Ottoman territory, and any success by the Muslim empire endangered the notion of Christian providence. When Tsar Alexander II arrived at Plevna in person, the contest to capture the village became a matter of national pride.
Thousands of Russian and Romanian soldiers began to arrive and form a semicircle around Osman’s defences in August and September, including the 59-year-old Tsar Alexander II and his cumbersome royal caravan. Even though his brother, the incompetent 46-year-old Grand Duke Nicholas, was the de facto commander-inchief of the Russian forces in Bulgaria, Alexander II shadowed the advancing army, imitating the legendary Peter the Great. Known for his fierce temper and stubbornness, Alexander II tended to cast an eye over decisions made in the field – to the displeasure of Nicholas.
Only two major Ottoman armies were in the vicinity that could provide viable support to Osman and the Plevna defenders. The Germanborn Mehmed Ali Pasha’s army operating along the Lom river to the east, and Süleyman Pasha’s army working to capture the Shipka Pass from the Russians to the south. Unfortunately, both officers passionately hated each other and failed to coordinate their efforts. Mehmed Ali had some minor successes against the Russian army under the Tsar’s son, but grew timid, abandoning his offensive. Süleyman bluntly hurled his men against
the Russians dug in on the mountaintops at the Shipka Pass with no success, losing thousands of veterans. For the time being, Osman would have to hold out as long as he could on his own.
The third Russian assault on Plevna commenced on 11 September 1877. For four days, beginning 7 September, a significant portion of the 424 Russian guns pounded the Ottoman defences with 30,000 shells prior to the general assault. The Russians planned to overwhelm the Ottoman defences with a total of 84,000 soldiers in a three-pronged assault, focusing on the Grivitza (right), Radischevo (centre), and Krischin (left) redoubts. The assault on 11 September proved to be a bloody upset. The four-day barrage did little actual damage besides creating a lot of noise, and the Russians stormed the Ottoman trenches and redoubts in their usual blunt and uncoordinated fashion. The rain began on 10 September and continued until 12 September, turning the landscape into a soupy quagmire.
The attack on the right at the Grivitza redoubts, largely made up of the Romanians only managed to wrestle Grivitza No 1 from the Ottomans after suffering fearful casualties, while the assault on the centre at the Radischevo redoubts utterly failed.
Despite the setbacks on the centre and right, one Russian general and his division managed to penetrate the Ottoman fortifications through sheer determination in the direction of the Krischin redoubts. The ‘White Russian’, 34-year-old General Mikhail Skobelev, had the ability to inspire his men to accomplish the impossible. During the storming of the Ottoman trenches, his sword was cut in two and his horse shot dead from underneath him, but Skobelev still gained a foothold on Osman’s redoubts with an amalgamation of men from various units. Pinned down, unable to advance, and with 1,800 metres between the captured position and the Russian artillery to the rear, Skobelev pleaded for reinforcements from his corps commander, Lieutenant General PD Zotov.
The Russians, fixed in the captured position with Skobelev, used bayonets, side arms and bare hands to dig an extension of trenches to protect their exposed flank facing the other Ottoman redoubts. Determined to drive off Skobelev, Osman took advantage of the Russian inactivity on the right and centre and reinforced this front with men from other sectors. Skobelev’s men beat off repeated Ottoman counterattacks, but reinforcements never came. Skobelev received a hand-delivered note from Zotov ordering him to fall back if his position could not be held with what force he had. Frustrated at the loss of an opportunity and the useless waste of life, Skobelev reluctantly abdicated his foothold and fell back the next day.
A total of 15,000 Russians and Romanians fell on the third assault of Plevna, more than the two previous assaults combined. At this rate of death, the Russian army would be obliterated, so a council of war of the senior Russian generals was held and a unanimous decision made to adopt a new method to capture the stronghold. The hero of the defence
of Sevastopol during the Crimean War, General Eduard Totleben, was called from his retirement in St Petersburg to oversee the siege of Plevna. Totleben redirected the Russian operations by dedicating his efforts to cutting off Osman and his men from support.
By mid-november, Osman’s 50,000 defenders were cut off by at least double the amount of Russian and Romanian soldiers, complemented by hundreds of well-positioned guns. On average, a skirmish or clash was taking place every five days and Osman could no longer replenish his losses on the front line. Disease began to spread, leading to homes, stables and sheds being turned into makeshift hospitals. On 13 November, Grand Duke Nicholas sent a flag of truce to Osman asking for his surrender, but Osman politely refused the offer.
Meanwhile, an Ottoman relief army was thrown together, under the command of Mehmed Ali. It had orders from Abdülhamid II to assemble at Sofia in the west and move through the Arabakonak mountain pass, falling on the rear of the Russian besiegers surrounding Plevna. Made up of some second and third tier Ottoman soldiers, Mehmed Ali’s army of 20,000 was quickly halted by a Russian force of 30,000 detached from the siege in order to block his advance.
With no conceivable support coming, Osman had no other choice than to surrender or attempt to break out by December. He chose to go down fighting. He concentrated a significant portion of his remaining manpower to the rear of his defences, hoping to blow a hole in the Russian line.
On 10 December, a massed column of Ottoman soldiers appeared and, with Osman in the lead, they rushed the Russian entrenchments roughly 2.7 kilometres ahead. Thousands of voices chanted Bismillah-ir-rahmân-ir-raheem (‘In the name of Allah, the most Compassionate, the most Merciful’) as Russian rifle fire and artillery shells tore through their tightly packed ranks.
The Ottoman soldiers kept driving forward through the deafening cannonade and thick smoke to puncture a hole in the Russian line.
Both sides hacked, clubbed and stabbed at each other and fired at point-blank range.
Well-directed Russian artillery fire and fresh reinforcements pinned down Osman’s men, while Russian counterattacks from the other sectors overwhelmed the other diminished Ottoman sectors. Even more devastating, Osman went down wounded, pierced in the calf, leading to a rumour among his men that he had been killed, destroying what morale remained.
With no other choice, Osman surrendered. After 143 days, the siege finally fell on the morning of 10 December 1877. The Ottomans lost nearly 6,000 in the attempted breakout, with 1,300 Russian casualties. The remaining Ottoman soldiers who had fought so hard for their sultan were marched off to be imprisoned in Russia. A day after the surrender, Osman was presented to Alexander II as a hero before being taken to Russia as a prisoner.