7 MANY GERMAN OFFICERS DIDN’T UNDERSTAND IT

The devastating 1939-1940 Blitzkrieg successes were largely achieved by a few far-sighted apostles of fast-paced mobile warfare. As a partly novel and untested form of warfare, scepticism existed among the more experienced senior army and army-group level commanders; these officers’ experiences of war were profoundly shaped by the gruelling slower-tempo battles of attrition that occurred on the Western Front during the Great War. These senior officers were not only sceptical about the prospects of decisive success through Blitzkrieg, they remained more tactically risk averse. Throughout the Polish and Western campaigns, senior commanders, like von Rundstedt and von Kleist, became deeply concerned about the vulnerable flanks created by the rapid panzer advances. Indeed, the Polish counter-offensive on the Bzura and the Anglo-french counter-strike at Arras sent shockwaves of concern through the more conservative senior officers, leading to temporary halt orders.

Moreover, the Western campaign was conceived as an operation to penetrate the Allied frontier defences and the Germans remained fuzzy as to precisely what they should do if and when they achieved a decisive operational breakthrough. Therefore, the rapid collapse and capitulation of France after six weeks surprised many within Germany, particularly since France had stubbornly held out for four years during the Great War. Even Hitler was surprised at the alacrity and totality of the Blitzkrieg triumph in the west. But then again, he was a reckless gambler who was willing and able to risk all in a massive, rapid offensive that overwhelmed his less well prepared, organised, motivated, trained and equipped opponents.