Raid on Taranto
Before the war the British possessed strategically important locations in the Mediterranean and were very concerned about the Italian naval build-up. Although at the time, the British Royal Navy was the strongest sea power afloat, it was spread out across the globe, and had no modern battleships. The number of Italian Regia Marina (Royal Navy) capital ships stationed in the Mediterranean theatre outnumbered British vessels, but the British did have an aircraft carrier, whereas the Italians depended upon airbases surrounding the contested waters. Taranto, Italy was the home port of the First Squadron of the Regia Marina fleet. Their force consisted of six battleships (two of the modern Littorio class and their older ships had been extensively modified), seven heavy cruisers, seven light cruisers and 13 destroyers.
Although the Italians commanded a strategic central position, the British had bases at the western and eastern ends of the Mediterranean whose forces could, if brought together, pose a significant threat to the Italian fleet.
The base locations became a real problem for Britain when the war began, especially in June 1940 when fighting between British and Italian forces in North Africa broke out. Both sides now needed to transport men, equipment, and supplies onto the African continent.
For the Italians the challenge was minimal as they only had to cross one of the narrower parts of the Mediterranean. The British, on the other hand were not so fortunate and their options limited to two less than satisfactory choices. They could expose their ships to attacks from Italian air, surface naval ships, and submarines by traveling down the European coastline, through Gibraltar, then making a lengthwise crossing of the Mediterranean, past Sicily, and Italy.
The second choice was safer but time consuming and would expend a considerable amount of fuel as the route to Egypt required sailing down the entire west coast of Africa, back north along the east coast, through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. The situation was compounded after France was invaded by the Germans which eliminated French naval assistance. The British could not sit by and lose the war in Africa simply because of supply problems. They had to do something to counter the Italian advantage.
The Italian posture in the central Mediterranean offered the opportunity to defeat the Royal Navy, except for two serious issues with their fleet. The Italians did not have enough oil to maintain their ships at sea for long periods as would be necessary to gain naval superiority in the Mediterranean and they lacked confidence needed to threaten or engage in a sea battle.
Planning the attack
Attacking the Italians at Taranto was not a new concept as the idea of launching
United Kingdom
COMMANDERS
Admiral of the Fleet Andrew Cunningham
Vice Admiral Lumley Lyster
FORCES
1 aircraft carrier • 2 heavy cruisers • 2 light cruisers 4 destroyers • 21 torpedo bombers
CASUALTIES
Killed: 2 • Captured: 2 • 2 aircraft lost
lanes open to the Suez Canal, the essential passage to India, Australia, and British colonies in Asia.
Italy goes to war with Britain
The day after Mussolini declared war, the Italians bombed British bases in Malta and there were several skirmishes at sea during July and August. Although the Italians held a substantial numerical advantage in both ships and aircraft along with the strategic position of their base at Taranto, they also had several weaknesses.
The fighting potential of the Regia
Marina depended on its battleships as there were no aircraft carriers because Mussolini believed the entire peninsula of Italy served that purpose. In addition to ships in port, Taranto was defended by air force interceptors located at distant bases, but they were not equipped for night fighting. Similarly, Mussolini’s military ambitions had strained Italy’s resources after invading Ethiopia in 1935, participating in the Spanish civil war, invading Albania in 1939, Greece in 1940 and their current challenge to the British in North Africa. All of this left the Italian industrial base in a condition where it would be unable to replace ships, making the Admirals overly cautious.
Eventually, Cunningham received reinforcements in September, including the newly commissioned carrier HMS Illustrious. These changes made the
Admiral confident that he could defeat the Italians in a naval battle.
In late 1940, the circumstances in the Mediterranean eventually reached a point where attacking the Italians was imperative. The operation was initially scheduled for 21 October with the planes slated to take off from the older HMS
Eagle, but two accidents delayed the attack forcing the British to reschedule the operation and replace Eagle with HMS Illustrious.
On the night of 11 November 1940, most of the capital ships of the Italian navy lay at anchor at Taranto, which was divided into inner and outer harbours, connected by a small canal. The battleships were in the larger outer harbour protected by a breakwater and anti-torpedo nets. The cruisers and some of the destroyers were secured in the inner harbour.
Although the Admirals recognised the theoretical danger of air attack, as Taranto was within operational range of British carriers, they were not overly concerned and allowed the ships to moor within close proximity of one another. After all, at no time in history had carrier-launched aircraft been used to strike a heavily defended naval base.
The attack
The attack plan for Operation Judgment included a deceptive operation codenamed MB8. The British were successful in dividing the attention of the Italians by simultaneously maneuvering several convoys in a business-as-usual fashion all around the Mediterranean.
At the last moment possible, escort ships from the convoys were re-positioned to form the attack force concentrated on Illustrious and sailed to a position within striking range of Taranto. The unsuspecting Italians did not grasp the motive for increased convoy activity and were also unaware of the British carrier’s position. All the preparations were complete for the attack.
At 9pm on the evening of 11 November, two waves of Swordfishes took off from
HMS Illustrious. The first group was comprised of six planes, each armed with a torpedo, four planes each carried six bombs, two were fitted with four bombs and two flares.
The second wave followed 90 minutes later and consisted of nine planes, five with torpedoes and four with flares and bombs. One plane in the second wave lost its auxiliary fuel tank on the way and turned back with another delayed for 20 minutes due to a taxiing incident on deck.
Not all went as planned as the first wave unintentionally split up when four planes drifted off course while flying through thin clouds. This delayed their arrival at Taranto.
The main group in their slow and lowflying bombers commenced their attack at 10:58pm and encountered a heavy antiaircraft defence consisting of 101 AA guns and 193 machine guns.
Adding to the difficulty or reaching their targets were 27 barrage balloons positioned so that attacking aircraft would crash into the chains that anchored them to the ground. It could have been much worse however, because a recent storm with high winds had dislodged 63 such balloons that were previously stationed in the area. Augmenting the luck of the British was the lack of torpedo-netting around the ships, as many were removed for planned gunnery practice.
The two waves of bombers swarmed the unsuspecting Italian fleet. Flares from the planes illuminated the water providing guidance for the pilots as they maneuvered for torpedo runs. Simultaneously, Swordfishes armed with bombs attacked other ships and land-based oil tanks. Although the raid was small, it was furious. British attackers were flying so low the
Italians could not shoot at them effectively at lowered trajectory for fear of hitting their own ships. Nor could they make good use of their searchlights, which would most likely have blinded their own gunners.
The Conte di Cavour, an Italian battleship was sunk by a torpedo before the Captain received permission to beach the vessel. A second battleship, Duilio, was also torpedoed but saved from sinking by running aground. The newest battleship Littorio was hit with three torpedoes and was also run ashore, but in waters still so deep that her bow was submerged. A heavy cruiser and two destroyers were also damaged. Several fires were started on other ships, at the oil storage depot and in the dockyard.
The British achieved all this in 65 minutes with surprisingly light losses. Two planes were shot down and a two-man crew was captured. The other two crewmen were killed in action. A follow-up attack was planned for the next night but was foiled by bad weather.
With only three operational Italian battleships to contend with, the British Mediterranean Fleet could now afford to split into two battlegroups and conduct simultaneous operations in different regions. The rattled Italians pulled their major warships out of Taranto for a safer harbour at Naples, far to the north and were no longer a threat to the British convoys. They never again used Taranto as a major base for their battle fleet.
The attack attracted a Japanese military mission to Italy in early 1941, where officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy exchanged information about what lessons could be derived from the attack. And in late 1941, Japan decided it was time to demonstrate those lessons at Pearl Harbor.