Battle of Leyte Gulf
The Battle of Leyte Gulf is considered to be the world’s largest naval battle, far greater than Jutland in terms of ships deployed, tonnage lost, personnel involved and casualties. It was fought over two days in four phases over four locations following the June 1944 Battle of the Philippine Sea. The battle resulted in the annihilation of the Japanese carrier air groups and their trained replacement pilots.
The objective of the American forces across the Central and South-Western Pacific, was to recapture the Japanese occupied Philippines. It was critical for Japan to hold onto the Philippine Islands for the simple fact that they lay astride Japan’s communications with their southern resources region, particularly for oil. In strategic terms the loss of the island group would represent a defeat equal to that of an invasion of the (non-oil producing) home islands.
Japanese Imperial Headquarters were well aware they would be up against two powerful enemy fleets. Admiral William Halsey’s US Third Fleet (Task Force 38) comprised six fast battleships, eight fleet carriers, six light carriers, five heavy cruisers, nine light cruisers, 66 destroyers and support vessels. Their objective was to stand off Leyte and guard against anticipated forays by the Japanese Combined Fleet to disrupt the landings. Halsey reported to Admiral Nimitz in Hawaii, who gave him a supplementary order that his main mission was to destroy large components of the enemy’s fleet if the opportunity arose.
Totally separate and reporting directly to General Douglas Macarthur was Admiral Thomas Kinkaid’s Seventh Fleet of over 500 transports, supply vessels, landing ships and support craft responsible for carrying the US Sixth Army to Leyte and putting it ashore. Close-in air cover for the amphibious fleet and the Sixth Army’s beachhead was the 16 small-sized escort carriers, each carrying only 28 aircraft, plus several destroyer flotillas of Task Force 77.4, divided into three smaller flotillas. Responsible for shore bombardment was FT77.2 under Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf comprising six of America’s older battleships, four heavy and five light cruisers, plus 22 destroyers, which Kinkaid diverted to guard the exit of Surigao Strait, one of two potential direct routes into Leyte Gulf, the other being San Bernardino Strait, which exit was Halsey’s responsibility to safeguard. Japanese Navy Headquarters judged the best defence of the Philippines was to throw all their naval assets at the enemy beachhead to prevent it from being reinforced and issued Operation SHOGO on 17 October 1944 accordingly.
The plan called for two powerful naval fleets to simultaneously converge upon the US Seventh Fleet’s lightly defended amphibious landing vessels in Leyte Gulf. Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita’s Central
Force of five battleships (including the 65,000 tonne giants Yamato and Musashi), 10 heavy and two light cruisers, plus
United States of America
COMMANDERS
Admiral William Halsey
Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid
Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague
Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf
FORCES
8 fleet carriers • 9 light carriers • 18 escort carriers 12 battleships • 11 heavy cruisers • 17 light cruisers 169 destroyers • 43 destroyer escorts 29 submarines • 1,800 aircraft
CASUALTIES
1 light carrier • 2 escort carriers • 2 destroyers 1 destroyer escort • 3,500 sailors killed
of Ozawa’s carrier force, set off northwards in pursuit, leaving San Bernardino Strait completely unguarded. Meanwhile Kurita received the following order from Imperial Japanese Headquarters: ‘All forces will dash to the attack, trusting in divine assistance’. Kurita replied: ‘We will break into Leyte Gulf and fight to the last man!’
Battleship action in Surigao Strait
Without waiting for Admiral Shima’s support force, Nishimura led the vanguard of Southern Force into Surigao Strait in line-ahead in the darkness of 2.25am on 25 October. American destroyers at the Strait’s entrance savaged the line of ships with torpedoes, hitting the battleship Fuso causing her to catch fire and fall out of line. Listing badly the battleship capsized, releasing a large quantity of oil which ignited on the surface as she went down. An estimated 1,620 of her crew perished, many refusing to be rescued by American vessels. Next the battleship Yamashiro was hit amidships causing the ship to list to port, which forced the flooding of her magazines serving her two aft gun turrets. After the loss of Fuso, Nishimura bravely continued with Yamashiro and the heavy cruiser Mogami, signalling: ‘We proceed until annihilated. I have accomplished my mission’. Waiting for him at the Strait’s exit was Rear Admiral Oldendorf’s TF77.2 comprising the battleships California, Tennessee, West Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania, which had all been damaged or sunk at Pearl Harbor and subsequently returned to service, plus a sixth battleship, the modernised USS Mississippi; all armed with 14in or 16in guns.
In every way imaginable Oldendorf’s battle squadron represented a dramatically more powerful force than the Japanese could bring to bear, deployed in a classic battle line across the Surigao
Strait, crossing the ‘T’ of Nishimura’s oncoming ships, so that six battleships and eight cruisers offered a devastating concentration of firepower (see map).
West Virginia, California and Tennessee were using advanced targeting radar
(which the Japanese lacked) and were hitting Yamashiro with their first salvoes. Yamashiro fought back gallantly with her four forward and her two midship
14in guns, but with odds of six to one the battleship was soon ablaze causing an explosion in one of the centre turrets, after which she was hit by at least five more torpedoes. The heavy cruiser Mogami turned around and retreated, but was sunk later in the day by gunfire and carrierbased bombers. Yamashiro, now stricken, capsized and sank stern first taking Nishimura and 1,636 of her crew down with her. Admiral Shima’s force arrived too late to be of assistance and wisely retreated. Known as the Battle of Surigao Strait, the encounter was the last occasion in which battleships fought battleships.
Japanese victory in sight off Samar
Battleships Yamato, Nagato, Kongo and Haruna and the remaining eight heavy and light cruisers, plus the remaining 11 destroyers, emerged from the unguarded San Bernardino Strait unopposed at 6.01am on 25 October to wreak havoc amongst the American landing ships. Kurita’s sole opposition was Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague’s Task Force 77.4.3 (call sign Taffy 3) of six small escort carriers totalling 168 aircraft, plus seven destroyers, which was lying off Samar, the third largest island in the Philippines. Even so, none of Sprague’s ships had a gun over 5in calibre against the 33 x 14in, 16in and 18in calibre guns of Kurita’s four battleships, the 8in and 6in guns of his cruisers and the torpedoes of his destroyers. Plus, its worth mentioning that the displacement of the Yamato alone was greater than all of
Sprague’s ships combined! Nevertheless, the smaller US carrier’s fighters, divebombers and torpedo strike aircraft were undaunted. Sprague ordered the destroyers to lay smoke screens and for every operational aircraft to attack Kurita’s ships, even if not armed, so as to cause a maximum show of strength. By 9am American losses were the escort carrier Gambier Bay and three destroyers, while Kurita saw two of his heavy cruisers sunk; but just as Kurita was on the cusp of winning a great victory, he ordered his fleet to withdraw back through San Bernardino Strait! Sprague wrote: ‘At 9.25am my mind was occupied with dodging torpedoes when I hear a signalman yell, “God-dammit boys, they're getting away!” I could not believe my eyes, I had expected to be swimming by this time. However, it took a whole series of reports from circulating planes to convince my battle-numbed brain that the Japanese fleet was retiring’. Postwar Kurita explained that the aerial and destroyer torpedo attacks were so relentless that he thought he was facing the fleet carriers of Halsey’s TF38, bearing in mind that he had no information that the decoy plan had actually worked. Some hours later Sprague’s ships faced the first kamikaze attacks of the war, which sank the escort carrier St. Lo. All told Sprague lost five ships, 23 planes and 1,130 men killed.
Four carriers sunk
After the Japanese Northern (decoy) Force had attracted Halsey’s attention on 24 October, Admiral Ozawa sent what planes he had in an unsuccessful attack on Halsey’s carriers, resulting in half being shot down, while the rest, since the pilots were incapable of making carrier landings, continuing on to Luzon. Then in the afternoon US search planes located Ozawa’s carriers. Halsey, flying his flag in the battleship New Jersey, considered this the main threat, thus his primary target. After all, Halsey considered Kinkaid’s Seventh Fleet strong enough to take on what was perceived to be a much reduced Japanese fleet, but his sudden departure with the whole of TF38 leaving the San
Bernardino Strait unguarded still remains a controversial and hotly debated topic. At midnight Admiral Ozawa had only 29 aircraft left compared to TF38’s 10 fast carriers, bearing down on him the next day with over 680 fighters and bombers. From dawn to dusk on the 25 October, off Cape Engaño, the northernmost point of Luzon in the Philippines, Ozawa witnessed the sinking of his light carriers Zuiho, Chiyoda and Chitose, one light cruiser, three destroyers and the last survivor of the six fleet carriers that had bombed
Pearl Harbor, the Zuikaku. The two hybrid battleship-carriers Ise and Hyuga, having dodged torpedoes and bombs all day, survived to head home to Japan. In all Japanese losses were three battleships, four carriers, 10 cruisers and nine destroyers totalling 306,000 tonnes.
In the abortive attempt to hold the Philippines and following their crushing defeat at Leyte Gulf, what was left of Japanese air power, the bulk of the
Japanese fleet and the XIV Area Army were all destroyed, leaving the ineffective strategy of kamikaze attacks. The American return to the Philippines cut the Japanese supply line to the resources of the Indies and denied the home islands the means to wage effective warfare. Leyte Gulf was also the last big-gun fleet action in which a total of 21 battleships took part.