Backgrounder: emergency planning
As the government makes plans to cope with difficulties that might arise from a no-deal Brexit, two experts reflect on how previous administrations have sought to respond to everything from floods to nuclear attacks
Much postwar emergency planning by the British government had a military flavour, focused on the possibility of nuclear attack during the Cold War. But from the 1970s on, a system of planning for civil emergencies emerged. This was prompted in particular by the miners’ strike of 1972, when government assessments described how “industrial action could have the most serious and immediate effect on the life of the nation or threaten the health and safety of the community”.
Britain had been days away from a major loss of electricity supply, which would have brought much of modern life to a standstill, and there was a widespread feeling that the government and the civil service had been slow to respond. Instead of large, unwieldy emergency committees, resources were poured into a new, more streamlined Civil Contingencies Committee. The new system was called into action during terrorist incidents like the Iranian embassy siege in London in 1980, and terror attacks remain prominent in contingency planning today.
The end of the Cold War and broader optimism about global and national developments meant less attention was paid in the 1990s to government provision for emergency action. However, as the new century began, a series of unforeseen crises boosted emergency planning as a political priority, while reviving criticisms about the government being ‘unable to respond’ at times of acute public need.
First came the so-called ‘ fuel protests’ in September 2000, when refineries were blockaded by drivers demonstrating against high fuel taxes – again raising the prospect, as in the 1970s, of the country grinding to a halt. The government was taken by surprise at how swiftly the protests and their effects spread. The crisis became acute because of the threat to human life in hospitals that were running out of fuel, and expanded across many sectors as supermarkets ran out of supplies and schools closed.
This was followed, in October and November 2000, by major flooding – the kind of extreme weather event that has since become a regular concern. Hard on the heels of that, from February to October 2001, came the foot-and-mouth outbreak, for which the government had to co-ordinate extensive emergency measures to contain the disease, including the mass slaughter and incineration of animals and tight control of the movement of people.
In 2004, parliament passed the Civil Contingencies Act, which attempted to improve procedures for emergency government and establish smoother co-ordination with other agencies and the emergency services. The government has also had to learn to deal with other developments in modern society, such as the growth of new information sources and social media, which means that details about emergency situations often spread faster among the population than inside government offices.
Politicians sense, too, that public scrutiny of their actions has ramped up, especially during crisis situations. The penalty for being seen to fail to cope during emergencies has steadily grown. Planning for emergencies, then, has moved gradually from association with only the most extreme circumstances – in particular, nuclear attack – to a more regular test of political competence.
During the miners’ strike, Britain was days away from a major loss of electricity supply. There was a feeling the government had been slow to respond DR CATHERINE HADDON
In the Cold War era, the idea of emergency planning by the government was associated above all with the threat of Soviet nuclear attack. But there was constant debate inside Whitehall and among the public about whether the retreat of the government into regional underground bunkers was appropriate, and whether any kind of emergency response could match the devastation that would occur.
In 1980 a BBC Panorama episode, ‘If the Bomb Drops’, took apart the government’s civil defence strategy. It was considered a ‘good result’, for instance, if only 30 per cent of the UK population died in the event of nuclear war. The episode followed a scenario run at what was known as a ‘sub-regional government’ in a Humberside County Council bunker outside Hull. Essentially, everyone was caught by surprise – some of the public servants jumped when the alarm rang.
As the scenario progressed, it became clear that the ‘controller’ in charge was ruthless – advocating use of force against an unruly civilian population and the death penalty without due process for those caught committing a crime. Humberside was considered to be a ‘well-prepared’ authority. Regions such as North Wales, by contrast, did not have a bunker to hold a regional government. But even well-prepared bunkers would have been of little use, since it was projected that government might completely collapse after an attack, only existing at a ‘street or parish’ level.
There was sharp criticism from groups like the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) when the government released information pamphlets such as ‘Protect and Survive’ in the late 70s and early 80s. They were meant to show people how they could prepare for a nuclear attack. But it was ludicrous, said the critics, to suggest people could survive nuclear war simply by lying flat on the ground or building a shelter in their homes out of tables, doors and stuffed bin bags. CND used the opportunity to oppose nuclear weapons, publishing the counter-pamphlet ‘Protest and Survive’. They weren’t alone in their scepticism: Leeds and Hull councils produced their own leaflets mocking the government’s version.
Whitehall didn’t really believe it could show itself able to cope with such an overwhelming situation. Instead, it doubled down on its policy of mutually assured destruction. Why spend billions on nuclear shelters, ran the argument, when you could ensure your safety through the development of nuclear weapons, making the threat of a strike too risky for the enemy?
Yet planning for nuclear emergencies was not confined to military situations. The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant in 1986 showed the devastation that could be caused by radiation spreading from a nuclear power station many hundreds of miles away. That helped push the idea of the government making plans not only for events in the UK, but also for environmental disasters taking place abroad but directly affecting Britain and its people.
Critics said it was ludicrous for the government to suggest people could survive nuclear war by building a shelter out of tables JOSHUA MCMULLAN