Churchill ‘considered nuclear attack’ on the USSR
The statesman was prepared to deploy extreme measures against the forces of communism, new research reveals.
Winston Churchill contemplated deploying a nuclear attack against Soviet cities in 1951, according to the author of a new study.
A cache of New York Times Company documents, uncovered by University of Exeter historian Richard Toye, detail meetings held between the British politician and US newspaper executives throughout the 1940s and 50s. In April 1951, Churchill – who was then out of office, but had hopes of returning to government – met with New York Times general manager Julius Ochs Adler. In a lengthy conversation, he repeatedly returned to the subject of his plans should he be re-elected as prime minister.
Adler later recalled Churchill’s proposals for his approach to the Soviet Union: “If he could secure the agreement of [the US] government, [Churchill said] he would lay down certain conditions to Russia in the form of an ultimatum,” Adler wrote. “Upon their refusal, the Kremlin should be informed that, unless they reconsidered, we would atom-bomb one of 20 or 30 cities. Simultaneously, we should warn them it was imperative that the civilian population of each city be immediately evacuated. He believed that they would again refuse to consider our terms. Then we should bomb one of the targets, and if necessary, additional ones. Such panic would ensue, certainly by the third attack – not only among the Russian people but within the Kremlin – that our terms would be met.”
The potential for such hardline measures was not restricted to the Soviet Union, either. When questioned about his stance on communist China, Churchill embraced
Churchill made these remarks about pussia as late as 1951, when the Soviets were known to have their own nuclear arsenal
the possibility of adopting confrontational tactics such as “bombing bases in China, and troop concentrations north of the Yalu [river, dividing China from North Korea]”. Adler recalled that, as he listed such proposals, “[Churchill] readily assented, but when [the proposal of withdrawing from] Hong Kong was reached, he then said ‘yes, even Hong Kong, if necessary’”. Toye believes this is because, had the west bombed China, Hong Kong would have been indefensible against Chinese attack – and a temporary strategic withdrawal would have been needed.
This aggressive approach to China would have seen Britain diverge sharply from the less interventionist US president Harry Truman. The fact that Churchill was willing to distance himself from US policy suggests that he believed Britain still had the power to carve out its own place on the world stage.
Thinking the unthinkable
As Toye points out, Churchill’s comments on China are perhaps more surprising than those regarding the Soviet Union, about which he had earlier made similar remarks in private. Yet the fact he continued to make these remarks as late as 1951, when the Soviets were known to have developed a nuclear bomb, adds to their weight. And, despite the fact that Churchill didn’t adopt these strategies upon re-election as prime minister in October 1951, the proposals still reveal much about wider political attitudes. “Churchill did not bomb Russia or China when he returned to power – in fact, he launched into a failed attempt to pursue detente with the Soviet Union,” said Toye. “But his comments remind us that, with the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki a few years before, pre-emptive nuclear warfare was by no means ‘unthinkable’ at this time.”
They also, Toye argues, tell us something about Churchill himself. “The remarks show that, whereas we know an awful lot about Churchill’s views of the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany and a range of other nations, his attitude to China has hardly been explored at all. This is not to say that it was a fundamental reference point in his thinking at all times, but he certainly had views on China and was obliged to engage with Chinese issues at many times throughout his career.
“If these comments had become public at the time, there would have been a major scandal that might well have hurt Conservative election chances. He was either reckless, or had an extraordinary trust that what he had said would be kept confidential.”